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Abstract 
This dissertation explores the dynamics of capital. accumulation in Canada over the last 
four decades, including the long downturn from 197 4 to 1990, the subsequent slump, and 
the long upturn from 1993 to 2008. To this end, it examines in great detailmovements in 
the rate and.mass of profit as well as their reflection in the marginal efficiency of capital 
(MEC). Building upon the theoretical framework developed by Henryk Grossman and 
refined by Anwar Shaikh, it demonstrates that a downward sloping MEC accounts for the 
escalating severity of crises in the period 1974-1989 and that the "Great Canadian 
Slump" of 1990-92 was a result of a shrinking and subsequently stagnating mass of 
profit. The depth and breadth of the crisis of 1990-92 created an environment conducive 
to the re-establishment of accumulation beginning around 1993. As real wages and the 
price of machinery and equipment fell, the re-organisation of production was made 
possible. Profound industrial restructuring alongside the cheapening of transportation, 
telecommunication and business-computing equipment helped to consolidate just-in-time 
( JIT) production systems and the usage of information communication technologies 
(ICT) in industrial processes. In tum, these historical processes reversed the tendencies 
of decline: the rate and mass of profit began to grow alongside the MEC, business 
investment picked up, real wages rose and a long period of sustained accumulation got 
underway from 1993 to 2008.Furthermore, the consolidation of JIT and ICT profoundly 
changed the character of inventory control and investment. In particular, businesses were 
able to hold lower levels of inventory and these new technologies and organisational 
forms resulted in fewer disruptions along the supply chain. Hence, there was a reduction 
ii 
of fluctuations in inventory investment and thusthe overall pattern of economic 
growth. The last chapter argues that the aforementioned historical processes underlay the 
stability of Canada's banking sector during thecrisis of 2008-09. Conventionally, 
Canada's sound banking system is viewed as the principal factor underlying economic 
stability in this period. Contrary to this position, the chapter argues that the stability of 
the banks was a function of the long phase of stable capital accumulation preceding the 
crisis. 
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Panic of error is the death of progress; and love of truth is its safeguard. 1 
- Alfred North Whitehead 
Who holds his peace will by few cares be wrung; 
Ambushed the man lies underneath his tongue. 2 
- Johann Wolfgang von Goethe 
Introduction 
This dissertation examines the causes, character and consequences of economic growth in 
Canada over the last four decades from the standpoint ofclassical political economy .It 
comprises a collection of studies on capitalism in Canada covering the years 1974-2008. 
These studies scrutinise the dynamics of growth and change during the long period of 
instability beginning in the mid-1970s, followed by the long period of stability beginning 
after the "Great Canadian Slump" of the early 1990s. Along the way, it discusses 
important transformations in the Canadian economy throughout the 1980s, 1990s and 
2000s, including the introduction and proliferation of "just-in-time" production and 
distribution systems as well as information communication technologies. The story ends 
with the "Great Recession" of 2008-09 and the role of Canada's banking system and 
recent patterns of capital accumulation in determining the outcome of the crisis. The 
dissertationattempts to demonstrate how the "laws of motion" explored by Karl Marx in 
the three volumes of Capital, further developed by Henryk Grossman in The Law of 
Accumulation and Breakdown of the Capitalist Systemand elaborated by Anwar Shaikh 
over the last four decadesexpress themselves concretely within this period ofCanadian 
1 A. N. Whitehead, Modes of Thought (New York: The Free Press, 1966): 16. 
2 Johann Wolfgang von Goethe, West-Eastern Divan. Translated by Edward Dowden. (Toronto: J.M. Dent 
& Sons Ltd., 1914): 85. 
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economic history. To this end, it applies a model of "long waves" rooted in classical 
Marxist theory. 
The dissertation belongs to a tradition mostly lost to academia. In accordance with 
the Greek cosmological view, it takes seriously the idea that "the excellence of the citizen 
must be an excellence relative to the constitution ... But the good man is a man so called 
in virtue of a single absolute excellence."3 The dissertation is undoubtedly a shining 
example of bad citizenship, especially concerning its attitude towards economic 
orthodoxy. Optimal returns appear to occur on the margins of the economics profession. 
With regard to the latter, the work falls squarely in the Classical Marxist camp of 
heterodox economics and, as such, openly and self-consciously disregards the orthodox 
division of the academy into distinct disciplines that occurred towards the middle of the 
nineteenth century. 4 It is interdisciplinary and hence makes contributions to economic 
theory, history and policy. 
In the first part of this introduction, I briefly outline the distinct methodological 
approach followed in this dissertation. In the second section, I provide a brief overview of 
the chapters. The purpose of this is two-fold. To repeat what was said above, the 
dissertation is a collection of studies. As such, there is some overlap with regard to 
content and little "connective tissue" between the chapters. There is, however, a logical 
and chronological ordering involved. The purpose of the second section is to give the 
3 Aristotle, The Politics (London: Oxford University Press, 1958): 101-2. 
4 Eric R. Wolf, Europe and the People without History (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1982): 7-
19. 
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reader a sense of the content of the dissertation and to demonstrate how these chapters fit 
together. Let us now tum to the question of methodology. 
Methodology 
It would be impossible to understand capitalism's long and short-run dynamics 
without an understanding of the role of economic crisis in them. Indeed, the latter figures 
centrally in this dissertation. It is also a useful starting point for the discussion of the 
methodology employed in this dissertation. 
Makoto Itoh notes that two analytical approaches to crisis theory are open to 
Marxists. The first "is to treat the various strands of crisis theory ... as a toolbox from 
which concepts can be selectively employed to analyse historically specific instances of 
capitalist economic crisis" and "the second approach is to adopt one of the strands of 
Marxist crisis theory."5In the "toolbox" approach, capitalist development is seen as "a 
contradictory process prone to crises, the genesis, nature and outcome of which are 
historically contingent."6To be sure, from this standpoint no "law of crisis" can be 
"drawn across the history of capitalism." 7Ii1 other words, periods of stability or instability 
are treated as system paths that "are contingent on historically specific forces and 
balances of power."8Undoubtedly, the toolbox approach can offer significant empirical 
insights into the history of capitalist development, but often at the expense of theoretical 
clarity. 
5 Makoto Itoh and Costas Lapavitsas, Political Economy of Money and Finance (London: MacMillan Press, 
1999): 127. 
6Leo Panitch& Sam Gin din. Capitalist crises and the crisis this time.In L. Panitch, G. Albo, V, Chibber 
(Eds.) Socialist Register 2011: The Crisis This Time. (New York: Monthly Review Press, 2010): 5. 
7 Greg Albo, Sam Gindin & Leo Panitch, In and Out of Crisis: The Global Financial Meltdown and Left 
Alternatives (Oakland: PM Press): 39. 
8 Anwar Shaikh, "The Power of Profit." Social Research, 71, No. 2 (2004): 7. 
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The treatment of Marxism as toolbox rather than a science that has made definite 
discoveries about the laws of motion of capitalist development - its logical ordering and 
tendencies - arises from a neglect of methodological considerations. There is an 
unfortunate tendency in Marxism to rip this or that concept out of the context of the 
whole and then attempt to shed light on this or that empirical circumstance by means of 
that concept. This is contrary to Marx's method. In fact, it has much more in common 
with the ahistorical application of concepts in neoclassical economics, which attempts to 
externally relate concepts to particular historical situations. 
Itoh rightly points out that "the labour theory of value is the cornerstone of Marx's 
theoretical system in economics. "9 Value categories reflect essential social relationsthat 
exist acrossall epochs within capitalism. Therefore, these categories must be included in 
our analyses of capitalist periods and crisis. To be sure, we cannot pick and choose this or 
that concept or process b~cause it appears more useful than another in describing the 
phenomena of a particular historical period. Instead, we must start from the system of 
concepts as.a whole. As Marcuse notes,. "the notion of capitalism is no less than the three 
volumes of Capital."10In other words, Marx developed a system of interlinking concepts 
that do not fare well in isolation from the system of thought as a whole. Moreover, the 
concepts of Marx's Capital are historical concepts.McNally writes, 
The theoretical categories of Marx's value theory are . . . historical 
precipitates from the start. As a result, history does not need to be added to 
these categories; it is embedded in them. Unlike theories that begin with the 
asocial and ahistorical premises of neoclassical economics, Marxian value 
theory does not encounter history as an alien continent that must subsequently 
9 ltoh, Political Economy of Money and Finance, 33. 
10 Herbert Marcuse, Reason and Revolution (New York: Oxford University Press 1960): 159. 
4 
be conquered; it does not commence with a core theory that is inherently 
resistant to historicisation and the priority of social relations of production 
and reproduction. 11 
Because they are historical concepts, they presuppose and embody the totality of 
social relations of which they are a part. To put it differently, in order to capture the 
process of reality,these concepts arerelational. Alfred North Whitehead summarises this 
approach when he notes that "each fully realized fact has an infinitude of relations in the 
historic world ... The data for any one pulsation of actuality consist of the full content of 
the antecedent universe as it exists in relevance to that pulsation. "12Likewise, Marxist 
concepts belong to a systemof conceptsreflecting a definite order of reality and for this 
reason cannot be considered in isolation from one another. To be sure, we cannot pick 
and choose this or that concept or process because it appears more useful than another in 
describing phenomena. Instead, we must start from the system of concepts as a whole. 
We can choose to examine reality from the standpoint of a particular concept, but if we 
are to reproduce the concrete in thought, this concept must not be abstracted from its 
context. Relational· conc~pts are embedded in a system of concepts. Analysis of 
capitalism should always proceed by moving from the most important categories - e.g. 
value, surplus-value, composition of capital, etc. - to the historically contingent. For 
instance, some thinkers have argued that the Great Recession of 2008-09 was not rooted 
in problems of profitability. They point to high profits in the period immediately 
preceding the crash. However, high profits in 2006-07 do not preclude over-
11 David McNally, "From Fetishism to 'Shocked Disbelief: Economics, Dialectics and Value Theory." 
Historical Materialism, 20, No. 3 (2012): 9-23. 
12 Whitehead, Modes of Thought, 89. 
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accumulation as the underlying reasonfor the depth, breadth and persistence of the global 
crisis. From the standpoint of value theory, conjunctural high profits are entirely 
compatible with a long-run secular decline in profitability and systemic instability. For 
instance, George Cooper points out that "additional borrowing from whatever source 
will, all else unchanged, tend to boost corporate profits."13 For reasons like this, 
precluding problems of profitability first requires a close examination of indicators like 
the organic composition of capital and long-run movements in the rate and mass of profit 
in order to separate out long-run from short-run dynamics (the mass of profit in fact 
began toshrink in the U.S. in the. fourth quarter of 2006, a sign of overaccumulation as we 
will see in Chapter 1). 14 We are then in a better position to understand historic events like 
the Global Financial Crisis of the late 2000s. 
The Marxist system of concepts reflects the definite order of reality. From this 
perspective, social reality consists of essential and phenomenal social relations. In other 
words, the multitude of phenomena that confronts us in each epoch belie what is common 
across epochs; that is, the essential.". The error of the. toolbox approach .is to treat 
historically contingentevents with the same importance as more fundamental relations or 
even to the neglect of the latter. For Marx, capitalist social relations - as reflected in the 
categories developed in Capital of surplus-value, the organic composition of capital and 
so on - reflect essential social relationships at the highest level of importance. These 
categories are essential and they are also the least readily apparent. The power of 
13 George Cooper, The Origins of Financial Crises: Central Banks, Credit Bubbles and the Efficient Market 
Fallacy (New York: Vintage Books, 2008): 118. 
14 Bureau of Economic Analysis, "Table 6.16D. Corporate Profits by Industry, Domestic industries." 
Accessed December 31, 2012. http://www.bea.gov/ 
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abstraction must discover them, but this does not negate their actuality. The categories 
are both essential and real and as such have a bearing on the historical process. 
These same relations form the kernel of the capitalist system and cannot be 
considered except by reference to the system as a whole in its concrete totality. In other 
words, the same method that forces us to transcend the phenomena of everyday life to 
discover the abstract essential relations of capitalism - because of their relational 
character - forces us "back down" to examine the ways in which these abstract 
categories manifest themselves concretely through a series of mediations. This is Marx's 
famous double movement of ascent from the real concrete and the complex world as it 
appears to us initially to the abstract and simple categories, followed by the organisation 
of the system of concepts to correctly reflect its real ontological layering. The aim is to 
reproduce the concrete and complex in thought in a new ordered conceptual totality. In 
other words, theory must move methodically from the abstract categories discovered by 
Marx to the concrete historically-specific phenomena that confront us, including all of the 
mediations and transformations along the way. 15 In this regard, Henryk Grossman writes: 
The task of all science is to investigate and understand the given concrete 
totality of phenomena, their connection and their changes. The difficulty of 
this task is that phenomena do not directly coincide with the essence of 
things. Investigation into the essence is the prerequisite for understanding the 
world of appearances. If contrary to vulgar economy Marx wants to discover 
the "hidden essence" and the "inner connection" of economic reality . . . this 
does not mean that concrete appearances do not interest him. To the contrary! 
. . . Concrete appearances are for Marx not only important because they are 
the starting point and means for knowledge of the "real movement", but they 
15 Many of the ideas here are elaborated upon in Geoffrey McCormack. "Rezension von In and Out of 
Crisis."In Das Argument, in review. 
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themselves are what Marx wants to discover and understand m their 
connection at the end of the day. 16 
This dissertation belongs to the Classical Marxist methodological tradition. In 
other words, it rejects the toolbox approach and instead attempts to demonstrate how the 
"laws of motion" manifested themselves in Canada between 1974 and 2008. For, on the 
one hand, "as soon as the 'laws of development' come to be regarded as so abstract that 
they can no longer explain the actual process of concrete history," writes Mandel, "all 
that remains is a degenerate form of speculative socio-economic philosophy."17 On the 
other hand, this rigid holding apart of "theory" and "history" and the denial of the 
historical relevance of the "laws of development" can just as easily lead to vulgar 
empiricism, in which empirical reality is in no way related back to the fundamental 
dynamics of capitalist development. This dissertation attempts to bridge these two 
extremes by moving from the abstract value categories developed by Marx to the 
concrete historical phenomena with which we are confronted, taking into account how 
the former are modulated - but not eliminated or made less important - by historically 
specific transformations of the capitalist system and historically contingent events. In 
short, it attempts to grasp "the essence, together with its mediations to the appearance" 
and hence the "unity of abstract and concrete elements."18 Let us now turn to the chapter 
overview. 
16 Henryk Grossman, Aufsatze zur Krisentheorie (Frankfurt: Verlag Neue Kritik, 1971): 45. Translation 
from the original German by Geoffrey McCormack. 
17 Ernest Mandel, Late Capitalism (New York: Verso, 1978): 20. 
18 Mandel, Late Capitalism, 21. 
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Chapter Overview 
This dissertation argues that the long-run patterns of capital accumulation in 
Canada - including long periods of stability and instability- are fundamentally related to 
movements in profitability. Contrary to other Marxist approaches to long-run dynamics, 
however, the approach proposed in this work de-centers movements in the rate of profit 
in favour of shifts in the mass of profit and, in particular, how the latter are reflected in 
the fundamental driver of accumulation, namely, what Keynes called the "marginal 
efficiency of capital". Chapter 1 develops the theoretical framework for understanding 
the subject of this historical investigation; namely, the long period of economic instability 
between approximately 1974 and 1990, the economic crisis and depression of the early 
1990s as well as the long period of sustained capital accumulation and relative stability 
from about 1993 to 2008. In addition to providing the theoretical framework for 
understanding long periods of stability and instability, it outlines the theory of 
"overaccumulation" or "failed valorization" as well as that of the short-run dynamics of 
the business cycle. The discussion in this chapter informs the subsequent analysis in 
chapters 2, 3, 4 and 5, wherein the theory is further concretized in historical analysis. 
Chapter 2 examines the long period of economic instability in Canada from 
approximately 1974 to 1992. The analysis examines the long-run movements of the basic 
Marxist categories (rate of surplus-value, organic composition of capital, turnover time, 
mass of profit, etc.) and demonstrates how they manifest themselves concretely. Long-
run instability is shown to be a function of how movements in the mass of profit translate 
into a long-run downward sloping marginal efficiency of capital. In addition to an 
9 
analysis of the Marxist categories, the bulk of the chapter consists of a detailed and 
unique historical account of the "Great Canadian Slump" of approximately 1990-92. 
Contrary to the conventional view, which sees the crisis as being a result of central bank 
interest rate policy, I argue that it was in fact - and fundamentally - a crisis of 
"overaccumulation" or "failed valorization" in the sense that Henryk Grossman used 
those terms. To make my case, I assembled a vast amount of empirical data, both 
quantitative and qualitative. The end result is a very concrete analysis of those 
tumultuous years of the late 1980s and early 1990s. 
Chapter 3 picks up where the previous chapter left off. From 1993 to 2008 
accumulation in Canada was smooth and stable. The dips of 1995, 2001 and 2003 were 
shallow and too short to be classified as recessions. In fact, many economists were 
optimistic that prudent economic policies and increasingly sophisticated financial 
systems had effectively smoothed out the business cycle. 19I argue that the deep economic 
contraction of the early 1990s and subsequent economic stagnation set the stage for a 
renewal of capital accumulation and the long upturn of 1993-2008. As real wages and the 
price of machinery and equipment fell in the context of the recession, the re-organisation 
of production was made possible. Indeed, profound industrial restructuring alongside the 
cheapening of transportation, telecommunication and business-computing equipment 
helped to consolidate just-in-time production systems and the usage of information 
communication technologies in industrial processes. The results of these changes were 
increased profitability and lower overhead costs. In tum, these historical processes 
19Timothy Lane, "The Changing Face of Risk in the Global Financial System," BIS Central Bankers' 
Speeches, 19 May 2011, http://www.bis.org/review/rl 10520c.pdf. 
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reversed the tendencies of decline: the rate and mass of profit began to grow, a high 
average marginal efficiency of capital was established, business investment picked up, 
real wages rose and a long period of sustained capital accumulation got underway. 
Chapter 4 looks at the effects of recent transformations in the Canadian economy 
on the business cycle during the long period of stability examined in the preceding 
chapter. It argues that the consolidation of just-in-time production (JIT) and distribution 
systems, as well as information communication technologies (ICT) profoundly changed 
the character of inventory control and investment. In particular, owing to computerised 
JIT requisition and inventory management systems, businesses were content to hold 
lower levels of inventory. To be sure, JIT and JCT have contributed to stabilising the 
inventory investment environment by reducing both the level and therefore volume of 
investment required to meet the needs of production and distribution (this has manifested 
itself in lower inventory-to-shipment ratios), and an increasing ability to monitor, forecast 
and influence changes in demand. Hence, these new technologies and organisational 
forms resulted in fewer disruptions along the supply chain, which reduced fluctuations in 
inventory investment. Consequently, these transformations contributed to a smoothing 
out the inventory investment cycle and the overall pattern of economic growth in Canada. 
Chapter 5 investigates the historical processes that undergirded the stability of 
Canada's banking sector during the global financial crisis of 2008-09. It argues that the 
historical processes outlined in chapters 3 and 4 underlay the stability of Canada's 
banking sector during the global financial crisis of 2008-09. The conventional view 
identifies Canada's sound banking system as the principal factor underlying economic 
11 
stability in this period. Contrary to this position, the chapter argues that the stability of 
the banks was in fact a function of a long phase of stable capital accumulation preceding 
the Great Recession (1993-2008). In other words, it contends that the strength of the 
Canadian economy during the financial turmoil of the late 2000s was not a function of 
the stability of its banking system; rather, the stability of the banks was a function of the 
strength of the economy over the preceding fifteen-year period. The chapteraccomplishes 
this by theoretically and empirically "re-embedding" the banks in the historical dynamics 
of capital accumulation in Canada. Hence, it underlines the important theoretical-
empirical linkages between the stability of bank assets and the economic context in which 
they are situated. In particular, it demonstrates that a growing mass of profit in this period 
stabilized bank assets and kept the banks afloat during the worst of the financial crisis. 
This analysis stands in sharp contrast to other accounts of banking in the recent period, 
which fail to account for how the banks are embedded in the dynamicprocesses of capital 
accumulation. 20 
In the conclusion, th~ main threads of the dissertation are brought . .together, 
summarized and the politics implicit in the analysis is made explicit. 
20See e.g. Mario Seccareccia. "Financialization and the Transformation of Commercial Banking in 
Canada." (Ottawa: University of Ottawa, 2010). · 
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Capitalist history is always enacted upon a moving stage.21 
- Anwar Shaikh 
Chapter 1: The Theory of Long- and Short-run Dynamics 
This chapter develops the theoretical framework for understanding the long-run patterns 
of economic development in Canada, including the long downturn (197 4-1990), the 
subsequent slump (1990-1992) and the long upswing (1993-2008). It also offers a basis 
for comprehending the shorter economic cycles along these long· curves. These patterns 
will be examined in great historical detail in the chapters to follow. The purpose of this 
chapter is to grasp theoretically the long- and short-run dynamics of capital accumulation 
in contemporary capitalism. In later chapters, we will see how these have been ·modified 
by recent trcµlsformations in the Canadian economy. As discussed in the methodological 
introduction to this work, we will proceed from the abstract to the concrete. In this case, 
this means moving from the long-run to the short-run dynamics of accumulation, 
followed by their relation and how each is modulated by the historically specific features 
of contemporary capitalism in future chapters. 
There are many approaches to analysing periods of long-run stability and ·chronic 
instability in capitalism. The field of study has a long, rich history of debate from Hyde 
Clarke to Anwar Shaikh.22 Whereas certain theories rely on social structures, world 
systems, the rise and fall of modes of regulation and regimes of accumulation or "up-and-
down" movements in the rate of profit, this chapter draws on the work of Henryk 
21 Anwar M. Shaikh, "The First Great Depression of the 21st Century". In Leo Panitch, Greg Albo and 
VivekChibber (Eds.) Socialist Register 2011. (London: Merlin Press, 2010): 45. 
22 Hyde Clarke, "Physical Economy", Railway Register, 1847; Anwar M. Shaikh, "The First Great 
Depression of the 21st Century". In Leo Panitch, Greg Albo and VivekChibber (Eds.) Socialist Register 
2011. (London: Merlin Press, 2010): 44-63. 
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Grossman and its subsequent development by Anwar Shaikh to explain long periods of 
stability and instability, but it does not strictly follow it.23 
In brief, it argues that these long periods of stability and instability are caused by 
long-run movements in the aggregate mass of profit and, importantly, how these 
movements manifest themselves in changes in the marginal efficiency of capital (MEC, 
to be discussed below). This approach identifies three "moments" in the long-run 
dynamics of accumulation, governed by movements in the mass of profit and MEC. 
First, it highlights that both phases of stability and instability occur along the same 
"curve" of accumulation. The extremes of strong growth, on the one hand, and deep 
slump, on the other, represent opposite poles of a continuum. In the "early" phase of 
accumulation, wide-ranging stability prevails. In the "late" phase of accumulation, the 
capitalist mode of production is characterised by increasing instability. From this 
perspective, there is no sharp division between phases of instability and those of stability. 
Finally, the "late" phase of accumulation is punctuated by volatility and crisis once the 
mass of profit stops growing, or when the MEC = 0. This is the point of absolute 
overaccumulation. Here, stagnation can "sneak" into existence or can be ushered in 
suddenly by a violent crisis, depending on historical specificities. Absolute 
overaccumulation can cause instability for a number of years. The early 1990s slump in 
23 S. Bowles, D. Gordon & T. Weisskopf, After the Wasteland: Democratic Economy for the Year 2000. 
(Armonk: M. E. Sharpe, 1990); I. Wallerstein, World-Systems Analysis: An Introduction. (Durham: Duke 
University Press, 2004); M. Aglietta, A Theory of Capitalist Regulation: The US Experience. (New York: 
Verso, 1979); A. Lipietz, Mirages and Miracles.(London: Verso, 1987); Ernest Mandel, Late Capitalism. 
(New York: Verso, 1993); Henryk Grossman, The Law of Accumulation and the Breakdown of the 
Capitalist System: Being also a theory of crises. (London: Pluto Press, 1992); A. Shaikh, "The Falling Rate 
of Profit as the Cause of Long Waves: Theory and Empirical Evidence." In Kleinknecht, A., Mandel, E. 
&Wallerstein, I. (Eds.), New Findings in Long Wave Research.(London: Macmillan Press, 1992). 
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Canada is a case in point (we will explore this in Chapter 2). In the intervening period 
between the "early" phase and the point of absolute overaccumulation, the growth rate of 
the mass of profit and the MEC approach zero. As the growth rate declines, endogenous 
and exogenous shocks become increasingly disruptive, and crises become deeper and 
longer. In Chapter 2, we will see how the period between the mid-1970s and the crisis of 
absolute overaccumulation (1988-1992) was a period during which the growth rate of the 
mass of profit was slowing and the MEC was approaching zero, thereby causing 
increasing instability. The crisis of absolute overaccumulation of the early 1990s 
subsequently helped to usher in a long period of stability (the subject of Chapter 3 ). 
This approach is at odds with theories of accumulation that treat movements in 
the rate of profit on total investment as the chief determinant of economic growth and 
stability. Long-run movements in the mass of profit - and more specifically, the MEC -
demonstrate significantly different patterns of economic development from those that 
arise from the plethora of measures available for the rate of profit. To be sure, the rate of 
profit does not govern accumulation directly, despite the coincidence of their patterns 
empirically. Happenstance, after all, is not determination. Hence, when Andrew Kliman 
in his recent book The Failure of Capitalist Productionpoints out that his new and 
improved measure for the rate of profit is strongly correlated with investment and 
therefore accumulation patterns, this is not surprising. The coincidence of the rate of 
profit and the rate of accumulation is related to how these are measured. The former is 
measured by profit over capital stock of the previous year. The latter is the rate of change 
in the capital stock. Given that capital stock grows owing to profit and that firms invest a 
15 
portion of this in the capital stock, it is hardly surprising that the growth of the capital 
stock should coincide with the rate of profit. The latter, after all, is an index of profit to 
capital stock. The rate of accumulation, on the other hand, is an index of the addition of 
new machinery, equipment, buildings and structures to the existing capital stock. Since 
the addition will always be a portion of total profits, one would expect a coincidence in 
patterns. However, this does not mean that there is a relationship of determination, no 
matter how strong the correlation. As we will see below, investment, and therefore 
accumulation, too, is a function of the marginal efficiency of capital (MEC), not the rate 
of profit directly. 
Moreover, many theories that rely on the rate of profit have an unhelpful 
"stagnationist"bias when applied historically. Andrew Kliman and Murray Smith are 
good examples of this. In their respective work, they attempt to demonstrate a long-run 
decline in the rate of profit. They have found innovative ways to do this. For instance, 
Smith adds what he calls socially necessary unproductive labour (SNUL) to the 
numerator for the organic composition of capital and seeks· to argue that increasing 
unproductive activities in the economy have contributed to the rising organic composition 
of capital.24Kliman, on the other hand, uses historical-cost capital stock (instead of the 
standard current-cost capital stock) to measure the denominator for the rate of profit. This 
produces a notably different trend in the latter.25 In particular, whereas others see a 
recovery in the profit rate after 1982, Smith and Kliman see the continuation of a secular 
24 M. Smith, Global Capitalism in Crisis: Karl Marx & the Decay of the Profit System. (Black Point: 
Femwood, 2010). 
25 A. Kliman, The Failure of Capitalist Production: Underlying Causes of the Great Recession (London: 
Pluto Press, 2012): 76. 
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decline. As a result, they see contemporary capitalism as inherently unstable and 
therefore look to external stimuli as the cause of growth in advanced capitalist 
countries.26For example, Murray Smith sees ballooning credit as the main impetus to 
growth in Canada in the 1990s.27 Similarly, Kliman believes the U.S. economy has been 
more or less stagnating since the 1970s. For him, economic growth up until the Great 
Recession was being driven by a series bubbles, first in the stock market and later in the 
housing sector.28The error of these thinkers lies in relating the long run movements in the 
rate of profit to capitalist reproduction in a direct way. For instance, after demonstrating a 
secular decline in the rate of profit since the 1970s, Kliman attempts to relate this decline 
to the current global slump. He writes that "the most obvious explanation [for the Great 
Recession of 2007-09], and therefore the explanation that would seem most plausible, is 
that ... the persistent fall in the rate of profit produced a persistent fall in the rate of 
capital accumulation and ... the fall in the rate of accumulation led in turn to"instability.29 
The most obvious explanation, however, is not always the most plausible. Certainly, 
before the Copernican Revolution, the geocentric astronomical model in natural sciences 
would have seemed the most obvious explanation for the movement of the heavenly 
bodies. This does not make it correct. Indeed, Grossman emphasized the fact that 
accumulation (though not the rate of accumulation) accelerates despite a falling rate of 
profit. This occurs "because the scope of accumulation expands not in proportion to the 
26Kliman, The Failure of Capitalist Production; R. Brenner, The Boom and the Bubble: The US in the 
World Economy. (New York: Verso, 2002). 
27 Smith, Global Capitalism in Crisis 
28Kliman, The Failure of Capitalist Production 
29Kliman, The Failure of Capitalist Production, 74. 
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level of profitability, but m proportion to the weight of the already accumulated 
capital. "30 
As will become increasingly clear from the analysis to follow, re-focusing our 
attention on the mass of profit and - more specifically - the MEC as the key determinant 
for stable reproduction precludes the stagnationist bias of thinkers like Smith and Kliman, 
especially with regard to empirical measurements of capitalist stability.From this 
perspective, one can have long-run stability despite a falling rate of profit. Unfortunately, 
as LefterisTsoulfidis points out, the "causal relationship between the rate profit and the 
mass of net profits . . . is usually lost in the writings of many modem Marxist 
economists."31 I will elaborate on this relationship in more detail below. The discussion 
of the relationship between the rate and mass of profit as well as the marginal efficiency 
of capital will form the basis of the theory of the long-run dynamics undergirding this 
dissertation. 
Like theories of long-run stability and instability, business cycle theory, too, has a 
long. history. To name but a few_ an~lytical . approaches·. that have emerged in. the 
economics profession, there is Hayek's theory of monetary overinvestment (resulting 
from an unstable supply of bank credit), Schumpeter's cyclical real growth approach 
(originating from surges of innovation), Friedman and Schwartz's theory of sequential 
monetary shocks (in which both consumption and investment react to monetary growth 
rates) and Minsky's disequilibrium theory of investment and financial instability (driven 
30 Henryk Grossman. The Law of Accumulation and the Breakdown of the Capitalist System: Being also a 
theory of crises. (London: Pluto Press, 1992): 74. 
31 LefterisTsoulfidis, Competing Schools of Economic Thought. (New York: Springer, 2010): 119. 
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by profitability expectations and eventual financial fragility). 32 The latter theoretical 
framework was deployed by Kindle berger in his famous historical work on the subject. 33 
To explain the short-run dynamics of capital accumulation, this chapter deploys 
the theory of the business cycle developed by Anwar Shaikh. 34 In short, it argues that 
random endogenous shocks spur excess demand, increased profitability and hence 
augmented investment. Since, in this context, profits from the previous period are 
insufficient to meet current investment requirements, credit must fuel growing 
investment. It is the growth of the resulting debt burden that objectively limits the 
upswing. In other words, internal profitability drives the cycle up, and the resulting debt 
burden drags it down. We will examine this theory more closely below. The upshot is 
that the forces driving the business cycle are different from the long-run dynamics 
determining the MEC. Yet they intersect in important ways. We shall explore this 
intersection below. 
The first section of this chapter reviews the theory of overaccumulation, or failed 
valorisatioh, as first advanced by Henryk Grossman . and later developed· by Anwar 
Shaikh. It examines the long-run dynamics of capital accumulation and contests the 
commonplace reading of Grossman that suggests his theory points to a "final collapse" of 
the capitalist system with no room for the role and effect of contending class forces. 
Furthermore, it enriches our understanding of this thinker by making available in English 
32Zarnowitz, Victor. "Recent Work on Business Cycles in Historical Perspective: A Review of Theories 
and Evidence." Journal of Economic Literature 23, no. 2 (June 1985): 523-80. 
33 C. P. Kindleberger.& R. Aliber. Manias, Panics, and Crashes: A Hist01y of Financial Crises. (Hoboken, 
New Jersey: John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 2005). 
34A. Shaikh, "Accumulation, Finance, and Effective Demand in Marx, Keynes and Kalecki." In 
WilliSemmler (Ed.) Financial Dynamics and Business Cycles: New Prospects. (Armonk, New York: M.E. 
Sharpe, 1989). 
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important selections from his magnum opus and his private correspondence (especially 
his work on the relationship between the dynamics of accumulation and wage 
movements). This section highlights the need to circumvent (partially at least) the debate 
about the rate of profit as it concerns crisis formation, and to focus instead on the growth 
rateof the mass of profit and the marginal efficiency of capital (MEC) in the development 
of crises. Finally, it examines how crises of absolute overaccumulation unfold both 
chronologically and across sectors as well as how they manifest themselves as crises of 
disproportionality and overproduction. To be sure, this dissertation falls squarely in the 
overaccumulation school insofar as the latter provides the framework for understanding 
long periods of instability and crises fundamentally bound up with capital accumulation. 
It rejects the underconsumption, disproportionality and wage-push profit squeeze 
accounts of crisis insofar as they seek to provide a general theory of instability and crisis 
in this sense. The latter will not be dealt with in this thesis. For treatments of these 
schools, see Kliman, Sweezy, Brenner and Webber and Rigby.35 Within the 
overaccumulation school, this dissertation most closely follows the work of Grossman. 
Anwar Shaikh, as the foremost contemporary theorist to build upon Grossman's work, 
also figures prominently in the dissertation. The second section of this chapter examines 
the theory of the business cycle developed by Anwar Shaikh and its relationship to the 
long-run tendencies of capitalist development. Future chapters will scrutinise how recent 
35 Andrew Kliman, The Failure of Capitalist Production: The Underlying Causes of the Great Recession. 
(Pluto Press, 2011), pp. 151-180; Paul M. Sweezy, The Theory of Capitalist Development: Principles of 
Marxian Political Economy. (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1970), pp. 156-162; Robert Brenner, The 
Economics of Global Turbulence. (New York: Verso, 2006), pp. 13-26; Michael J. Webber and David L. 
Rigby, The Golden Age Illusion: Rethinking Postwar Capitalism. (New York: The Guilford Press, 1996), 
pp. 154-58. 
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developments in technology, production and distribution have modulated the short- and 
long-run dynamics of capital accumulation. Let us now proceed to our examination of the 
basic theory informing this dissertation. 
Theory 
Capitalism is a contradictory and crisis-ridden system. To account for the oft-
occurring expansions and contractions of the economy, mainstream economists 
developed business cycletheory. Many economists have studied the phenomenon of the 
business cycle, including Goodwin, Phillips, Kalecki and Samuelson, to name but a few. 
Within this discipline, the recessionary phase of the business cycle is defined as a longer 
or shorter interlude in which real Gross National Product (GNP) grows negatively.36 
However, the duration and depth of recessions vary. Indeed, economists make a 
distinction between the business cycle and the growth cycle. Whereas the business cycle 
involves both an expansion and a contraction, the growth cycle is characterised by fast 
followed by slow growth. In other words, the growth cycle does not involve a 
contractionary phase. 37 As we will see further below, the character of these cycles -
whether "business" or "growth" - are internally related to both the long-run dynamics of 
accumulation as well as historically-specific characteristics of the particular period of 
capitalism in which they occur. 
To avoid a mechanical reading of these cycles, when continental European 
economists study phases of accumulation and contraction they prefer to speak of 
36 Paul A. Samuelson and William D. Nordhaus, Economics, 7th ed. (Boston: McGraw-Hill Irwin, 2001), 
4 78, 761. The standard measure of a recession is two negative quarters of economic growth. 
37
"Growth Cycles."In Glossary of Statistical Terms. Organisation for Economic Co-operation and 
Development, 2007, p. 351. 
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conjunctures. Conjunctural analysis highlights the dynamic character of capitalist 
accumulation, and this often appears to be more amenable to the varying contours and 
features of the trade cycle. Some heterodox economists have taken this dynamism to 
mean that each economic contraction or slowdown is historically contingent. For 
instance, Panitch and Gindin write that "capitalist development is a contradictory process 
prone to crises, the genesis, nature and outcome of which are historically 
contingent."38Contrary to this view, I hope to demonstrate that capitalism admits of a 
dynamic regularity.To put it differently, there are cyclical movements built into the 
system, but these cycles exist alongside a powerful, immanent and recurrent tendency for 
capitalist social reproduction to breakdown altogether. This immanent tendency results in 
a sometimes descending, sometimes ascending "curve" of capitalist development (what I 
shall refer to below as the "late" and "early" phases of capital accumulation, 
respectively). Or, put differently, capitalism goes through long periods of instability and 
stability. These internal rhythms are then "modulated by conjunctural factors and specific 
historical events."39 To be sure, from this perspective, capitalism has a "logic" that exists. 
across periods. Analysis must demonstrate how this logic manifests itself in particular 
times and particular places. This does not mean, however, that there is no place for 
historical contingency or random events. It is the way these different processes relate that 
produces concrete historical outcomes. 
38Leo Panitch and Sam Gidnin, "Capitalist Crises and the Crisis this Time". In Leo Panitch, Greg Albo and 
VivekChibber (Eds.) Socialist Register 2011. (London: Merlin Press, 2010): 5. 
39 Anwar Shaikh, "The First Great Depression of the 21st Century", 44. 
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All economic crises m capitalism belong to the same genus insofar as each 
interrupts - or is an interruption of - the process of accumulation in some way.40 The 
investment cycle is an oft-occurring species of crisis.41 This cycle takes two forms 
readily acknowledged by mainstream economists; namely, the inventory investment cycle 
and the fixed investment cycle.42 Fundamentally, these cycles arise from the turbulent, 
competitive and unplanned character of capitalism. Indeed, capitalism is characterized by 
constant mismatches between supply and demand.43 A full account of these cycles will be 
provided in the second part of this chapter. 
Despite the erratic, unplanned character of accumulation and the investment 
cycles that arise from it, capitalism has a remarkable ability to generate long periods of 
relative stability. In these periods, the economy goes through growth cycles or business 
cycles with short and shallow recessions. 44 I will discuss the theory behind these periods 
in the section that follows. For now, it is enough to note that capitalism in Canada 
developed on such an ascending curve from 1993 to 2008. This is the subject of Chapter 
3. In order to understand how this long ·period of stability was possible, however, we 
must first examine another species of crisis inextricably woven into the very fabric of 
capitalist accumulation itself- the crisis of overaccumulation.45We shall see that this type 
40Leo Panitch and Sam Gindin. "Capitalist Crises and the Crisis this Time", 4; P. Mattick, Marx and 
Keynes: The Limits of the Mixed Economy. (London: Merlin Press, 1980): 75. 
41 David McNally, Global Slump (Oakland, CA: PM Press, 2011): 66. 
42 Jacob J. Van Duijn, The Long Wave in Economic Life (London: George Allen &Unwin Ltd., 1983): 8-15. 
Schumpeter called these the Kitchin and Juglar cycles, respectively; after the persons who discovered them. 
43 A full account of these cycles is beyond the scope of this chapter. 
44 Mandel observes, but does not theorizethis fact in Late Capitalism. , 
45 Henryk Grossman uses the terms overaccumulation and failed valorization to denote the same process. 
Whereas the former emphasises that too much capital has been accumulated, the latter emphasises that not 
enough surplus-value has been produced relative to constant capital to continue accumulation at a given 
rate. 
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of crisis is intimately bound up with the long-run tendencies that make long periods of 
stability and instability possible. To this end, we turn to the foundational work of Henryk 
Grossman on the topic. 
Henryk Grossman 
Grossman's chief work has been interpreted in two ways. An advocate of the first 
and (until recently) most popular interpretation, Anton Pannekoek, believed that 
Grossman sought to demonstrate that capitalism would automatically and "for purely 
economic reasons" reach the point of final collapse.46 Complementing this view, he 
suggested that Grossman dismissed "human intervention" in the process of social 
transformation. 47 
The second (admittedly less common and less dramatic) interpretation suggests 
that Grossman developed more of a "cyclical" model of capitalist development - one 
where crises recur - and that "human intervention" in both the movement of wages and 
political strife are important components of this process. Grossman's award-winning 
biographer., Rick Kuhn;, writes that his ."breakdown tendency takes the form of recurrent 
economic crises ... definitely not a unidirectional path to final collapse."48 Moreover, in a 
letter to a colleague in the U.S., Grossman writes that "the idea is foreign to me that 
capitalism must collapse 'of itself or 'automatically,' as Hilferding and other socialists 
... argue against my book."49Furthermore, in his chief economic work he writes that 
"despite its objectively given necessity, breakdown is in great measure capable of being 
46 A. Pannekoek, "The Theory of the Collapse of Capitalism.:' Captial& Class 1, no. 1 (1977): 62. 
47Pannekoek, "The Theory of the Collapse of Capitalism", 62. 
48 Rick Kuhn, "Economic crisis, Henryk Grossman and the Responsibility of Socialists", Historical 
Materialism 17 (2009): 7. 
49 Henryk Grossman. "Letter to Paul Mattick." June 21 1931 (Translated by G. McCormack) 
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influenced by the living forces of the struggling classes and allows a certain space for the 
active intervention of the classes. ,,so It is this second, dynamic interpretation of 
Grossman's work that informs the theoretical discussion in this chapter. 
In addition to the caricatures of Grossman as a "final collapse" theorist, there are 
a number of specific criticisms that have been made of his breakdown theory. In 
Anglophone academia, the principal critiques were made by Paul Sweezy in the early 
1940s and Howard and King in the late 1980s.51 It should be noted, however, that these 
criticisms began circulating well before the publication of the first abridged English 
translation of Grossman's The Law of Accumulation and Breakdown of the Capitalist 
System in 1992. 52 In other words, they began circulating before Grossman could to some 
extent "speak for himself' to English-speaking audiences. In what follows, I will address 
each of these criticisms in turn. I will show that they are based on invalid caricatures of 
Grossman's nuanced thought. 
To begin, Sweezy suggests that Grossman's theory of breakdown is somehow 
based .upon Bauer's reproduction scheme. Sweezy rightly. suggests that. "to take any 
particular, and necessarily arbitrary, scheme and assume that it faithfully represents the 
essentials of the real process of capital accumulation is to invite theoretical disaster."53 
Nevertheless, we need not take this criticism seriously. Grossman makes perfectly clear 
50 Henryk Grossman, Das Akkumulations- und Zusammenbruchsgesetz des 
kapitalistischen Systems. (Frankfurt: Verlag Neue Kritik,1970): 601-2 (Selectiontranslatedby G. 
McCormack) 
51 Paul M. Sweezy, The Theory of Capitalist Development: Principles of Marxian Political Economy. (New 
York: Monthly Review Press, 1970) and M. C. Howard and J. E. King, "Henryk Grossman and the 
Breakdown of Capitalism."Science & Society 52, No. 3 (Fall 1988): 290-309. 
52 Henryk Grossmann, The Law of Accumulation and Breakdown of the Capitalist System: Being Also a 
Theory of Crises. Translated by JairusBanaji.(London: Pluto Press, 1992). 
53Sweezy, The Theory of Capitalist Development, p. 211. 
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that he merely uses Bauer's reproduction scheme as a foil to demonstrate the breakdown 
tendency. In fact, he is critical of the empirical validity of Bauer's claims regarding, for 
example, the level of the organic composition of capital. Around 1930, he wrote that 
"Bauer's numerical example, with its unusually low organic composition is not a 
reflection of contemporary capitalism but expresses the low organic composition under 
capitalism in its early phases ... I demonstrated my proof under conditions dictated by 0. 
Bauer."54 ·In a letter to Paul Mattick in 1931, Grossman similarly and more explicitly 
tries to clear up the confusion regarding his usage of Bauer's scheme of reproduction: 
I did not want to give the impression that I derive the breakdown tendency 
from Bauer's scheme. Indeed, I emphasized in the book that Bauer's scheme 
is unrealistic. That position is a direct implication of my methodological 
piece on the 'Plan for Capital'; Bauer makes unrealistic, false assumptions 
and I just wanted to pursue his argument ad absurdum ... Bauer's scheme is 
insufficient on many grounds ... I wanted to demonstrate that the result of 
even this, his mistaken scheme, is breakdown and not equilibrium. I do not 
want, however, to identify myself with Bauer's scheme under any 
. 55 
circumstances. 
As is clear from Grossman's statements above, Sweezy's criticism of the latter on these 
grounds ·is. fundamentally incorrect. 
In addition to the above criticism, Sweezy argues that Grossman's theory of 
breakdown is internally inconsistent on the basis of his restrictive and unrealistic 
assumptions. I will reproduce his criticism here, despite its faulty assumption that 
Grossman's argument rests upon Bauer's reproduction scheme, because it highlights 
54 Henryk Grossman, "Notes on Alfred Braunthal's review" (circa 1930). 
http://www.marxists.org/archive/ grossman/ 1929/breakdown/braunthal.htm 
55 Henryk Grossman, "Grossman to Paul Mattick Sr, June 21st, 1931." 
http://www.marxists.org/archive/ grossman/ 1931 /0621.htm 
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problems in Sweezy' s own thinking about the driver of technological change m 
capitalism: 
Under almost any circumstances, the assumption that constant capital grows 
twice as rapidly as variable capital seems highly unrealistic. But it is nothing 
short of fantastic when coupled with the assumption that the working force is 
growing at the enormous rate of 5 per cent per annum, for a rapid growth in 
the size of the working force is precisely the factor operating most strongly to 
keep down the ratio of constant to variable capital. This is so because an 
abundant labor supply prevents wages from rising and hence holds in check 
the tendency to substitute machinery for labor power. It follows that if we 
assume a very rapid growth in the labor supply it would only be reasonable to 
assume an increase in constant capital approximately equal to the increase in 
variable capital. On this hypothesis, the scheme can be expanded indefinitely 
... we should have to conclude that capitalism can go on for ever. 56 
In the above passage, Sweezy again fails to grasp Grossman's theory of 
accumulation and betrays faulty assumptions of his own. The inducement to invest in 
labour-displacing technological innovation is the result of pressure from wages for 
Sweezy, linked to the rate of accumulation, which he posits as the independent variable. 
He writes that "the price of labor power tends to rise under the stimulus of accumulation 
... and that this induces a continuous substitution of machines for labor power."57 This 
vision of technological change is inconsistent with that of Marx. For the latter, it is the 
competitive process itself - i.e. the warlike rivalry between capitalists - that drives 
technological innovation, not merely wage pressures.58 Technological innovation 
decreases unit costs relative to competitors while simultaneously increasing the 
56Sweezy, pp. 211-212. Emphasis added. 
57Sweezy, p. 212. 
58This misunderstanding undoubtedly stems from Sweezy' s uncritical adoption of the neoclassical quantity 
theory of competition; i.e. that competition is a function of the size and power of firms relative to the 
market in which they are situated, instead of Marx's vision of strategic competition. See John Weeks, "The 
Fallacy of Competition: Markets and the Movement of Capital." In JameeMoudud, Cyrus Bina and Patrick 
L. Mason (Eds.), Alternative Theories of Competition. (New York: Routledge, 2013), p. 22. 
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magnitude of output. To put this into Marxist terms, capitalist competition reduces the 
individual labour-time required for the production of commodities. If the individual 
capitalist can produce his or her commodities below the socially-necessary average 
labour-time, he or she has more room to set a competitive markup below the socially-
necessary average price of production and above his or her individual cost-price. 59 As a 
result, he or she can capture more market share than his or her rivals (this must be done in 
any case due to the increase of output and hence surplus-value spread over more 
commodities). Undoubtedly, this need not take place as a result of technological 
innovation. There can, for instance, be innovations in the organization of production 
alone. However, the latter two forms of innovation often go hand-in-hand. Workers can, 
of course, also be made to work harder and faster on a given technological and 
organizational level. Nevertheless, empirically, capitalist production is characterized by 
an increasipg organic composition of capital - and this is what counts. Grossman admits 
as much when he wrote in response to a critic that movements in the organic composition 
of capital "cannot be ·abstractly, deductively decided and has to be decided through 
empirical observation. Experience, indeed the experience· of more than one hundred 
years, teaches that the value of constant capital, thus also of the total capital, in relation to 
variable capital grows more quickly than variable."60 Of course, this should not be taken 
to mean that Grossman is saying that the organic composition of capital will always be at 
a high level in the advancedstages of capitalist development. Indeed, here he is pointing 
59Karl Marx, Capital, Vol. 1. (New York: Penguin, 1990): 433-5. In this volume, Marx has yet to introduce 
cost-price, but the basic mechanism can be translated into the language he adopts for these processes in the 
third volume of Capital. 
60 Grossman, "Notes on Helen Bauer's Review" (Circa 1930). 
http://www.marxists.org/archive/grossman/1929/breakdown/hbauer.htm 
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to the experience of the last hundred years in which the rate of growth of constant capital 
exceeds that of variable capital. This does not, however, speak to the particular level of 
the organic composition, which can vary according to historical circumstances (e.g. a 
lower composition of capital after a severe crisis in which capital-values are destroyed or 
even how changes in the value composition of capital eventually come to be reflected in 
the organic composition). In other words, Grossman is pointing to a tendency, not an 
invariant, unidirectional trend; i.e. one that works itself out through large swings that 
nevertheless observe regularity. 
With the above in mind, Sweezy is wrong on both counts of his Grossman 
critique. First, inter-capitalist competition in and of itself is sufficient to drive 
technological innovation. Technological innovation is not merely driven by 
accumulation-driven wage pressures. As a result, it is possible to have a rising organic 
composition of capital. Second, despite what Bauer's scheme says, movements in the 
organic composition of capital have to be examined empirically. After all, in Grossman's 
formulation, the organic composition of capital is seen ~s a variable among many.61 
Howard and King provide a number of challenges to Grossman's theory of 
breakdown as well. They hold that Grossman "failed completely to establish the necessity 
of capitalist breakdown."62 As above with Sweezy, I will address each of their criticisms 
in turn (of which there are a quite a few). First, the authors note that "critic after critic 
·objected that Otto Bauer's initial assumptions were too rigid realistically to model an 
61Grossman, The Law of Accumulation, p. 98. 
62 Unless otherwise stated, the quotations that follow in this section come from M. C. Howard and J.E. 
King, "Henryk Grossman and the Breakdown of Capitalism." Science & Society 52, No. 3 (Fall 1988): 290-
309. 
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actual capitalist economy." We have already dealt with this criticism above and will not 
pursue it further here. 
Second, the authors suggest that - in the face of an increasing organic 
composition of capital -"capitalists would adapt their behavior to avoid ruination, 
slowing the overall pace of accumulation and reducing the rate of increase of the organic 
composition of capital." Here we need only point out again that actual movements in the 
organic composition of capital must be gleaned empirically. 
Third, Howard and King suggest that "if the rate of exploitation is allowed to 
rise" there is nothing in Grossman's analysis to suggest that it would not offset the 
tendency to breakdown. We will see why this criticism is incorrect below in our 
treatment of the dynamics of accumulation. In short, it can be shown that even if the rate 
of exploitation rises faster than the organic composition of capital, the rate of profit will 
still fall. We will return to this below. 
Fourth, the authors suggest that Grossman "treats the effects of technical change 
in cheapening the elements of both constant and variable capital as subsidiary factors 
which merely supply a 'correction' to the underlying forces leading to economic 
breakdown. But these effects are an inherent part of the process of capital accumulation." 
In other words, the authors criticize him for not including the factors that might lead to 
the cheapening of the constant capital component of the organic composition of capital, 
which would thereby contribute to capitalist stability. To be sure, they criticize him for 
not taking into consideration movements in the value composition of capital. This 
criticism is unwarranted on methodological grounds. Grossman is here dealing with the 
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organic composition of capital. Elsewhere, he notes the important distinction between the 
value composition of capital, the technical composition and the organic composition. 63 
Hence, he is aware of the ongoing process of the cheapening of the means of production. 
Indeed, in the section of his book on modifying countertendencies, he writes that 
"devaluation necessarily flows out of the mechanism of capital even in its ideal or normal 
c~mrse. It is a necessary consequence of continual improvements in technology, of the 
fact that labour time is the measure of exchange value ... It follows that the assumption of 
constant values has a purely provisional character."64 In other words, his model should 
be considered at a particular level of an analysis -i.e. from the standpoint of the organic 
composition of capital, not the value composition of capital. In any case, keeping in mind 
that the organic composition of capital is historically variable for Grossman, this problem 
resolves itself again at the empirical level. What were the actual movements of the 
organic composition of capital? 
Fifth, the authors argue that Grossman "should have explained why individual 
capitalists cease -to invest at a point where the rate· of profit is still healthily positive." 
Here the authors clearly miss Grossman's main theoretical point; i.e. that a fall in the rate 
of profit is insufficient grounds for crisis. Rather, a stagnating or shrinking mass of profit 
is for him the underlying cause of crises of overaccumulation or failed valorization. We 
will return to this point in great detail later, as this important distinction forms the 
theoretical kernel of this entire dissertation. We need not pursue the point further here. 
63Grossman, The Law of Accumulation and Breakdown of the Capitalist System, pp. 79-80. 
64Grossman, The Law, p. 156, emphasis added 
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Sixth, other criticisms by Howard and King include the fact that Grossman 
"glosses over the distinction between the different departments of the economy" and that 
he "assumes all commodities to sell at their labor values ... yet it is by no means self-
evident that this would leave his analysis unimpaired."Regarding the second point, it is 
not at all clear that the transformation of values into prices of production wouldin fact 
undermine the theory. The criticism remains undeveloped in their article and I shall not 
speculate here on what they were attempting to get at. On the first point, I would suggest 
that this treatment is unfair. Grossman raises department issues at several points 
throughout the book. For instance, he remarks that Rosa Luxemburg had misunderstood 
"the significance of Marx's methodological procedure. For who could ensure that 
accumulation takes place proportionally in the two departments? No such regulator exists 
under capitalism or can exist ... As a rule the actual process of accumulation is quite 
unequal in the various branches. "65 Although his mathematical model does not deal with 
the problem of the departments and is concerned to show the point of breakdown, the 
implicatiQI)S of this breakdown for the departments areperfectly compatible with the 
model at a lower level of analysis. Paul Mattick makes this point in his book Marx and 
Keynes, where the breakdown tendency leads to a realization crisis and a crisis of 
disproportionality of sorts: 
Because not enough[ surplus-value] has been produced, capital cannot expand 
at a rate which would allow for the full realization of what has been 
produced. The relative scarcity of surplus-labor in the production process 
appears as an absolute abundance of commodities in the circulation process 
and as the overproduction of capital. 66 
65Grossman, The Law, p. 119. 
66Paul Mattick, Marx & Keynes: The Limits of the Mixed Economy. (London: Merlin Press, 1980), p. 79. 
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We shall return to this problem in more detail below. It is sufficient here to point out that 
the departments figure centrally in the analysis, especially - but not exclusively - at a 
lower level of analysis. Why not exclusively? At the most basic level, the departments are 
presupposed in the very dual character of the commodity as a use-value and an exchange-
value. 
Seventh, the authors suggest that Grossman "paid no attention to the 
underconsumptionist and disproportionality strands in Marx's theory of crisis." This is 
not a fair assessment of Grossman either. Much of The Law of Accumulation and 
Breakdown was dedicated to combating the theory of underconsumption, and Grossman 
himself wrote his own tract on disproportionality crises in a separate work. 67 The same 
holds true for the criticism levelled against Grossman that he "misunderstood the 
Marxian notion of 'absolute over-production of capital,' which occurs when the reserve 
army of the unemployed has fallen to zero, so that further accumulation adds nothing to 
the production of surplus value." Grossman was clearly providing an alternative 
explanation using the same textual material. The criticis·m is invalid. 
Eighth, the authors argue that the rate of profit "must increase" if the cheapening 
of the means of production and consumer goods is taken into consideration. This, of 
course, is to consider the analysis from the standpoint of the value composition of capital, 
not the organic composition of capital. This distinction is important. Indeed, empirically 
there are clearly periods where the organic composition of capital rises and the rate of 
67Henryk Grossman, "The Theory of Economic Crises" ( 1922), 
http://www.marxists.org/archive/ grossman/ 1922/crises/index.htm 
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·profit falls. Grossman was certainly sensitive to these dynamics, as I have already shown 
above. 
Ninth, Howard and King suggest that Grossman "assumes that there is no 
difficulty in realizing all the surplus value that is produced." In particular, they suggest 
that loan capital is "set aside" and not "offset" by any investment. "Effective demand will 
therefore be insufficient to realize the total surplus value." Hence, they argue, Grossman 
is a "prisoner of Say's Law." This criticism is unwarranted on methodological grounds: 
he does not set out to analyze the credit system in detail. It figures into his analysis, but in 
a secondary way. Nevertheless, Grossman is implicitly critiquing Say's Law when he 
suggests that there is too little surplus value to purchase what has been produced in 
additional fixed and circulating capital, even after it is mediated by the credit system. As 
overaccumulation sets in, he writes, "the scale of production reaches a level where there 
is not enough surplus value to valorise the accumulated capital. The accumulation fund 
... shows a deficit ... which is initially covered by borrowings. This in turn reduces the 
total mass of available loan capital ... until ... the loan is completely exhausted." Finally, 
the crisis begins "because there is not enough surplus value to continue accumulation, 
even after borrowings. "68 Hence, Say's Law is broken - on a very fundamental level the 
proposition cannot be maintained - and Howard and King's criticism is shown to be 
invalid. We will examine this more closely below. 
Above we have seen that the existing criticisms of Grossman do not hold water. 
This concludes the section on the critiques of Grossman. Let us now turn to our 
68Grossman, The Law, p. 114. 
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discussion of accumulation and overaccumulation, the theoretical foundation for 
understanding long periods of stability and instability in capitalism. 
Accumulation and overaccumulation 
Capitalism is beset with a fundamental contradiction. On the one hand, capitalist 
stability is premised upon growth; on the other, growth itself is a source of instability. 
Capitalist accumulation itself begets crisis. Henryk Grossman calls this kind of 
disruption in the process of capital accumulation a crisis of overaccumulation or failed 
valorisation (das Versagen der Verwertung). Understanding this species of crisis is 
necessary to understanding long periods of capitalist stability and instability. In what 
follows, I explain the dynamics underlying this form of crisis with the help of Henryk 
Grossman's chief work, The Law of Accumulation and Breakdown of the Capitalist 
System: Being Also a Theory of Crisis (1929). 
Fundamentals 
Let us begin with the fundamentals. Marx notes that labour is "a condition of 
human existence which is. independent·· of all forms of society.'~69 Nevertheless, the 
specific form it takes in each particular historical epoch varies. In the capitalist epoch, the 
process of production has a dual character. 70 Marx saw this dual character as "crucial to 
an understanding of political economy."71 The dual character of capitalist production 
entails both a process for the production of commodities and "a valorisation process for 
obtaining profit." This duality of capitalist production informs the entire edifice of 
69 Karl Marx. Capital, Volume I. (New York: Penguin Books, 1990): 133 
70Grossman. The Law of Accumulation, 61. 
71 Marx, Capital, Volume 1, 132 
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Marx's Capital. This is clear in his reproduction schema, for instance, where the distinct 
use-values arising from the sectors responsible for means of production and means of 
consumption are taken to be central to capitalist reproduction. Indeed, as Grossman 
writes, the reproduction scheme( and therefore the dual character of labour and the 
commodities capitalism produces) "underlies the whole ana~ysis of the first volume as 
well as the other volumes of Marx's principal work (and not merely the chapter on 
reproduction in the second volume)."72 Nevertheless, despite the dual character of 
capitalist production, its essential driving force is the profit motive. Indeed, "the 
entrepreneur will only continue production and extend it further if it enables him to 
enlarge his profits."73To be sure, capitalist production produces both use-value and value. 
Yet it is the latter - in the form of profit - that drives the system forward. We return to 
this fundamental point below. 
Competition in capitalism is a "turbulent and inherently violent process" that is a 
lot like war. Market share is the "territory" and technical change is the "arms race." 74 In 
competition, businesses are compelled to seek out ways to secure market share from their 
competitors. The primary means of competition is the cheapening of commodities. For 
this reason, capitalists are forced to find ways to cut costs. To this end, they must invest a 
portion of their profit into research and development, new technologies, the expansion of 
production and so on. The upshot is that capitalists must accumulate capital to stay 
competitive. Capitalist production, therefore, "should never be depicted as something 
72 Henryk Grossman. "The Change in Marx's Original Plan for Capital and Its Causes. "Translated by 
Geoffrey McCormack.In Rick Kuhn (Ed.) Economic Studies of Henryk Grossman. (Leiden: Brill, 2014), 
emphasis added. 
73Grossman, The Law of Accumulation, 61. 
74Tsoulfidis, Competing Schools, 112. 
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that it is not, i.e. as production whose immediate purpose is consumption ... This would 
be to ignore completely its specific character."75 To be sure, the production of profit, and 
the transformation of a portion of this back into capital, i.e. accumulation, "is the 
immediate purpose and the determining motive of capitalist production."76That is to say, 
profit is both the motive for production and the source of accumulation. Moreover, as I 
will show below, the stability of the capitalist system as a whole depends upon 
accumulation. Without profit, however, this accumulation would be impossible. 
Here it is worth pausing for a moment to highlight the important linkage 
described above; i.e. that between competition and accumulation. The theory of 
competition informing this work profoundly - fundamentally - differs from the notion 
of'perfect competition" found in neoclassical textbooks as well as that of "imperfect 
competition" informing Post-Keynesian and some Marxist work (e.g. the Monthly 
Review School). In the neoclassical camp, the quantity theory of competition prevails. 
From this perspective, competition is understood to be a function of the number of firms 
competing and the size of the market for their homogenous commodity. Firms have 
perfect information and there are no entry or exit barriers within and between industries. 
As such, the degree of competition depends upon the number of firms competing relative 
to the size of the market. In this model, firms do not have pricing power; i.e. firms are 
price takers. Importantly, however, this vision of "perfect competition" cannot be made 
consistent with "endogenous technological progress involving fixed investment."77This is 
75 Marx, Capital, Volume. 3 (New York: Penguin Books, 1993): 351-2 
76 Marx, Capital, Volume. 3, 351-2 
77 J. K. Moudud, "The hidden history of competition and its implications." In J. K. Moudud, Cyrus Bina 
and Patrick L. Mason (Eds.).Alternative Theories of Competition (New York: Routledge): 47. 
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for two reasons: first, because firms are miniscule price takers, they have no incentive to 
grow their market shares; and second, "monopoly profits are needed to induce firms to 
invest in new knowledge." 78Hence, the linkage between competition and innovative 
accumulation in the classical tradition informing this work is inconsistent with the 
neoclassical tradition of perfect competition (a theoretical situation in which no 
monopoly profits exist). Importantly, it is also inconsistent with Post-Keynesian and Neo-
Marxist ideas of "imperfect competition", for technological innovation itself tends to 
break down barriers to entry. The result is that monopoly prices cannot be sustained.79 
Therefore, any model seeking to link "imperfect competition" to endogenous 
technological innovation is internally inconsistent. The vision of what JameeMoudud 
calls "strategic competition" informs the entirety of this dissertation. 80 In this vision of 
competition, all firms are aggressive price-setters. Moudud concisely summarises 
strategic competition as follows: 
Firms set their prices on the basis of strategic considerations arising from the 
threat of actual and potential rivals. Because ongoing innovation and 
technological change are persistent features of the capitalist economy, entry 
barriers are generally porous over any longer-run time period. Thus prices are 
set as competitive mark-ups (as opposed to monopoly ones) as firms attempt 
to target the minimum-cost range of their average total costs. The porosity of 
entry barriers and the fact that market prices in any industry are regulated by 
the cost structures of the most efficient firms are core features . . . that relate 
directly to the classical theory of competition. 81 
78 J.K. Moudud, "Introduction." In J. K. Moudud, Cyrus Bina and Patrick L. Mason (Eds.).Alternative 
Theories of Competition (New York: Routledge): 2. 
79Moudud, "The hidden history", 45-4 7. 
80 J. K. Moudud, Strategic Competition, Dynamics, and the Role of the State (Northampton: Edward Elgar, 
2010). 
81Moudud, "Introduction", 6. 
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Competing firms gain profit at the expense of their rivals, but this only explains 
differential accumulation. It does not explain absolute accumulation and the absolute 
growth of profits. For Grossman, as for Marx, the source of profit is unpaid labour-time. 
Simply put, workers add more value to output than the value of their wages and salaries. 
They spend more time working for capital than they do for themselves. For example, 
suppose the average working day is eight hours long. Now suppose it takes an average of 
four hours for the worker to produce enough value to purchase the bundle of commodities 
required for his or her reproduction. The worker receives this value in the form of a 
day's wage. This means the worker has in fact worked four hours for him- or herself and 
four hours "for free" for the capitalists. The value created by the worker above and 
beyond what is paid out in wages is called surplus-value, an aliquot part of which is 
profit. Living labour is the sole source of surplus-value, and all forms of idle income 
derive from it (e.g. profit, interest and rent). 82 
We can calculate the rate of surplus-value for any given point in time by the 
formula s/v. ·In this formula, s stands for surplus-value and v stands for the wages and 
salaries paid out to production workers (i.e. variable capital). 83 The rate of surplus-value 
tends to rise in capitalism. This is because capitalists find cheaper ways to produce 
commodities over time through labour-saving technologies. 84 These cheaper 
commodities are then consumed by workers. In this way, variable capital is reduced 
relativeto surplus-value. In other words, capitalism tends to reduce the value of the 
82 Also included in surplus-value are non-production activities. 
83 Production workers produce surplus-value, whereas non-production workers do not. 
84Gerard Durnenil and Dominique Levy, "The Classical Marxian Evolutionary Model of Technical 
Change."In Mark Setterfeld (Ed.).Handbook of Alternative Theories of Economic Growth, Forthcoming. 
(Aldershot: Edward Elgar, 2009). 
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bundle of commodities that workers consume. It takes less labour-time today to produce 
this bundle of commodities than it did, say, twenty years ago. For example, in 1991 a 
high-end laptop computer with a 12 MHz processor, lMB memory and a built-in 20MB 
hard drive would cost approximately $3000.00. Today, for a mere $300.00, one can 
purchase a machine with over 10,000 times more storage capacity and over two-hundred 
times more processing power. The tendency to cheapen commodities applies to most 
goods workers consume. As the elements of consumption require less and less labour-
time to produce, the quantity of labour-time dedicated to the production of surplus-value 
increases. Surplus-value tends to rise relative to variable capital. 85 This is called relative 
surplus-value. Additionally, the rate of surplus-value can also be increased by forcing 
workers to expend more labour-time in any given day.86 This is called absolute surplus-
value. 
Because technological innovation in capitalism has a labour-saving bias, capital 
accumulation depends more and more on machinery and equipment. In other words, 
capitalist production displays "a tendency to replace human labour with machines. "87 
Machinery, equipment and raw materials constitute constant capital. As capitalists invest 
in labour-saving technologies, the ratio of constant capital to variable capital tends to rise. 
The value of machinery and raw materials tends to rise relative to the value of total wages 
paid to production workers. To put it differently, the machinery behind the elbow of each 
85 Anwar Shaikh, "The Fa1ling Rate of Profit as the Cause of Long Waves: Theory and Empirical 
Evidence," in New Findings in Long Wave Research, eds. Alfred Kleinknecht, Ernest Mandel and 
Immanuel Wallerstein (London: Macmillan Press, 1992): 177. 
86 For example, blackberries and e-mail allow businesses to squeeze more surplus-value from workers even 
after the official working-day is over. 
87 James W. Rinehart, The Tyranny of Work (Toronto: Nelson, 2006): 154. 
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worker tends to increase over time because investment in the latest machinery tends to 
make individual capitalist firms more competitive. For instance, one bulldozer operator 
can do the work of a dozen manual labourers in a fraction of the time. To take another 
example, in the logging industry in Canada, between 1995 and 2005, the number of 
workers employed in the sector declined by 44 percent, yet output increased by 10 
percent in· the same period. 88 The introduction of labour-saving technologies and new 
forms of organisation undoubtedly made this situation possible. For instance, John 
Deere's "walking tree harvester" (developed in 1994) was the first of its kind. The six-
legged walking machine hews trees, strips them of their branches and cuts them into 
manageable pieces. It can do the work of several lumberjacks in a fraction of the 
time. 89The upshot is that as capitalism develops the magnitude of machinery behind the 
elbow of each worker grows. The ratio of the value of machinery, equipment and raw 
materials to the value produced by living labour is called the organic composition of 
capital and can be expressed in the formula Cll.90 The technical composition of capital 
tends to rise over time due to investment in labour-saving technologies, and this is 
"followed suit" by the organic composition of capital.91 
Before proceeding, we must examine one more variable in the production of 
surplus-value. The capitalist system can yield more surplus··value in any given year by 
decreasing the turnover time of capital. Turnover time constitutes the production time 
88 CANSIM Table 379-0023 and 281-0024 
89SAE International. "A Deere walks into a forest ... " http://www.sae.org/mags/sohe/l l 1l8 
90 Marx makes the distinction between the technical, value and organic compositions of capital. For our 
purposes, the key determinant is the organic composition of capital. For a short summary of the distinction, 
see Ben Fine and Alfredo Saad-Filho, Marx's Capital, Fourth Edition (London: Pluto Press, 2004), 102-
108. 
91Tsoulfidis, Competing Schools, 117. 
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and circulation time for any given commodity. All capitalists are compelled to decrease 
their individual turnover time. The faster they produce and sell their commodities, the 
greater the share of total surplus-value they secure from their rivals. This results in a 
socially necessary turnover time that all capitalists are required to meet or beat on pain of 
extinction.92 Yet, if the yearly socially necessary turnover time can be reduced, the~ 
aggregate surplus-value can be increased for the system as a whole for that year. Simply 
put, the reduction of turnover time means workers produce more surplus-value in any 
given year while the quantity of unproductive labour-time is reduced relative to output. 
Marx notes that 
a reduction in turnover time or in one of its two component sections, 
production time and circulation time, raises the mass of surplus-value 
produced. But since the rate of profit simply expresses the ratio of the mass 
of surplus-value produced to the total capital engaged in producing it, it is 
evident that any reduction of this kind raises the rate of profit as well. 93 
The law of the tendential fall in the rate of profit 
We can now combine the rate of surplus-value (s/v), the organic composition of 
capital (C/l) and turnover time (t). into the formula for the "annual" rate of ·profit · 
(r).94Each of these components is essential to understanding crises of overaccumulation. 
( s/v ) r= 1+C/l +t 
The above formula demonstrates that profitability depends upon the rate of surplus 
value, the organic composition of capital and turnover time. First, all things being equal, 
92 David Harvey, The Limits to Capital (New York: Verso, 2008): 186. 
93 Marx, Capital, Volume 3, 163. It is important here to note that the costs of circulation are viewed by 
Marx as deductions from surplus-value. 
94 This measure of the annual rate of profit considers surplus-value before it is distributed in the forms of 
profit, interest, rent and wages of non-production workers. 
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the rate of profit will rise if the rate of surplus value rises. The reverse occurs if the rate 
of surplus value falls. Second, if the composition of capital or the turnover time rise, the 
profit rate will fall. The reverse occurs if these ratios fall. A growing organic composition 
means that the number of workers available to produce surplus-value shrinks relative to 
constant capital. A rising organic composition of capital causes the rate of profit to fall 
because it undermines the source of profit, i.e. the surplus-value produced by workers. 
Basu and Manolakos have demonstrated mathematically that the long-term trend in the 
rate of profit is determined by the growth of the composition of capital. "The most 
striking aspect of this argument," they note, "is that it does not depend on the behaviour 
of the rate of surplus value." Indeed, no matter how the latter behaves over time, as long 
as the composition of capital grows, "the rate of profit will have a long-term negative 
trend."95 To be sure, even if the rate of surplus-value rises faster than the organic 
composition, the latter will still cause the average rate of profit to fall. This is because 
the source of surplus-value, living labour, grows slower than constant capital. This, too, 
applies to the effect of turnover time.· Turnover time is circulation time plus produ~tion 
time. If this is decreased, it will have no bearing on the organic composition of capital. It 
simply leads to higher profitability in a given time period, all things being equal. In fact, 
decreasing turnover time may accelerate the replacement of older fixed capital vintages, 
thereby facilitating further labour-saving innovations and a falling rate of profit. As we 
have seen above, all capitalists are compelled to invest in labour-saving technologies to 
95DeepankarBasu and Panayiotis T. Manolakos. "Is There a Tendency for the Rate of Profit to Fall? 
Econometric Evidence from the U.S. Economy, 1948-207." Economics Department Working Paper Series 
(Amherst: University of Massachusetts Amherst, 2010). See also Tsoulfidis, Competing Schools. 
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cheapen their commodities. If they cheapen their commodities first, they can take market 
share away from their competitors and procure a larger share of total surplus-value. As 
labour-saving technologies generalise across the economy, all capitalists invest more in 
machinery and equipment than in labour power. The source of surplus-value gets smaller 
relative to total investment, despite turnover time. Therefore, though the accumulation of 
capital may improve profitability for any individual capitalist in the short run, it. tends to 
undermine profitability for capitalists as a whole in the long run. Marx calls this the law 
of the tendential fall in the rate of profit. This law is central to the theory of 
overaccumulation. 
The rate of profit, mass of profit and the crisis of overaccumulation 
As I noted above, nothing in capitalism will be produced unless it can be 
produced at a profit. This should highlight the fact that the falling rate of profit in and of 
itself is not a sufficient condition for crisis. After all, businesses strive to earn profit, not 
necessarily a particular rate of profit level. This fact has been pointed out by the Austrian 
economist, Murray N.·Rothbard: 
Even if the profit rate falls, why should businessmen stop investing, 
especially all of a sudden? What is the mechanism to explain the sudden, 
sharp upper turning point? Moreover, even if the profit rate falls, the 
admittedly increasing mass of saved capital might well increase the absolute 
amount of aggregate profits, so that even though the rate falls, the process 
may still stimulate a great deal of further investment. 96 
96Murray N. Rothbard, Classical Economics: An Austrian Perspective on the History of Economic Thought 
Volume II (Aldershot: Edward Elgar, 1995): 431. 
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Unbeknownst to Rothbard, Marx recognized these problems in his treatment of crisis.97 
The answers have been repeated time and again by succeeding classical political 
economists, such as Henryk Grossman, Paul Mattick and Anwar Shaikh. In 1929, 
Grossman wrote: 
"Rate of profit" and "mass of profit"have entirely different meanings for 
theory, despite the close connection between them. Several writers ... could 
not demonstrate the necessary breakdown of capitalism because they 
confined their attention to the fall in the rate of profit. Breakdown cannot be 
derived from this. How could a percentage, a pure number such as the rate of 
profit produce the breakdown of a real system? ... An explanation is only 
possible when we relate the breakdown not to the rate of profit, but to its 
mass.98 
In short, accumulation will continue until the mass of profit begins to stagnate. 
As the rate of profit falls, the mass of profit continues to expand. As long as enough 
profit is being produced, accumulation can continue. It is, after all, profit that is 
reinvested in additional machinery and equipment, not the rate of profit. To put it 
differently, accumulation depends upon a growing mass of profit. Once the mass of 
profit begins to stagnate or shrink, however, the rate of return on the marginal unit of 
capital - i.e. on the latest investments - turns zero or negative. To be sure, at the point of 
absolute overaccumulation, the magnitude of returns does not increase, despite the 
addition of new capital. At that point, capitalists stop investing in new machinery and 
equipment. As Mattick points out in. his book Marx and Keynes, in this situation "the 
existing capital is simultaneously too small and too large: it is too large in relation to the 
existing surplus-value and it is not large enough to overcome the dearth of surplus-
97 Marx, Capital, Volume 3, 349-375. 
98Grossman, The Law of Accumulation, 102-3. 
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value. "99 There is too much constant capital relative to surplus-value. A cns1s of 
overaccumulation means that there is not enough surplus-value in the system to keep 
accumulation going at a given rate. 100 
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The graph above is an abstract representation of the movements of the rate and 
mass of profit. IOI Note that the mass of profit continues to expand despite a falling rate of 
profit. The marker on the curve for the mass of profit indicates the point of absolute 
99 Paul Mattick, Marx and Keynes: The Limits of the Mixed Economy (London: Merlin Press, 1969): 68. 
100 As Henryk Grossman puts it: "This not because too much surplus value has been produced but because 
in relation to the accumulated mass of capital too little surplus value is available." See Henryk Grossman, 
The Law of Accumulation, 79. 
101 Henceforth, I will refer to the mass of surplus-value as the mass of profit. The reader should understand 
the latter as the mass of surplus-value in its undistributed form (i.e. not yet in the differentiated forms of 
profit, interest, rent, etc.). 
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overaccumulation. 102 At this point, the mass of profit begins to stagnate and investment 
in new machinery and equipment necessarily grinds to a halt because additional 
investment in capital does not result in additional profit. In the third volume of Capital, 
Marx describes the situation as follows: 
As soon as capital has grown in such proportion to the working population 
that neither the absolute labour-time that this working population supplies nor 
its relative surplus labour-time can be extended ... where, therefore, the 
expanded capital produces only the same mass of surplus-value as before, 
there will be an absolute overproduction of capital; i.e. the expanded C + L1C 
will not produce any more profit, or will even produce less profit, than the 
capital C did before its increase by .dC. 103 
The causal relationship between the rate and mass of profit, as well as the 
precisepoint of overaccumulation, can be understood in the following way. In "normal" 
accumulation, the marginal unit of capital (~C) procures an additional sum of profit (~s). 
At first glance, what we describe here appears similar to what Keynes called the marginal 
efficiency of capital (MEC). However, the theoretical framework deployed by Keynes is 
very different from our own. For this reason, it should be made clear that we use the 
MEC concept with certain caveats. 
Keynes coined the "Marginal Efficiency of Capital" in Chapter 11 of The General 
Theory of Employment, Interest and Money (1936). He incorrectly attributes the idea to 
Fisher. It was in fact quite original. 104 In any case, Keynes defined the MEC as "the 
relation between the prospective yield .of a capital-asset and its supply price or 
102 This model is not intended to be an exact representation of reality. The exact timing of the crisis of 
overaccumulation is subject to changes in the rate of surplus-value, the organic composition of capital and 
the turnover time of capital. 
103 Marx, Capital, Volume 3, 360. 
104Tsoulfidis, Competing Schools, 254. 
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replacement cost, i.e. the relation between the prospective yield of one more unit of that 
type of capital and the cost of producing that unit."105 To be sure, 
the marginal efficiency of capital is here defined in terms of the expectation 
of yield and of the current supply price of the capital-asset. It depends on the 
rate of return expected to be obtainable on money if it were invested in a 
newly produced asset; not on the historical result of what an investment has 
yielded on its original cost if we look back on its record after its life is 
over.
106 
Keynes argued that to induce new investment, the MEC must exceed the rate of 
interest. 107 Otherwise, investors will engage in passive rather than active investment. In 
other words, the driver of accumulation is the MEC minus the interest rate. As long as 
the difference between the MEC and the interest rate is positive, active investment will 
occur. If this condition is not met, investment will stop. Indeed, "the succession of Boom 
and Slump can be described and analysed in terms of the fluctuations of the marginal 
efficiency of capital relatively to the rate of interest."108This idea is incredibly useful and 
is an important component of the theory to follow. 
Despite its importance to Keynesian economics, however, the MEC has fallen 
into disuse in recent times. A cursory glance at the pages of the Journal of Post 
Keynesian Economics suffices to make the point: The MEC has been mentioned in 77 
articles since 1979. It was cited in 45 articles in the 1980s, 21 in the 1990sand 11 in the 
2000s. Between 2006 and 2012 - at a time when the concept would find its greatest 
105 J. M. Keynes, The General Theory of Employment, Interest, and Money (New York: Harvest, 1964): 
135, emphasis added. 
106 Keynes, The General Theory, 136. 
107 Keynes, The General Theory, 140-41. 
108Keynes, The General Theory, 144. 
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pertinence, as we will see in the penultimate chapter of this dissertation - it was not 
mentioned at all. 
Shaikh equates the MEC in Keynes with the rate of profit, and the MEC minus the 
interest rate with Marx's rate of profit of enterprise. He identifies the latter as the driver 
of active investment. He writes, 
The interest rate is the benchmark, the safe alternative, to the rate of return on 
active investment. Marx argues that it is the difference between the two rates, 
which he calls the rate of profit-of-enterprise (r - i), that drives active 
investment. Keynes says much the same thing: he calls the profit rate the 
marginal efficiency of capital (MEC), and focuses on the difference between 
it and the interest rate as the foundation for viability of investment. 109 
There are two problems here. First, the rate of profit of enterprise is supposed to be a 
benchmark for two alternative investment options for capitalists. If the interest rate 
exceeds the rate of profit, capitalists will choose the safer, passive investment. The 
problem with this view is that the rate of profit represents returns on total investments; 
i.e. returns on sunk capital. Capitalists will not shut down production altogether if the 
interest rate rises above the rate of profit on total investment. Hence, this does not really 
measure the choice between two alternatives (i.e. either active or passive investment). 
To understand the real alternative, the MEC (minus the interest rate) must be deployed. 
This is related to the second problem: Marx's rate of profit of enterprise and Keynes' 
MEC (minus the interest rate) measure different phenomena. The former measures profits 
on total investment minus the interest rate. The latter measures the rate of return on the 
latest ·investments (minus the interest rate). It is here that an alternative exists for the 
capitalists: To invest in additional equipment (active) o.r to lend the funds (passive)? The 
109Shaikh, "The First Great Depression of the 21st Century", 46-4 7. 
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MEC minus the interest rate therefore is a better measure for the real driver of capital 
accumulation, not the rate of profit of enterprise. 
The MEC was implicitly recognized by Grossman. Indeed, from his standpoint, 
the long and numerous debates about the proper measure for the rate of profit as well as 
the rate of profit of enterprise are of secondary importance with regard to crisis 
formation. Kliman argues that the rate of profit on historical-cost capital stock is the 
relevant driver of accumulation, whereas Shaikh argues for the rate of profit of enterprise 
on current-cost capital stock. It is beyond the scope and purpose of this section to address 
these debates in detail. Nevertheless, for Grossman, neither the rate of return on 
historical-cost capital stock nor the rate of return on current-cost capital stock is precise 
enough to explain accumulation and breakdown in capitalism. As we have seen above, 
Grossman points out that investment will continue until the mass of profit begins to 
stagnate or shrink. At that point, the rate of return on the latest investments turns zero or 
negative. To repeat, the rate of return on the marginal unit of capital - i.e. the latest 
investments, not the his.torical pr replacement cost of the total current capital stock - is 
central to the dynamics of accumulation and breakdown. From this perspective, there is 
an affinity between Keynes and Grossman. The MEC does not measure the rate of return 
on current-cost capital stock. Instead, it measures new profits over newly added capital 
stock at any point in time. In this sense, the MEC is intimately bound up with the process 
of accumulation itself. From this perspective, it is the returns on new additions to the 
capital stock that are most relevant. 
so 
Grossman's implicit usage of the MEC is central to the analysis made in this 
dissertation. Hence, we must here take a moment to point out the important difference 
between Keynes and Grossman on this question in terms of the determinants of the MEC, 
even if the Grossman never wrote explicitly about the MEC itself. First, for Keynes the 
MEC is a function of demand and supply. Increased investment will cause the MEC to 
fall "partly because the prospective yield will fall as the supply ... is increased, and partly 
because ... pressure on facilities for producing that type of capital will cause its supply 
price to increase." 11° For Grossman, on the other hand, the MEC is internally related to 
the dual character of labourin capitalist production; i.e. to Marx's labour theory of value 
and the tendency for the rate of profit to fall, as we have seen above. The same dynamics 
that lead to a falling rate of profit and, eventually, a stagnating mass of profit are 
internally related to the long-run determinants of the MEC. 
There is a second important difference between Keynes and Grossman. In 
Keynes, the MEC represents an expectation for returns on an additional unit of current-
cost capital stock. In Grossman, on the other hand, it is afaitaccompli .. In other words, it 
represents for him the actual return on the last unit of investment. This approach allows 
us to focus our attention on the objective limits to accumulation, rather than to have to 
rely on the subjective whims of expectation as in Keynes. 
To sum up, for Keynes the MEC was the expectation of yield on one additional 
unit of capital. For him, the supply price of capital is determined by supply and demand. 
If demand for capital increases, its supply price will rise and the MEC will fall, all else 
11
°Keynes, The General Theory, 136. 
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being equal. Likewise, the prospective yield will fall if as the supply is increased. Hence, 
for Keynes the MEC is determined by movements in supply and demand. For us, on the 
other hand, the MEC is internally related to the labour theory of value and the 
mechanisms that cause the rate of profit to fall in the classical Marxist tradition. As the 
rate of profit falls and the growth rate of the mass of profit begins to slope downwards, 
the returns on the latest investments begin to shrink. This is reflected in a downward 
sloping MEC. Finally, for Keynes the MEC is an expectation. For us, it is objectively 
determined by the law of value. Thus, it occurs independently of Keynes' animal spirits. 
In this work, therefore, the MEC can be expressed algebraically as follows. 
Where !JPtf !JCt-l + !JWt-l equals the change in profits from timet-1 to timet over the 
change in capital stock from timet-2to timet-1 and the change in wage. payments from 
timet-2to timet-1, 
In other words, this measure of the MEC is the profits made "this year" over the new 
investments (new additions to capital stock and the labour force) made "last year". 
The precise point of overaccumulation is achieved when the MEC reaches zero. 
According to Tsoulfidis, this occurs when "the percentage change in capital stock (~CIC) 
[and, I would add, to be consistent with Grossman, additional wages (~ W /W) - GM] is 
equal to the percentage change in the rate of profit (~r/r) in the opposite direction." At 
that point, "any profits from new investment are off set by the cost of that investment, 
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thereby holding the mass of profit stagnant." 1111t is important to emphasise that this is a 
long-run process. The MEC can tum zero or negative due to contingent shocks to 
profitability. The kind of deep slump that is hard to get out of, however, is a result of the 
long-run movement towards a zero MEC. The table below demonstrates this process 
numerically. 
T bl 1 N a e . Id umer1ca f I . I d" f fi emonstration o accumu ation ea me to a staenatm~ mass o pro 1t 
t C+W r p L\C+L\W/C+W L\r/r MEC 
1 116.67 ! 15.99% l8.65 16.67% -4.08% 11.90% 
2 135.32 15.12% 20.46 15.99% -5.40% 9.72% 
3 155.78 I 14.28% 22.24 15.12% -5.58% 8.70% 
I 
4 178.02 13.46% 23.96 14.28% -5.75% 7.71% 
5 201.98 ' 12.66% 25.58 13.46% -5.91% 6.75% 
6 227.56 11.89% 27.07 12.66% -6.07% 5.83% 
7 254.62 i 11.15% 28.40 11.89%' -6.21% 4.94% 
8 283.03 10.45% 29.57 11.15% -6.35% 4.09% 
9 312.59 9.77% 30.54 l0.45% -6.48% 3.29% 
10 343.13 9.12% 31.31 9.77% -6.60% 2.52% 
11 374:.44 I 8.51% 31.87 9.12% -6.72% 1.79% i 
12 406.31 7.93% 32.22 8.51% -6.83% 1.10% 
13 438.53 I 7.38% 32.37 7.93% -6~93% 0.45% 
14 470.89 6.86% 32.31 7.38% -7.02% -0.16% 
15 503.21 . 6.37% 32.08 6.86% -7.11%' -0.73% 
In the above example, at tl the capitalist has invested $116.67 at a 15.99% rate of 
profit. The return on that investment is therefore $18.65. At t2, assuming a turnover time 
of one year and a re-investment rate of one-hundred percent, the capitalist re-invests his 
capital and profits from the previous year, which amounts to $135.32 ($116.67 + $18.65 
= $135.32). Assuming a rising organic composition of capital, the rate of profit falls in 
the intervening period (in this case, by 0.87 percentage points). Therefore, the sum of 
capital ($135.32) is multiplied by a lower rate of profit (15.99%), giving us a return of 
111Tsoulfidis, Competing Schools, 120. 
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$20.46. The mass of profit has grown from $18.65 to $20.46, despite a falling rate of 
profit. Nevertheless, as the table above makes apparent, the MEC has begun to grow 
negatively. In this case, it fell by 2.18 percentage points. We shall return to this point 
below in dealing with causes of long periods of stability and instability. The table above 
demonstrates how the process of declining profitability alongside a growing mass of 
profit continues until tl4. At this point, tiC/C = 7.38% and !:ir/r = -7.02%. Each has 
changed by approximately 7%, but in opposite directions. According to the theory, the 
mass of profit will stagnate if the percentage change in capital stock is equal to the 
percentage change in the rate of profit in the opposite direction. This is our theoretical 
watershed; i.e. the line dividing the phase of accumulation from that of absolute 
overaccumulation. At that point, both the mass of profit growth rate and the MEC turn 
negative."Breakdown" occurs between ti 4 and ti 5 when investment in new fixed capital 
grinds to a halt. Henceforth, the mass of profit stagnates and "the persistent lack of new 
investment and the rising unemployment rate form the two characteristic phenomena of 
d . . . ,,112 epress1on. · 
The relationship in the table above is represented graphically below. Here it is 
important to note that at ti 4, while the rate of profit is 6.86%, the MEC is -0.16%. To be 
sure, despite a positive rate of return on total investments, the rate of return on the latest 
investments is negative. From this it is clear to see that not the rate of profit, but the 
marginal efficiency of capital - as we have defined it above --drives capital accumulation. 
What sense would it make to add new capital equipment and workers if the returns would 
112Tsoulfidis, Competing Schools, 120, emphasis added. 
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be negative? In other words, the rate of profit can be positive, but if the MEC is zero or 
negative, no new investments will occur. To be clear, despite continued returns on total 
investment, investment in new machinery and equipment grinds to a halt because those 
new units of capital will not produce a return. Hence, the mass of profit and the MEC are 
crucial to understanding crises of overaccumulation - not merely movements in the rate 
of profit. 
Figure 2. Rate of profit, mass of profit and the MEC 
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So far we have examined our general framework for analysis, including the roles 
of the falling rate of profit and the stagnating mass of profit in crisis formation, in 
particular. The movement of the MEC is central to business investment and therefore 
capital accumulation. As we will see below, this ratio - not the rate of profit in and of 
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itself - drives long periods of stability and instability. First, however, the next section 
will examine the relationship between wage movements and overaccumulation, before 
examining how absolute overaccumulation (MEC :S 0) unfolds temporally and across 
sectors. After these two issues have been addressed, we will examine the central 
importance of the MEC in determining long phases of stability and instability. 
Wage movements and overaccumulation 
At this point in the analysis it is useful to examine the role of the class struggle 
and its relation to overaccumulation. First, there is a tendency in capitalism for real wages 
to rise. As we shall see, this is not inconsistent with the tendency towards the growing 
"immiseration" of the working population. In the course of capital accumulation, the 
organic composition of capital tends to rise alongside a rising productivity of labour. The 
result is the perpetual cheapening of commodities and therefore rising real wages, as we 
have seen above in our discussion of relative surplus-value. The tendency for real wages 
to rise is a temporary phenomenon. In other words, it belongs only to the initial - or 
"early". --:-· phase of capital accumulation .. At the advanced· - or "late" - phase of. 
accumulation (and once overaccumulation sets in) a crossroads is reached in the 
movement of wages. From this point on, capital accumulation can only continue if wages 
fall. According· to Grossman, this is the correct foundation for interpreting the general 
law of capitalist accumulation. He writes that "immiseration . . . can and must be . . . the 
result of the late phase of capital accumulation. " 113 In this context, an increasing rate of 
exploitation resulting from a reduction of real wages could act as a temporary "safety 
113 Grossman, Das Akkumulations-, 598. 
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valve" for the capitalist system. Nevertheless, the working class could push back against 
this downward pressure on wages. It might be possible, for instance, to win wage 
increases. In this way, the objectively determined law of breakdown does not contradict 
class struggle. Instead, despite its objectively given necessity, breakdown is subject to the 
living struggle of the classes and allows for their active intervention. 114 Here Grossman is 
clearly implying that, in the context of overaccumulation, rising wages can act to trigger 
cnses. 
To clarify Grossman's position further, I reproduce here my translation of a 
selection of his letter to Paul Mattick (dated June 21 1931 ). In this letter, Grossman 
demonstrates the intensification of the class struggle that accompanies a period of 
overaccumulation diagrammatically. In his hand-drawn diagram below, "Kapital" and 
"Mehrwert" can be translated as "capital" and "surplus-value", respectively. 
Figure 3.0veraccumulation and class struggle 
Grossman writes, 
The magnitude of capital 1900 (small square) grew until the year 1931, 
together with the organic composition. Surplus-value, too, in the year 1900 
(line A-B) grew to the magnitude C-D. However, in order for the organic 
composition to rise in the accumulated capital as well, a relatively increasing 
114 Grossman, Das Akkumulations-, 595-603. 
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portion of the mass of surplus-value must be used for the purposes of 
accumulation. Therefore, the consumable portion of surplus-value, the part 
intended for additional workers (av) and for the consumption of the capitalists 
themselves (k) becomes ever smaller, absolutely and relatively. In 1900 it 
amounts to the magnitude E-B, in 1931 only F-D. If the workers receive the 
previous portion av, then not enough remains for the capitalists. If the latter 
want to secure their portion k, then not enough remains for the workers. An 
objectively revolutionary situation arises: the system reveals that it can no 
longer secure the living conditions of the population. The class struggle 
becomes intensified from and through this objective situation; i.e. the 
subjective factor - that the working class is capable of overthrowing the 
system by means of class struggle - only enters the objective situation in this 
phase of development. Of course, the idea is foreign to me that capitalism 
must collapse "of itself' or "automatically," as Hilferding and other socialists 
(Braunthai) argue against my book. 115 
The intensification of the class struggle that accompanies a phase of 
overaccumulation is a result of the objectively-given long-run dynamics of accumulation. 
But it does not follow that the outcome of this struggle is pre-given by these same 
objective conditions. To the contrary, one can clearly infer from the foregoing analysis 
that the outcome of the class struggle in the context of overaccumulation is subject to 
questions of organisation, capacities and leadership. 
To sum up, we ·have so far examined the theoretical linkages between the falling 
rate of profit, stagnating mass of profit, the marginal . efficiency of capital (MEC), class 
struggle and crisis. In the next section, we explore how the crisis of absolute 
overaccumulation unfolds across time and sectors, before drawing out some of the 
threads implicit in the argument above and extending them to an analysis of long periods 
of stability and instability in capitalism in the subsequent section. 
115Grossman, "Letter to Mattick". It is important to note that Grossman's graph diagram abstracts from 
value disturbances in the organic composition of capital caused by movements in the value composition of 
capital. In reality, the process is much more complex; but his representation is sufficient for his purposes 
here. 
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Accumulation and capitalist reproduction 
What is the relationship between capital accumulation and instability? In other 
words, why does an interruption of capital accumulation create economic volatility? The 
short answer runs as follows: Under capitalism, it would be impossible for workers to 
consume the total output of industry. As we have seen, workers produce more than the 
value of their wages. After its production, this surplus-value is distributed in the forms of 
profit, interest, rent, etc. But more surplus-value is produced by the great majority of 
working people than could possibly be consumed personally by the minority of 
capitalists, bankers and landlords taken together. For this reason, capitalism produces a 
permanent imbalance between production and consumption. If this were the end of the 
story, capitalism would be in a permanent state of crisis. However, we know that 
capitalism produces long periods of stability. Luxemburg and Malthus looked for 
external sources of demand to create stability in the forms of colonial markets and the 
aristocracy, respectively. In our framework, the source of this stability is capital 
accumulation. In other words, "equilibrium" between production and consumption is 
maintained by accumulating capital. What cannot be consumed by capitalists, landlords 
and bankers is consumed in accumulation. Above we saw how accumulation is a source 
of instability; we now see how it is also a source of stability. 116Periods of stability are 
characterised by a strong rate of accumulation; periods of volatility are characterised by 
a weak rate of accumulation. We will discuss in greater detail periods of stability and 
116 Mattick, Marx and Keynes, 55-56. 
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instability in the next section. For now, let us examine in detail how sufficient demand 
can be generated internally for stable capitalist reproduction to occur. 
This section makes the case that stable capitalist reproduction requires stable 
accumulation. So long as capital accumulation is taking place, it is _possible for stable 
reproduction to occur. In other words, workers and capitalists in each sector of the 
economy will have sufficient means to purchase the consumer goods produced and 
capitalists will have sufficient means to purchase the produced means of production. An 
interruption in accumulation interrupts capitalist reproduction. In what follows, we will 
examine why this is so. After exploring the conditions that must be met for proportional 
capitalist reproduction to occur, we will examine how the crisis of overaccumulation acts 
to interrupt proportional reproduction. This is important, because it allows us to 
understand how an interruption in accumulation resulting from a zero or negative MEC 
unfolds across sectors of the economy. 
Drawing on Marx's Capital, David Harvey in his Limits to Capital demonstrates 
the conditions that must be met for proportional capitalist reproduction to occur. These 
are summarized in part in the table below. 
Figure 4. Proportional reproduction 
Department 1 Balanced exchange Department 2 
(means of roduction) (consum tion goods) 
Output (Wt): Output(W2): 
Ct+ ~Ct <:::::::------' Vt+ ~V1 +Sot 
Cz + ~Cz 
'------:::> V2+~V2+So2 
60 
Department 1 produces means of production for both itself and Department 2, 
including replacement equipment and raw materials as well as additional means of 
production (represented by .1.C). Hence, the output of Department 1 can be represented 
algebraically as follows: 
Wi = Ci + l1Ci + C2 + l1C2 
Department 2 produces consumergoods. Its output is composed of the 
commodities purchased by the original labouring class in each department (V), those 
purchased by additional labour-power (i1 V) and those luxury and non-luxury items 
consumed by the non-producing class and its hangers-on (S). Hence, the output for 
Department 2 can be expressed as follows: 
W2 =Vi+ l1Vi +Soi+ V2 + l1V2 + So2 
In balanced exchange, Department 1 consumes Ci+ /J.Ci and sends C2 + l1C2 to 
Department 2, while the latter consumesV2 + l1V2 + S02 and sends Vi+ l1Vi +Soi to 
Department 1. Therefore, proportional exchange between departments must be: 
C2 + l1C2 = Vi + l1 Vi + Soi 
To be sure, the value produced in Department 1 and sent to Department 2 must be 
equal to the value produced in Department 2 destined for Department 1. It must satisfy 
equivalence in exchange as well as the particular use-values required by each department. 
If this proportionality is not maintained, a crisis of disproportionality will ensue. 117 
Therefore, the following question must be posed: What conditions must be met for 
proportional expanded reproduction? 
117 D. Harvey, The Limits to Capital (New York: Verso, 2006): 168. 
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In a nutshell, Harvey demonstrates that in order for expanded reproduction to 
occur, stableand proportional capital accumulation must be maintained. Relatedly, it is 
interesting to note that, in this model, more surplus-value must be dedicated to the 
production of capital equipment than to the production of consumer goods. In other 
words, the weight of accumulation in Department 1 is greater than that in Department 2. 
In any case, the upshot is that accumulation must remain proportional. Let us examine 
how he reaches this conclusion. 
Harvey draws on Marx's numerical example to make his case. In his example, 
Department 1 is composed of the following parts: 4000C + 1000V + 10005 = 6000 = 
W1 . Put differently, 
c 4000 5 1000 1000 
V = 1000 V = 1000 r = 5000 
In other words, the value composition of capital is 4: 1, the rate of exploitation is 
one hundred percent and the rate of profit is twenty percent. On the other hand, the 
composition of Department 2 is 1500C + 750V + 7505 = 3000 = W2 • Again, 
expressed differently, 
c 1500 5 750 750 
V = 750 V = 750 r = 2250 
In other words, the value composition of capital in Department 2 is 2: 1, the rate of 
exploitation is one hundred percent and the rate of profit is thirty-three percent. 
Therefore, in order for the system to remain balanced, expanded reproduction -
accumulation - must occur in the following way.· Of the 1 OOOS produced in Department 
1, 400 must be invested to expand constant capital, 100 to expand labour-power and 500 
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for the consumption of the capitalist class. In Department 2, 750S must be divided as 
follows: 100 for new constant capital, 50 for new variable capital and 600 for capitalist 
consumption. Hence, 
Department 1 4000C + 400ilC + 1000V + 100ilV + SOOS01 = 6000 = W1 
Department 2 1500C + 100ilC + 750V + 50ilV + 600S02 = 3000 = W2 
That is, for smooth and proportional growth to occur, the departments must have different 
rates of reinvestment: 
Table 2. Rates of reinvestment 
Department 1 400L1C + 100L1V 50% 
10005 
At these rates of reinvestment, the value composition of capital (VCC) in each 
department grows proportionately. Hence, the output, too, from each department will 
remain proportional: 
Table. 3. Old and new value ~om positions of capita1118 
NewVCC 
Department 1 Department 2 
4400 
1100 
1600 
800 
Therefore, where a is the rate of reinvestment and k is the value composition of 
capital, for expanded reproduction to occur smoothly, 
118 These tables abstract from changes in the VCC except those governed by a rising TCC. 
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a2 1 + k2 
=---
According to Harvey, this means"that the relative rates of reinvestment must 
reflect differences in value compositions in the two departments." The upshot of all of 
this is that "the two sector accumulation model Marx builds appears to show that, under 
the right conditions, including correct reinvestment strategies on the part of capitalists, 
accumulation can continue relatively trouble-free for ever."119 
For Marx, capitalist reproduction - the equalization of supply and demand -
would always only occur in an approximate sense. In other words, given the anarchic 
character of capitalist production, the system would be characterised by persistent over-
and under-shooting. Moreover, if households choose to hoard their money, there would 
be insufficient demand. Hence, capitalist reproduction in Marx is hardly akin to the 
world of Say and Ricardo, where supply always creates its own demand. But it is also 
fundamentally different from the underconsumptionist ideas of Malthus and 
Luxemburg. 120 
We have seen, then, that capital accumulation in Department 1 must occur 
proportionally to capital accumulation in Department 2 in order for proportional 
reproduction to occur. But we have already seen, on the basis of the fundamental 
dynamics relating to the MEC, that an interruption of capital accumulation will occur 
once the MEC is equal to zero or negative. As such, the crisis of resulting from a zero or 
negative MEC must manifest itself simultaneously as a crisis of disproportionality. The 
119Harvey, Limits, 169. 
120Moudud, Strategic Competition, 64 
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interruption of capital accumulation that a zero or negative MEC brings leads to an 
imbalance in reinvestment in the two branches of production. 
More explicitly, negative returns on the marginal unit of capital mean that it is no 
longer profitable for entrepreneurs to invest in new machinery and equipment. The result 
is a decline in the demand for new capital equipment. For this reason, the crisis of 
absolute overaccumulation first manifests itself as a crisis of overproduction in the 
economic sphere responsible for the production of capital equipment, which Marx calls 
Department 1. This is therefore simultaneously a crisis of disproportionality. Paul 
Mattick relates this process well in his book Marx and Keynes: 
Thus, the actual glut on the commodity market must be caused by the fact 
that labor is not productive enough to satisfy the profit needs of capital 
accumulation. Because not enough has been produced, capital cannot expand 
at a rate which would allow for the full realization of what has been 
produced. The relative scarcity of surplus-labor in the production process 
appears as an absolute abundance of commodities in the circulation process 
and as the overproduction of capital. 121 . 
Falling demand for capital goods causes a reduction in investment in Department 1, the 
consequence of which is the release of labourers in this department. The knock-on effect 
for Department 2, responsible for the production of means of consumption, is declining 
profitability, itself a result of the reduction in demand for consumer goods due to the 
decreased purchasing power of the labouring population. The crisis of overproduction in 
Department 1 spreads to those sectors responsible for the provision of consumer goods 
and services and manifests itself as a crisis of underconsumption. Effective demand 
declines relative to the quantity of consumer commodities available for purchase; i.e. the 
121Mattick, Marx and Keynes, 79. 
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labouring population increasingly lacks the means to purchase output from Department 2. 
Prices and profits fall in both sectors. In response to declining profits, Department 2 
reduces investment, sets labourers free and the downward spiral of declining 
consumption and production continues. 
The "early" and "late" phases of accumulation 
The point of absolute overaccumulation discussed above must be distinguished 
from the "early" and "late" phases of accumulation leading up to that point. The growth 
rate of the mass of profit is essential to understanding the phases preceding the crisis of 
absolute overaccumulation. For it is the growth rate of the mass of profit that determines, 
in part, the MEC. I argue that the MEC level is the foundation for long periods of 
stability and instability. 122 
122 As I have already noted above, this is different from other Marxist accounts of long periods of stability 
and instability in capitalism. Mandel, for instance, adheres to a semi-endogenous theory of long waves that 
is a function of movements in the rate of profit. The destruction of constant capital and the improvement in 
the rate of surplus-value caused by exogenous factors like WWII improve profitability for a time, but the 
endogenous process of capital accumulation itself (resulting in a rising organic composition of capital) 
eventually causes the rate of profit to fall. For Mandel, long waves of stability and instability are caused by 
up and down movements in the rate of profit. See Ernest Mandel, Late Capitalism. (New York: Verso, 
1993), Chapter 4. I do not consider this approach to be adequate, for- as I have already shown above - the 
driver of accumulation is the marginal efficiency of capital, not the rate of profit directly. The former is a 
function of movements in the mass of profit. This approach is similar to the approach pioneered by 
Grossman, drawing on Marx, and further developed by Shaikh. See Henryk Grossman. The Law of 
Accumulation and the Breakdown of the Capitalist System: Being also a theory of crises.(London: Pluto 
Press, 1992). I do, however, think Shaikh is inconsistent in his Socialist Register 2011 piece, wherein he 
refers to the rate of profit of enterprise (the rate of profit minus the interest rate) as the driver of 
accumulation, as we have already seen above. See Anwar Shaikh, "The First Great Depression of the 21st 
Century". In Leo Panitch, Greg Albo and VivekChibber (Eds.) Socialist Register 2011. (London: Merlin 
Press, 2010): 44-63. Moreover, Mandel's approach is also inadequate empirically, for the rate of profit fell 
throughout the post-war period, but owing to a growing mass of profit (and a positive MEC), relative 
stability prevailed. See Anwar Shaikh, "The Falling Rate of Profit as the Cause of Long Waves: Theory and 
Empirical Evidence." In Alfred Kleinknecht, Ernest Mandel, and Immanuel Wallerstein (Eds.) New 
Findings in Long Wave Research (London: Macmillan Press, 1992), p. 185. This, incidentally, is also 
Robert Brenner's major empirical weakness in his The Economics of Global Turbulence (New York: 
Verso, 2006), wherein he sees the introduction of Japan and Germany into the global market for 
manufacturing goods - and hence over-competition - as the principal force driving down profits in the 
1970s. In fact, the rate of profit in the U.S. began falling around 1946. It was not until the mass of profit 
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The theory propounded in this chapter must be differentiated from conventional 
theories of the relationship between accumulation and the rate of profit. Accumulation is 
nota function of the rate of profit, as e.g. Kliman suggests. Instead, as Grossman rightly 
points out, accumulation "is only a function of ... the magnitude of profit. " 123 This 
highlights the need to deemphasise the rate of profit in our analyses of crisis formation (it 
still remains relevant for e.g. interest rate determination, as we shall see in Chapter 2) and 
emphasise the growth rate of the mass of profit - and more specifically, movements in 
the MEC as the key driver of capitalist stability or instability. The confusion arises 
because, more often than not, the denominators for the rate of accumulation and the rate 
of profit are identical. Additionally, the magnitude of dollars invested will always be a 
portion of the mass of profit. Therefore, it is always likely that there will be a strong 
correlation between the rate of profit and the rate of accumulation. Nevertheless, 
correlation is not determination. 
It is the growth rate of the mass of profit that governs the accumulation in 
capitalism, for - if we provisionally abstract from the dynamics of credit - the growth 
rate of the mass of profit objectively determines the outer limit of accumulation and is the 
incentive to further investment. In other words, one cannot "invest" the rate of profit, and 
this is why the mass of profit is the key. As we have seen above, the mass of profit is the 
source of investment. If the growth rate of the mass of profit is positive, then 
accumulation, too, will be positive because the means for investment are present. 
began to stagnate in the 1970s in the U.S. that overaccumulation began to manifest itself. Hence, Mandel is 
incorrect on theoretical grounds as well as empirical grounds. The strength of my approach is to concretely 
specify the MEC as the driver of accumulation. Hence, the inducement to invest on a more concrete level is 
a function not of movements in the rate of profit, nor in the mass of profit, but movements in the MEC. 
123Grossman, The Law of Accumulation, 61. 
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However, as accumulation shifts from its "early" to its "late" phase, the growth rate of 
the mass .of profit begins to decline and accumulation necessarily slows. We will see 
below how this relates to the MEC, the fundamental driver of accumulation. As 
accumulation slows down, the system becomes unstable and is more likely to enter a 
deep crisis during the downward phase of one of its periodic investment cycles or as it is 
subjected to historically contingent shocks to profitability. To be sure, the slowed rate of 
growth of the mass of profit, and hence accumulation, ushers in a long period of 
stagnation and instability in which the recessionary phase of the investment cycles 
become longer and deeper. This is simply the flipside of a period of relative stability in 
which the growth rate of the mass of profit has not yet declined to critical levels and the 
rate of accumulation is high. 
The figure below represents the above dynamic graphically. Though the point of 
absolute overaccumulation occurs at time 11, the entire period preceding that point is one 
of slowing accumulation and growing instability, i.e. the movement from the "early" to 
the "late" phase of ·accumulation. For even though the ·mass of profit is growing 
absolutely, its rate of growth is slowing. 
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Figure 5. Mass of profit grows at a slowing rate 
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We can be even more precise. As we have seen, the growth rate of the mass of 
profit does not govern the incentive to invest directly. This is mediated by the marginal 
efficiency of capital. As long as the mass of profit is growing, the MEC will be positive. 
Nevertheless, the mass of profit does not tell us about the MEC level. It is the latter that 
determines long periods of stability and instability. Like the growth rate of the mass of 
profit, the MEC slopes downward as accumulation proceeds. Therefore, the "early" and 
"late" phases of accumulation are defined by relatively high and low MEC levels, 
respectively. As the mass of profit growth rate begins to slow, the MEC begins to decline 
and the economy becomes less buoyant and more susceptible to shocks. Not only is 
accumulation slowing down - with all of its accompanying ills (e.g. higher 
unemployment, slower productivity growth, etc.) - but as the MEC slows and approaches 
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zero, little shocks to profitability begin to have very large effects. This is demonstrated 
graphically below. 
Figure 6. The early and late phases of capital accumulation 
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The graph above demonstrates theoretically the MEC as it declines from the 
"early" to the "late" phases of accumulation. Keeping in mind that the MEC is the driver 
of accumulation, a continually declining MEC in the face of the turbulent character of 
capitalist accumulation and the investment cycles with which it intersects will produce 
deeper and longer crises. To be sure, when the downturn of the investment cycles (or 
other endogenous or exogenous shocks) intersect with ever-shrinking MEC levels, it 
becomes ever more likely that these profitability shocks cause the MEC to decline below 
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zero. The graph above applies a "shock" of four-percent to each point in time to 
demonstrate that the frequency of crisis increases as accumulation proceeds from its 
"early" to its "late" phase. When the MEC drops below zero, a general interruption in 
capital accumulation occurs. Crises tend to get deeper and longer in the "late" phase of 
capital accumulation. A low MEC combined with shocks to profitability generates deeper 
crises.Kliman applies the same thinking, but to the rate of profit, identifying shocks to the 
latter as the determining factor in crisis formation. As I have already shown, this is 
incorrect, as the rate of return on total investments has no direct bearing on investment in 
new capital stock or labour power. It is only the returns on the latest investment that 
determine whether investment will continue. 
Since they are inherent to the dynamic of capitalist accumulation, shocks to 
profitability generated by the investment cycles are important to our analysis. Given their 
endogeneity and periodic occurrence, a theoretical analysis of these cycles is required. It 
is to an analysis of the inventory and fixed investment cycles that we tum in the next 
section. First, however, to sum up the foregoing section, it is movements in the MEC that 
determine periods of stability and instability in capitalism. And the MEC is internally 
related to the same processes that lead to a falling rate of profit and, eventually, a 
stagnating mass of profit. Since investment is determined concretely, however, it is 
proper to focus on the MEC as the direct driver of investment and, therefore, 
accumulation. 
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Investment cycles 
The business cycle model employed in this dissertation is that developed by 
Anwar Shaikh from the Harrod-Domar model. I have chosen this model because it can be 
easily integrated into a classical Marxist framework. In fact, Joan Robinson noted how 
closely the Harrod-Domar growth model resembled Marx's reproduction schema. Indeed, 
Marx shared a vision with Harrod and Domar of endogenously generated 
growth. 124Moudud highlights three characteristics of this model that make it highly 
compatible with the classical Marxist model. First, the model points to "an endogenously 
generated growth path driven by investment in which the capacity utilization rate is at 
some normal level." This is called the "warranted growth path". Second, "the warranted 
growth path is consistent with varying degrees of unemployment." Third, Harrod was 
concerned to model the conditions for endogenously generated instability. 125 
However, the Harrod-Domar model suffers from a serious defect; i.e. the so-
called "knife-edge" problem, whereby the model generates explosive growth or 
stagnation in the context of excess demand or excess capacity, respectively. In other 
words, the conditions for achieving Harrod' s warranted growth rate - where all savings 
are absorbed by investment - are highly restrictive. Anwar Shaikh has provided a 
compelling solution to this problem by demonstrating the processes whereby the model 
would diverge from and converge on the warranted growth path. In this way, Shaikh 
further developed the classical Marxist framework for analysing the short- and long-run 
124Moudud, Strategic Competition, 65. 
125Moudud, Strategic Competition, 65-66. 
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dynamics of capital accumulation. This section elaborates the business cycle model 
developed by Shaikh in the late 1980s. 
In this model, there is no assumption of any balance between aggregate supply 
and demand or aggregate capital disbursements and internal finance. Capitalist 
production is anarchic and is characterised by constant discrepancies and shocks. These 
shocks are central to the model. First we will examine the short inventory investment 
cycle, and subsequently we will examine the long fixed capital investment cycle. 
Since supply and demand are never actually in equilibrium, excess demand 
characterises the system. Positive excess demand is that which cannot be met by current 
supply. If excess demand is positive, then "realized profits will be greater than potential 
profits. " 126 In this circumstance, firms must increase investment in circulating capital to 
meet demand and to take advantage of increased profitability. Since the internal finances 
of the firm are the profits remaining from the previous production period, firms will need 
to borrow the sum equivalent to meet excess demand. To be sure, additional investment 
to meet ·exc·ess demand must be fuelled by· credit. 127 To repeat, excess demand 
encourages investment because it translates into above-potential-profit levels; however, 
this investment is premised upon borrowing. Borrowing implies future finance charges. 
Therefore, periods of excess demand are internally limited by the acceleration of future 
finance payments as the system grows. Contrary to other business cycle theories, not the 
interest rate, but the magnitude of business debt is central to this theory of the business 
cycle. The internal profitability of the system drives "accumulation and the consequent 
126Shaikh, "Accumulation, Finance, and Effective Demand in Marx, Keynes and Kalecki", 67. 
1271bid, 70. 
73 
debt burden" constrains it. 128 Hence, Shaikh argues that business investment responds 
"positively to the level of excess demand and negatively to the burden of debt service 
payments."129 Expansions are fuelled by excess demand and contractions are caused by 
cumulative debt service payments. 
From the standpoint of the firm, if internal finance increases relative to potential 
profits, a concomitant increase in the rate of accumulation of circulating capital will 
ensue. If internal finance decreases relative to potential profit, the rate of accumulation of 
circulating capital will decrease. The availability of internal finance depends upon profits 
from the previous period and current debt-service payments. Once the latter become too 
great, borrowing slows down and a period of slower growth ensues. A period of slow 
growth allows business time to pay back its debts through normal profit-generation at a 
reduced rate of investment (i.e. at a rate of investment that does not require credit). As 
the internal financial position of the firm becomes healthier - i.e. as internal finance 
begins to increase relative to potential profits - the rate of accumulation of circulating 
capital will increase.. The next. cy<?le begins when th~ Bystem is exposed to another 
endogenous shock. In this way, short-run adjustments in circulating investment cycle 
endlessly around expanded reproduction. This is the short cycle, which generally lasts 3-
5 years. 
Short-run investment in circulating capital is complemented by investment in 
fixed capital. In a period of excess demand, capacity will be insufficient to meet the 
demands of production. Therefore, firms will invest in fixed capital to increase capacity. 
128Ibid, 72. 
129Ibid, 81. 
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The decision to invest in fixed capital takes longer than the decision to invest in 
circulating capital, but investment in fixed capital is subject to the same debt constraints. 
As investment in fixed capital accelerates, capacity will grow, but eventually investment 
in circulating capital will have to slow down as a result of the debt that that investment 
implies. Investment in circulating capital will slow and cycle around normal capacity 
utilization. This is the long cycle, which generally lasts 7-10 years. 
So far we have seen the relationship between the dual character of labour 
embodied in commodities, the falling rate of profit that is its. result as well as its 
relationship to the stagnating mass of profit. We have seen, moreover, how these 
processes are related to the marginal efficiency of capital (MEC) and its role in 
determining long phases of stability and instability. In particular, in phases of stability, 
the MEC will be high and positive. In phases of instability, it will be low and eventually 
zero or negative. Moreover, we have seen how the investment cycles are related to the 
MEC; i.e. how the shocks to profitability these produce :result in short and shallow 
recessions or "growth cycles"jn periods of a _relatively high MEC and deep and long 
recessions or depressions in periods of a relatively low MEC. Throughout, we have 
highlighted the importance of the continuation of accumulation to stable capitalist 
reproduction. Above we have seen how an interruption in capital accumulation creates 
instability. In particular, we have seen how the conditions required for proportional 
growth and how these conditions become increasingly undermined in the "late" phase of 
capital accumulation and at the point of overaccumulation or failed valorisation. In this 
circumstance, proportional growth of the departments becomes impossible. 
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It is these same crises, however, that can create the conditions for the restoration 
of accumulation and expanded reproduction on a new foundation. In the next section, I 
will show how crises can serve to improve the rate and mass of profit as well as the MEC 
and usher in a long period of renewal. This process, I will argue in Chapter 3, was the 
foundation for the long period of stability in Canada, from 1993-2008. 
Crisis and renewal 
As I have already noted, when cycles of overinvestment intersect with the 
descending curve of capitalist development, represented by a low MEC, recessions 
become long and deep.Moreover, as the MEC approaches zero, accumulation becomes 
increasingly unstable. By the time the MEC reaches zero or turns negative, "absolute 
overaccumulation" sets in. The mass of profit stagnates and so too does the economy. 
Profound slumps of this kind serve as potential pivot points for capital. Since the cause of 
overaccumulation is a dearth of surplus-value relative to constant capital, a period of 
renewal requires a change in the ratio of surplus-value to constant capital. The causes 
that effect a chang~ in this ratio can be multiple and varied. History has infinitely more 
imagination than we have. 130 However, for capitalism considered at the current level of 
abstraction, we must examine how crises effect changes in profitability directly and how 
these changes manifest themselves in movements of the MEC. As I have shown, the 
immediate determinants of profitability are the rate of surplus-value, the organic 
composition of capital and turnover time. Once the MEC turns zero and a crisis of 
absolute overaccumulation has set in, powerful countertendencies come to bear on these 
130 Alain Lipietz, Mirages and Miracles (London: Verso, 1987): 11. 
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variables. In part, surmounting the crisis is a function of these countertendencies; in part, 
it requires the conscious efforts of the capitalist class and the state. 
The crisis unleashes a large wave of bankruptcies and unemployment. The fear of 
unemployment increases the pliancy of labour; and the growth of the reserve army 
depresses wages. The weakened state of labour allows for the possibility of the 
reorganization of the workplace and the implementation of new technologies. Whether 
or not this happens will be the outcome of class struggle. The immediate boon to 
capitalist production is the reduction of real wages. At the same time, bankruptcies 
reduce the organic composition of capital by destroying constant capital. When a firm 
files for bankruptcy, its assets must be auctioned off in order to pay off its creditors. 
Machinery and equipment are sold at fire-sale prices. The result for capital as a whole is 
a reduction of the organic composition of capital accompanied by a drop in the price of 
unsold fixed and circulating capital. In other words, the value represented in machinery, 
equipment and raw materials (constant capital) is reduced. These changes are reflected in 
an improved MEC for firms still in .. a ·position to invest. The MEC, remember, is the 
returns on the latest investments. In the context of a crisis of this sort, the price of 
additional units of labour has fallen, as has the price of capital equipment and raw 
materials. Hence, there is an improvement in the MEC and new incentive to invest. 
Moreover, the firm that bought up machinery cheaply now has excess investment funds. 
These funds may be invested in new technological and organizational innovations if 
labour is sufficiently pliant; especially since new inventions have been accumulating over 
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the long downturn.. 131 New technologies that are adopted tend to increase the rate of 
exploitation further and reduce the turnover time of capital. In the long run, they may 
also cheapen the elements of constant capital In these ways, the crisis creates the 
conditions for renewed accumulation. An ascending curve of capitalist development 
ensues. 
Conclusion 
In this chapter, we have explored the long and short-run dynamics of capital 
accumulation in theory. I have emphasised the importance not ·of the rate of profit, nor 
strictly of the mass of profit to continued accumulation. Instead, I have highlighted the 
importance of what Keynes called the marginal efficiency of capital (MEC). In other 
words, business investment and therefore accumulation will continue so long as the 
returns on the latest investments are positive. I have shown how this is the driver of 
accumulation and, at the same time, how it is internally related to the more fundamental 
processes of long-run profitability. I have argued that movements in the MEC, not the 
rate of profit, are central to understanding long periods of stability and instability. In the 
"early" phase of capital accumulation, the MEC is high and stability prevails. As 
accumulation continues apace and enters into its "late" phase, the MEC progressively 
approaches zero. In this "late" phase, the economy is more sensitive to profitability 
shocks, because the MEC can more easily be driven below zero. In the same way, this is 
how the long-run movements in the MEC intersect with investment cycles. I have shown 
that once the MEC achieves zero - in terms of its long-run tendency - the class struggle 
131 Ernest Mandel, Late Capitalism (New York: Verso, 1993), Chapter 4. 
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can act as an important trigger for crises. Absolute overaccumulation (this is, after all, 
what an MEC of zero implies) means that the value produced is not sufficient to maintain 
accumulation, unless wages can be reduced. Hence, wages increasingly get in the way of 
further accumulation in this late phase. It is in this context that the class struggle, if 
successful - i.e. if workers are able to maintain their wages level - can act as a trigger for 
the crisis. Once this crisis occurs, however, it is possible for favourable conditions for 
the renewal of capital accumulation on a new foundation to be met. The above theory 
shall inform the rest of this dissertation. It is to my account of the last three decades of 
capitalist development in Canada that our attention now turns. 
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Depression is a precondition for prosperity; prosperity comes to an end in a new 
depression. They are, so to speak, two sides of the same coin. 132 
- Paul Mattick 
Chapter 2: The Dynamics of Accumulation and Breakdown, 1974-1992 
In the previous chapter, I examined in great detail the theory of overaccumulation, or 
failed valorisation, as developed by Henryk Grossman in his The Law of Accumulation 
and Breakdown of the Capitalist System: Also Being a Theory of Crisis. In this chapter, I 
demonstrate the explanatory power of this framework by analysing the dynamics of 
growth and breakdown in Canada between 1974 and 1992. In what follows, I argue and 
empirically validate the claim that economic instability between 1974 and 1992 was a 
result of overaccumulation. I demonstrate that a slowdown in the growth rate of the mass 
of profit - reflected in a shrinking marginal efficiency of capital - accounts for the 
escalating severity of crises in the 1980s and early 1990s, and that the crisis of the early 
1990s was the result of absoluteoveraccumulation, and I relate these events to the more 
fundamental dynamics of accumulation (most importantly, the rising organic composition 
of capital). The depth and breadth of the crisis and the subsequent depression provided 
the necessary context for the re-establishment of accumulation in Canada beginning 
around 1993, the subject of Chapter 3. 
In the first major section of this chapter, I examine some of the scarce literature on 
the historical dynamics of profitability and accumulation in Canada. In the second major 
section, I examine the rate of profit and its determinants, including the rate of surplus-
value, the organic composition of capital and turnover time. I argue that the long-run 
132Paul Mattick, Marx and Keynes: The Limits of the Mixed Economy. (London: Merlin Press, 1969): 83. 
80 
instability to which the Canadian economy was subjected throughout the 1970s, 1980s 
and 1990s can be understood by examining the interactions between the movements in 
the rate of profit, the mass of profit and the marginal efficiency of capital (MEC). In the 
third major section of this chapter, I examine in great detail the crisis of the early 1990sin 
Canada and the ensuing depression. In this section, I argue that the economic turmoil of 
the early 1990s must be understood in relation to the long-run tendencies of capitalist 
development in Canada. In particular, I argue that the dynamics resulting in a falling rate 
of profit eventually must usher in a stagnating or shrinking mass of profit (MEC ~ 0). I 
argue that the latter is the fundamental reason for the breadth and depth of the early 1990s 
crisis. 
Before beginning my analysis, I would first like to say a word about the Marxist 
ratios deployed in the next section. The purpose of any measure is to illuminate a 
particular relation. The particular measures I use in this section always stand in close 
relation to the aspect of reality I seek to explain. For instance, the reader will notice that I 
use different measures for the rate of profit. This is not an inconsistency. As Kl_ima.tl 
correctly points out, "the most relevant rate of profit to consider always depends upon the 
particular question being addressed." Moreover, "because there is no all-purpose 
measure of 'the' rate of profit, it is not legitimate to reject a particular measure on the 
grounds that it fails to fulfill an all-purpose role."133 In the first section, I seek to 
demonstrate how the rate of profit relates to the rate of surplus-value, the organic 
composition of capital and turnover time. To this end, I develop a proxy measure for the 
133 A. Kliman, The Failure of Capitalist Production: Underlying Causes of the Great Recession (London: 
Pluto Press, 2012): 94. 
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rate of profit that incorporates in the numerator a broader measure of "profit" (surplus-
value), including e.g. wages and salaries paid to nonproduction workers. Later on, when 
examining the dynamics of accumulation and crisis on a more concrete level, I deploy a 
measure for the rate of profit more appropriate to that level of analysis; namely, one that 
includes business sector corporation profits and interest payments before taxes, but does 
not include wages and salaries of nonproduction workers. In that instance, the question is 
not one of relating the Marxist ratios to the rate of profit, but of demonstrating the crucial 
turning points in business profitability and their relation to the marginal efficiency of 
capital and crisis (in particular the crisis of the early 1990s ). 134 In this context, the 
broader measure for the rate of profit is inappropriate. In the same vein, to demonstrate 
the long periods of stability and instability - as they are determined by capital investment 
- I examine a measure for the marginal efficiency of capital. Still in other places, where I 
seek to illuminate e.g. the relative movements of the rate and mass of profit in the U.S. 
and Canada, I use indices because the levelsof the rate and mass of profit are not relevant 
134 An analysis of the difference between these two profit rates principally via the movements in the 
magnitude of nonproduction worker wages and salaries is beyond the scope of this chapter. On a more 
concrete level, i.e. considering the rate of profit as it concerns accumulation more directly and after 
distribution, the growth of unproductive activities (insofar as they form a component part of surplus-value) 
likely contributed to the falling rate of profit in this period. Wages and salaries of unproductive labour grew 
as a percentage of total wages and salaries. In 1981 this ratio stood at 13.76 percent. By 1992 it reached 
17.33 percent. To put it differently, in 1981 approximately 16 cents were paid out in nonproduction wages 
and salaries for every dollar paid out in production wages and salaries; by 1992 this number had risen to 21 
cents. An analysis of unproductive activities must occur on a lower level, i.e. after distribution. For this 
reason, its components must be disaggregated into the flows stemming from variable capital (i.e. taxes on 
workers) and surplus-value "(unproductive labour-power purchased and taxes). From this perspective, 
unproductive labour cannot strictly be considered surplus-value. The broader rate of profit measure 
deployed in this study does not use this disaggregated approach, and in this sense it is one-sided. I am 
reserving an analysis of the relationship between unproductive labour and the rate of profit to a future 
study. This gap does not affect this study because, first, accumulation and crisis are determined by 
movements in the mass of profit considered in the narrower sense, i.e. after unproductive labour 
compensation has been deducted from surplus-value, i.e. on a more concrete level than that considered in 
this section of the chapter. Second, this gap is not likely to affect the downward trend in the (broader) rate 
of profit. 
82 
to the question being asked. Finally, I have opted for Marxist proxy measures for the rate 
of surplus-value, organic composition, turnover time and (the broader) rate of profit. 
Although imperfect, these proxies are not likely to significantly skew the tendential 
movement of these ratios. More detail about these measures can be found in the Data 
Appendix. With the above caveats in mind, let us now tum to our review of the literature. 
Literature on the historical movements of profitability and growth in Canada 
There is an unfortunate paucity of literature on the historical dynamics of profitability 
and capital accumulation in Canada. In fact, to my knowledge there is no literature at all 
on the historical movements of the marginal efficiency of capital in Canada over the last 
period. There have, however, been a few pieces that look at trends in the rate of profit and 
capital accumulation over the last decades. In this connection, I will examine here the 
work of Murray Smith and K.W. Taylor, Mario Seccareccia and Fletcher Baragar as well 
as that of Jim Stanford. 135 I will begin with Stanford, whose approach is admittedly least 
commensurate with my own. I will follow this with a review of Seccareccia and Baragar 
and then .proceed to Smith and Taylor. Thrpughout, I will situate my own work in this 
literature. 
In Paper Boom, Stanford argues that the last decade of the twentieth century saw 
less investment in the "real" economy than in the so-called "paper" economy. He 
suggests that Canada's economy developed two personalities during the 1990s. The paper 
135 Jim Stanford, Paper Boom: Why Real Prosperity Requires a New Approach to Canada's Economy. 
(Ottawa: Canadian Centre for Policy Alternatives, 1999) and "Having Their Cake and Eating It Too -
Business Profits, Taxes and Investment in Canada: 1961-2010." April 2011. Canadian Centre for Policy 
Alternatives; Mario Seccareccia and Fletcher Baragar. 2008. "Financial Restructuring: Implications of 
Recent Canadian Macroeconomic Developments." Studies in Political Economy, 82: 61-83; Murray Smith 
and K. W. Taylor. 1996. "Profitability Crisis and the Erosion of Popular Prosperity: The Canadian 
Economy, 1947-1991." Studies in Political Economy, 49: 101-130. 
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economy was booming while the so-called "real" economy was suffering. For Stanford, 
"the emergence of a huge financial bubble ... may have actually undermined the 
accumulation of real wealth by creating uncertainty about the stability of wealth and by 
diverting the creative energies of Canadians away from more concretely useful economic 
undertakings."136To make his case, Stanford cites declining net investment as a share of 
GDP .137 This, it is supposed, is a sign of a diversion of funds away from productive 
investments. Unfortunately, he does not consider the effects of restructuring and 
organizational change on the fixed investment share of GDP. For instance, his graph 
demonstrates that the majority of the decline in investment was in buildings and 
structures in this period. 138In this dissertation, I hope to demonstrate that this decline can 
be attributed to significant restructuring and organizational change with the introduction 
and proliferation of just-in-time production and distribution. As further proof of 
deteriorating investment, Stanford suggests that "the stagnation of real household 
incomes reflects the corresponding stagnation of the real economy where most Canadians 
earn a living." 139Unsurprisingly, this view assumes that capitalism must be stagnantif its 
working population is living on stagnant income.Of course, capitalism can get by just 
fine - in fact thrives - on stagnant wages, as we have seen in Chapter 1. The goal of 
capitalist production after all is profit, not rising working-class income and 
consumption. 140 
136 Jim Stanford, Paper Boom: Why Real Prosperity Requires a New Approach to Canada's Economy. 
(Ottawa: Canadian Centre for Policy Alternatives, 1999): 34. 
137Ibid, p. 148. 
138Ibid, p. 154. 
139Ibid, p. 36. 
140 Of course, this is not to say that capitalism cannot thrive with rising wages as well. 
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According to Stanford, the principal reason the paper economy became unhinged 
from the real economy and began to undermine it was a series of policy changes that "can 
be dated to about 1981" when "the goal of full employment" was explicitly abandoned. 141 
Elsewhere he identifies this as "the point at which growth and job-creation were deposed 
from the podium of macroeconomic priorities in favour of inflation-control and financial 
profitability."142 Since that time, high interest rates "have become a more-or-less 
permanent feature of Canada's economic landscape" and "slower economic growth, 
chronic unemployment, and a virtually permanent atmosphere of recession have been its 
long-term results."143 To be sure, Stanford locates the source of the economic malaise 
squarely in fiscal and monetary policy choices. He argues that "interest rates, both short-
run and long-run, are clearly an outcome of deliberate policy" and that falling profits are 
a result of government policy around "free trade and deregulation" that "heightened 
competitive pressures which businesses face." 144 There is however one exception that 
does not seem to be purely the result of policy. For Stanford, "the success of workers in 
winning higher incomes ... contributed to a long-term squeeze on the profitability of 
private business" as well. 145 As a result of all of these processes,there has been a 
significant "slowdown in economic growth since 1980."146 
141 Ibid, p. 147. Importantly, the Canadian state never had a policy of full employment. 
142Ibid, p. 158. 
143Ibid, p. 147. 
1441bid, p. 232. 
145Ibid, p. 247. For a critique of the wage-push profit squeeze theory, see Robert Brenner, The Economics of 
Global Turbulence (New York: Verso, 2006), pp. 19-24. 
146Ibid, p. 165. Stanford attributes equal plausibility to three possible explanatory factors for economic 
slowdown (GDP growth, real interest rates and business profitability), but he does not examine the 
relationships between each factor. From the standpoint of classical political economy, GDP growth is 
determined by business investment. Investment, in turn is determined by profitability. If business can make 
a profit it will invest. Therefore, in terms of causality, the rate of profit is the most important factor, 
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The upshot of the above is to highlight that the principal problem for Stanford is 
one of policy.Indeed, the sense in which the laws of capitalist accumulation operate 
"behind our backs" appears to be entirely lost on him. For Stanford, the last decade of the 
last century was an era of "permanent recession" brought about by government policy 
aimed at controlling wage increases and inflation. 147 This policy was 
about redistributing the economic pie ... protecting real returns, helping stock 
markets reach still loftier heights, and generating huge capital gains on 
existing bonds. And the deliberate recreation of a large and permanent pool of 
desperate unemgloyed workers has done wonders for private employers in the 
real economy. 1 
Therefore, he concludes that "if investment and hence job-creation are too slow in 
Canada, this is primarily because of the way Canadian economic and financial policies 
have evolved over time."149 Of course, the political logic of this position is that the 
apparent economic malaise finds its remedy in capitalist policy formation. 
More recently Stanford published a piece that covers newer developments not 
addressed in his Paper Boom, but the argument is similar. 150 In "Having Their Cake and 
Eating It Too -. Business Profits, Taxes and Investment iri Canada: ·1961-2010," he 
correctly begins by suggesting that "the vibrancy and success of business investment 
followed by the rate of interest. These factors - together - determine the rate of profit of enterprise. As we 
have seen above, according to Shaikh it is the latter that determines·investment and GDP growth (Stanford 
seems to acknowledge this fact on p. 214). This dissertation differs from Shaikh insofar as it views the 
MEC minus the interest rate as the principal driver of business investment, as we have already seen above. 
The upshot is that Stanford misses these connections altogether, leaving us with a hollow statistical 
analysis. 
147Ibid, p. 194. 
148Ibid, p. 198. 
149Ibid, p. 181. 
150 Jim Stanford, "Having Their Cake and Eating It Too - Business Profits, Taxes and Investment in 
Canada: 1961-2010." April 2011. Canadian Centre for Policy Alternatives. 
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spending is a central determinant of the overall state. of the economy."151 The principal 
point he makes in the piece is that corporate tax reductions over the last decades "have 
had no visible direct impact on business investment."152 In other words, they have not 
sufficiently contributed to the growth of the capital stock. In fact, despite corporate tax 
rate reductions between 1988-2010 under Mulroney, Martin and Harper, business 
investment spending remained approximately two percentage points below postwar 
levels, at around "14 to 16 percent of GDP."153 The result, Stanford suggests, is that "the 
average capital-labour ratio in Canada is actually lower than it was twenty years ago."154 
For Stanford, "this is an unexpected and worrying finding." Indeed, "we would expect the 
average Canadian worker . . . to be utilizing more capital in their daily work than two 
decades ago, not less."155 In addition to lower levels of investment as a portion of GDP 
and their apparent deleterious effects on the capital stock, the combination of 
significantly improved corporate profitability, lower corporate taxes and growing capital 
depreciation charges over the last period led to an increase in business after-tax cash 
flow. 156 Hence, Stanford concludes, the.difference between investment and cash flow has 
been growing over the last two decades, and this has resulted in a large quantity of funds 
that "have not been ploughed back into new expenditures on fixed non-residential capital 
in Canada."157The parallels with Paper Boom spring to the eye. To be sure, the gap 
between after-tax corporate cash flow and business investment in fixed non-residential 
151 Ibid, p. 5. 
152Ibid, p. 6. 
153Ibid, p. 7. 
154Ibid, p. 9. 
155 Ibid. 
156 Ibid. 
157 Ibid, pp. 9-10. 
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capital stock has resulted in "excess corporate saving."158 These excess funds have 
flowed into "excess" dividend payouts, "excess" accumulation of cash and short-term 
financial assets, the reduction of debt, a net outflow of FDI as well as share buybacks and 
acquisitions. 159 The upshot, for Stanford, is that not enough of this "excess corporate 
saving" is being reinvested in the capital stock; or, to use the language of Paper Boom, 
too much money is flowing into the "paper" economy and not enough is being invested in 
the "real" economy. As a result, "spending power, job-creation, and productivity growth" 
have suffered. 16° For Stanford, improving demand-side conditions by increasing 
corporate taxes and investing in public infrastructure would be a significant boon to the 
economy and would put these funds to good use. Here, too, the solution to the apparent 
malaise is to be found in capitalist policy formation. 
Importantly, many of the factors that Stanford sees as ills over the last decades 
are - from a Classical Marxist standpoint - beneficial to capital accumulation and 
reproduction. For instance, he writes that "the capital stock is barely keeping up with the 
growth in Canada's working population as a result of the investment slowdown"161 and is 
"inadequate to Canada's needs for more capital."162 However, he does not take into 
consideration that the apparent shrinking of the capital stock may be a reflection of a 
change in its price or value. He does not consider what is happening to the capital stock 
in physical terms. In either case, he identifies the declining capital-labour ratio as 
something that we should be concerned about. However, from a Classical Marxist 
1581bid, p. 13. 
1591bid, p. 13. 
160Ibid, p. 27. 
1611bid, p. 9. 
1621bid, p. 27. 
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standpoint, a declining capital-labour ratio reflects a falling organic composition of 
capital and is therefore a boon to capital accumulation. We will investigate the actual 
trends in the organic composition of capital for Canada below. We will see that this was, 
indeed, an advantage to profitability and business investment over the last twenty years in 
Canada. Let us now turn to examine the work of Baragar and Seccareccia on the recent 
period of Canadian capitalism. 
In "Financial Restructuring: Implications of Recent Canadian Macroeconomic 
Developments," Baragar and Seccareccia argue that growth since the 1990s has been 
driven principally by consumer debt. The argument runs as follows: the fiscal revolution 
and the low-inflation regime established by government policy-makers in the 1990s 
created a situation of public surpluses for the first time in decades. At the same time, the 
restructuring of the private sector in the 1980s and 1990s led to a great increase in 
profitability. In turn, this led to robust levels of investment - levels not seen since the 
peaks of 1974 and 1981. 163 However, the latter was organized at the expense of labour. In 
particular, the following measures. shifted the balance of power in favour of capital: lean 
production, the restructuring of employment insurance, statutory retrenchment for public 
services as well as the proliferation of user fees, the use of unemployment to combat 
inflation and the state's growing role in controlling labour. 164 These developments 
contributed to the formation of large corporate surpluses, as identified by Stanford above. 
As a result, the corporate sector began to lend to the working class, whose wages had not 
163Mario Seccareccia and Fletcher Baragar. 2008. "Financial Restructuring: Implications of Recent 
Canadian Macroeconomic Developments." Studies in Political Economy, 82: 61-83, p. 69. 
164Ibid, p. 73. 
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kept· up with the growth of productivity. In the context of low interest rates and easy 
money, the working class began to take on mortgages. As housing prices began to rise, 
workers who owned homes were able to gain access to additional credit. 165 As a result of 
these processes, the government and corporations have reduced their debt-loads, while 
working-class debt has increased substantially. To be sure, however, "strong and 
sustained consumer spending is playing a major role in pushing demand and supporting 
growth in the Canadian economy."166 
So, how is what I am proposing different from Baragar and Seccareccia? 
Whereas for me the key determinant of capitalist stability is the MEC minus the interest 
rate and its relation to Marx's value categories and capital accumulation, for Baragar and 
Seccareccia, in this piece, it is effective demand. In their analysis of recent 
macroeconomic developments in Canada, the authors argue that the long period of 
·stability in question was based upon an unsustainable and unequal distribution of wealth. 
Indeed, "the new century in Canada is marked by a virtually unprecedented stretch of 
public sector surpluses, private corporate surpluses, and household sector deficits."167 To 
remedy the situation, the authors suggest a return to the policies of the postwar "Golden 
Age" in which growth was sustained "by a virtuous cycle of rising real wages and 
productivity, propelled forward via expansionary fiscal policy."168 From a Classical 
Marxist perspective, these policy suggestions do not address the contradictions of 
capitalist society at a more fundamental level. In other words, as we have already seen, it 
165Ibid, p. 77. 
166 Ibid, pp. 78-79. 
167Ibid, p. 62. 
168Ibid, p. 81. 
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1s growth itself that ushers in stagnation. Productivity increases ultimately reduce 
profitability by increasing the organic composition of capital; and accumulation - not 
rising real wages - must be maintained for capitalism to have any viability. 
In a recent unpublished paper, Baragar is. more attentive to Marx's value 
categories in describing the processes that unfolded in the period before the early 1990s 
recession and the neoliberal growth regime that got underway afterwards. He 
appropriately identifies "declining profitability" as the principal problem facing North 
American capitalism in the 1970s and 1980s, and argues that the turn to neo-liberal 
policies conceived of as "a concrete program of reconfiguring markets and restructuring 
production" was effective for capital insofar as it consolidated its power, raised the rate 
of surplus-value, restored profitability and shifted the distribution of wealth to those at 
the top. 169 In particular, it was the imposition of monetarist policies that forced 
uncompetitive firms to go bankrupt, thereby destroying capital values and weakening 
labour. The result was a reduction of the organic composition of capital and an increase 
in the rate of surplus-value. 170 To be sure, the shift to neoliberal policy occasioned 
restructuring in this period. Indeed, "supply-siders ... prevailed in the corridors of power 
as well as in the halls of academe . . . The attendant restructuring swept through the 
economy and renewed profitability was duly forthcoming." 171 In turn, the program of 
austerity implemented at the time acted to improve profitability, to "stabilize the 
macroeconomic framework" and to "lay the foundation for renewed accumulation" by 
169Fletcher Baragar. 2013. "Austerity and Capital Restructuring." Unpublished manuscript, pp. 8 and 1. 
170Ibid, p. 3. 
171Ibid, p. 4. 
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weakening labour and freeing up capital to effect the restructuring that would favourably 
alter the constant and variable components of capital. 172 
The latter approach to the period is admittedly much closer to my own than the 
two analyses preceding it. By deploying value categories and focusing on profitability 
and the organic composition of capital, Baragar offers a much deeper analysis. There are, 
however, some important differences with my theorization. First, Baragar locates the 
renewal of accumulation in the mid-l 990s in neoliberal policy and a program of austerity. 
In fact, my research demonstrates that the conditions for renewed accumulation in 
Canada began to be established beforeneoliberal policies were fully adopted in Canada 
(with the election of Jean Chretien in 1993) and before substantialausterity policies came 
into effect (e.g. with the implementation of Bob Rae's Social Contract in 1993). Indeed, 
bankruptcies and the concomitant reduction in the price of machinery and equipment 
began as early as 1988 (but only really took off after 1990), as we will see in Chapter 3. 
The austerity measures undoubtedly contributed to the weakening of labour, but the crisis 
of the early 1990s had ·already ·dramatically increased the industrial reserve army of 
labour, as we will see later on in this chapter. In other words, austerity largely took place 
in the context of the renewal of capital accumulation. Indeed, that is why it successfully 
resulted in a rebalanced budget by 1995. To be sure, Baragar emphasizes the 
consciousactivity of the capitalist class in the process of restructuring to the exclusion of 
the developments that occur "behind the backs" of these actors. Second, Baragar tends to 
172Ibid, p. 5. 
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lump in the processes occurring m Canada with those that occur in the U.S. 173This 
dissertation demonstrates that the long-run dynamics of capital accumulation in Canada 
and the U.S. are in fact quite distinct. 
Before turning to my analysis of the long downturn, it is worth examining the 
work of Murray Smith and K.W. Taylor on the same topic and how their interpretation of 
events differs from my own. In their 1996 article, entitled "Profitability Crisis and the 
Erosion of Popular Prosperity: The Canadian Economy, 1947-1991," the authors argue 
that Canada's economic malaise at the time had its roots in the falling rate of profit 
(which began in 1950).174 They assert that "contemporary capitalism is indeed in crisis" 
and that this is the fundamentally the result of a growing organic composition of 
capital. 175 In the course of their article, they make an important distinction between 
"capitalist prosperity" and "popular prosperity."176 Importantly, they define capitalist 
prosperity has "an economic situation marked by 'adequate~· rates of return on invested 
capital, that is to say, a high average rate of profit."177 Popular prosperity, on the other 
hand, refers to ·"an economic situation characterized by low levels of unemployment and 
rising average living standards." 178 These two forms of prosperity were reconciled in the 
postwar period; however, due to the falling rate of profit, contemporary capitalist 
prosperity increasingly takes place at the expense of popular prosperity. The authors 
173Ibid, p. 2. 
174Murray Smith and K. W. Taylor. 1996. "Profitability Crisis and the Erosion of Popular Prosperity: The 
Canadian Economy, 1947-1991." Studies in Political Economy, 49: 101-130. 
175Ibid, p. 103. 
176Ibid, p. 106. 
177 Ibid, pp. 104-5. 
178Ibid, p. I 05. 
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argue that "inadequate" rates of return - and they do not specify what this means - have 
caused the economic malaise. 
There are a number of problems with this approach. First, "adequate" rates of 
return to induce investment are not specified. To be sure, the authors provide no basis 
from which to judge what constitutes a "high average rate of profit" or a low average rate 
of profit. Hence, they fail to demonstrate how capitalist investment is objectively limited 
by profitability. To be sure, their analysis leaves plenty of room for subjectively 
determined investment levels. After all, that which may be deemed an "adequate" rate of 
return for one capitalist may not be for another and so on (even if we are speaking of 
movements in the average rate of profit). In this way, capitalist investment becomes 
subjectively limited instead of objectively limited, despite their claims to the contrary. 
Second, in the same way, they assume the rate of profit governs accumulation directly. 
Following Grossman, my approach is different in that it demonstrates the objective limits 
to further investment in fixed capital and hence accumulation based upon movements in 
the mass .of profit and, in .particular, the marginal..efficie~cy of capital. Third, as a· result 
of these problems, they are unable to identify key turning points of central importance to 
the dynamics of growth and crisis. Smith and Taylor discuss stagnation, but do not 
specify the mechanisms of crisis formation, especially as concerns that important turning 
point for capital in this country, i.e. the Great Canadian Slump of 1990-92. To be sure, 
they do not specify the mechanisms of breakdown. This element of the analysis is left 
very vague and is admittedly a significant weakness in their approach. Their silence on 
the question of the eruption of the early 1990s crisis can be attributed to the theoretical 
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limits of reducing the dynamics of capital accumulation to movements in the rate of 
profit. Below I will show how re-focusing our attention on movements in the mass of 
profit, like Grossman, and in particular on the marginal efficiency of capital, allows 
usboth to pinpoint the mechanisms leading to the outbreak of the crisis of the early 
l 990sand to identify the reasons for increasing economic difficulties leading up to that 
point. Fourth, the authors do not adequately distinguish the long-run patterns of capital 
accumulation in Canada from the rest of the world. Hence, they argue that "the basic 
trends with respect to productivity growth, the average rate of profit, the rate of new 
capital stock formation inthe private business sector, the real wage, and unemployment 
were typical of the advanced capitalist world as a whole."179 In fact, the rate of profit in 
Canada and the U.S. followed distinct paths in this period, as we will see below. 
Moreover, their article was written three years after capital accumulation got restarted in 
Canada and two years after total compensation per hour worked began growing again 
(albeit at a slower rate than productivity growth), as we will see in Chapter 3. Thus the 
article. is historic.ally inaccurate regarding events in. Canada and does not deal with how 
they differed from events in the U.S. Let us now tum to my interpretation of the 
dynamics of accumulation and breakdown between 1974 and 1992. 
The tendential fall of the rate of profit in Canada 
In the years 1974-1992, GDP growth and employment rates fluctuated considerably. 
In this section, I will explain the dynamics of capitalist accumulation in Canada during 
these years by means of the theory outlined in the previous chapter and the empirical data 
179 Ibid, p. 108, emphasis added. 
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at hand. As 197 4 is widely recognized as the year the Canadian economy took a turn for 
the worse, I will use this year as the starting point for my analysis. 18° For the purposes of 
this analysis, I have derived Marxist proxy measures from Statistics Canada's national 
accounts. Let us now turn to these figures. 181 
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Figure 7. Rate of profit falls, 1974-92 
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Figure 7 above demonstrates the downward trend in the average rate of profit. 
The average rate of profit measures aggregate profit (surplus-value)over gross fixed 
capital stock of the previous year (constant capital). 182 Profit is the life-blood of 
18° Kenneth Norrie, Douglas Owram and J.C. Herbert Emery, A History of the Canadian Economy, 4th ed. 
(Toronto: Thomson Nelson, 2004): 402. 
181 For data sources and methods, see Appendix. 
182 To be sure, this measures the gross rate of profit. The gross rate of profit measures total surplus-value 
over gross fixed capital stock, whereas the net rate of profit measures surplus-value minus nonproduction 
worker wages over fixed capital stock. At this level of abstraction, when dealing with the effects of the 
organic composition of capital, the rate of surplus-value, etc. on the rate of profit, the gross rate of profit is 
used. The net rate of profit is a more concrete measure with slightly more complex determinants; i.e. 
taking into consideration the growth of nonproduction activities and their determinants. A full discussion of 
these determinants of the growth of nonproduction labour is beyond the scope of this dissertation. 
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capitalism. Without it, no accumulation can take place. The rate of profit tells us about 
the overall "health" of the economy. As I have shown, a falling rate of profit is a 
necessary, but not a sufficient condition for instability. Movements in the mass of profit 
- and their reflection in the MEC - are the key to periods of stability and instability. 
Before examining the mass of profit and the MEC, let us turn our attention to the 
determinants of the rate of profit. 
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Figure 8. Rate of surplus-value rises, 1974-92 
Source: See Appendix 
As we have seen, the theory tells us that the rate of profit can fall 
despitemovements in the rate of surplus-value. This holds true empirically as well. The 
fall in the rate of profit cannot be attributed to a fall in the rate of surplus-value in this 
period, as the latter grew throughout most of the 1980s as the rate of profit was falling 
(see Figure 8 above). In other words, a falling rate of surplus-value was not the cause of 
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the falling rate of profit in this period. I will explore the political implications of this fact 
later. 
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According to the theory, a rising organic composition of capital contributes to a 
falling rate of profit. Unlike with the rate of surplus-value, there appears to be a strong 
relationship between the organic composition of capital and the rate of profit in the period 
leading up to and following the early 1990s economic crisis. 
The organic composition fluctuated cyclically throughout the period (a result of 
the dynamics of the business cycle, already explained in Chapter 1 and to be explored in 
more detail empirically in Chapter 4 ), but it remained high and trended upwardsuntil 
1993 (see Figure 9). A similar, downward trending pattern is apparent for the rate of 
profit. The significance of a high and rising organic composition and its relation to 
stagnation will become apparent when we tum to the post 1990-92 crisis trend, which 
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exhibits a downward movement coincident with a rising rate of profit and renewed 
accumulation. 
As theorized above, a high orgaruc composition indicates creepmg 
overaccumulation. In part, this accounts for the slowdown of accumulation throughout 
the period (see Figure 13 below). A rising organic composition points to the internal 
limits of capitalist growth. As accumulation advances, accumulation itself becomes more 
difficult. As Marx put it, "the true barrier to capitalist production is capital itself."183 
Like with the rate of surplus-value, the political implications of this fact will be discussed 
below. 
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Another important factor for the downward trending rate of profit in this period 
was the significant increase in turnover time (see Figure 10 above). Turnover time 
constitutes production and circulation time. In 1974, it would take 13 years to turn over 
183 K. Marx, Capital, Volume3 (New York: Penguin Books, 1991): 358. 
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gross fixed capital stock once; by 1992, it would take 18 years. This increase is likely a 
function of the growth of constant capital throughout the period. As I will demonstrate 
further below, capital found new ways to decrease turnover time throughout the 1980s 
and 1990s. These innovations were implemented in the restructuring that followed the 
crises of 1982 and especially 1990-92. 
Figure 11. Declining mass of profit growth rate, 1973-92 
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As the theory suggests, eventually a falling rate of profit will usher in a stagnating 
mass of profit. The above graph demonstrates that the growth. rate of the mass of profit 
trended downward throughout the period. The peak of each business cycle is 
significantly lower than the one preceding it. Although the growth of the mass of profit 
began to slow down in the 1970s, it did not reach destabilising levels until the 1980s. At 
this point, the business cycles combined with overaccumulation to produce long and deep 
crises. The depth of the 1982 crisis can be partly attributed to the high interest rates of 
the period. The rate of profit of enterprise is the average rate of profit minus the interest 
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rate. In 1981, the rate of profit of enterprise was -3 .1 percent, while the average rate of 
profit was 12.5 percent. A larger share of profit was distributed to the credit 
intermediaries and the banks at the expense of individual enterprises, thereby facilitating 
bankruptcy and unemployment. High interest rates were part of the government's anti-
inflationary strategy at the time, but also reflect the normal mechanisms of capitalist 
accumulation. 184 A confluence of factors combined in 1990 to produce the deepest crisis 
since the Great Depression of the thirties. 185 At that point in time, the business cycle 
combined with the downward trend in the mass of profit to produce a deep and long 
crisis. We will return to the 1990-92crisis in greater detail further below. 
Figure 12. MEC, 1975-89 
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The declining growth rate of the mass of profit coincided with a marginal 
efficiency of capital (minus the interest rate) at critically low levels throughout this 
184Norrie et al., A History of the Canadian Economy, 405. In Chapter 5, I will demonstrate how the 
dynamics of accumulation - not institutional arrangements - ultimately govern the relationship between 
banks and firms. 
185 Norrie et al., A History of the Canadian Economy, 405 
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period. In fact, the average MEC throughout this period (indicated by the broken line in 
Figure 12 above) was -2.6 percent. If we compare this with its average level in the period 
1993-2008, the difference is astonishing. In the latter period, the MEC averaged 13.6 
percent. In other words, the average difference between the 1993-2008 and 1975-1989 
was an incredible 16.2 percentage points. That is to say that if capitalists invested in the 
period 1993-2008, they could expect a return of 13.6 percent on their latest investments 
on average. Likewise, in the period 1975-1989, investing in additional capital equipment 
was a very risky undertaking. We will examine trends in the MEC in more detail in 
Chapter 3. For now, it is sufficient to .point out that accumulation through this period was 
fragile to say the least. Moreover, as a result of these problems of profitability, the rate of 
capital accumulation slowed throughout the period. 
Figure 13. Rate of accumulation slows, 1974-91 
Source: See Appendix 
As we have seen, the rate of accumulation is a function of the mass of profit and 
the MEC. This is an important observation, and the coincidence of the patterns is more 
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meaningful than that between the rate of profit and the rate of accumulation, as opposed 
to what many Marxists suggest (e.g. Kliman). In the latter case, the denominator is often 
the same in both the measure for the rate of profit and for the rate of accumulation (either 
gross capital stock or net capital stock) and therefore produces a similar pattern for that 
very reason. Using the growth rate of the mass of profit - and more specifically the MEC 
- gets us closer to the processes governing accumulation and crisis. When the mass of 
profit growth rate begins to slow along with the MEC, accumulation mustslow down 
(and, of course, once the mass of profit stagnates or shrinks, the paucity of investment 
funds and zero or negative profitability on the latest investments will cause business 
investment to stop altogether, the absolute point of overaccumulation). We have seen 
that the growth rate of the mass of profit slowed in this period and that the MEC was 
critically low. Predictably, this is reflected in a declining rate of accumulation. I 
demonstrated how the rate of accumulation is an "equilibrium mechanism" in capitalism. 
When accumulation runs into trouble, the latent disequilibrium between production and 
consumption in capitalism manifests itself in greater instability. This is precisely the 
character of the period in question. 186 
Political implications 
Before examining the crisis of 1990-92, it is worth noting the political 
implications of the above analysis. Using Marxist measures, we see that declining 
profitability was not due to a long-run wage-push profit squeeze, nor was it due to a 
186 Norrie et al., A History of the Canadian Economy, 401 
103 
decline in the production of surplus-value. 187 Implied in these latter theories of crisis is a 
politics of class equilibrium, according to which an institutional framework can be 
established in which workers are neither too strong nor too weak. According to this 
view, weak workers' wages are too low to purchase the commodities produced, which 
leads to a crisis of underconsumption. On the other hand, strong workers are 
unproductive and their wages are too high. This state of affairs reduces profitability and 
causes the economy to stagnate. From this perspective, crises can be avoided by 
institutionalising the right balance of class power. The analysis above demonstrates that 
the theory behind this politics is patently false. The "productivity" of workers - insofar 
as the relevant measure of productivity is the production of surplus-value - was high 
throughout the period. The economy began to run into trouble in 197 4, but the rate of 
surplus-value did not decline. Clearly, the production of surplus-value by employed 
production workers was not a problem. Instead, I have shown that it was capitalist 
accumulation itself that begot stagnation. A rising organic composition of capital was the 
principal cause of the falling rate of profit, the shrinking growth rate of the mass of profit· 
and the low-level MEC in this period. In other words, slowing growth occurred relatively 
independently of distribution in the long-run. The wage-push profit squeeze theorists only 
account for declining profitability, investment and stagnation in distributional terms (i.e. 
the class struggle over the distribution of wealth). They do not theorize it as a system-
wide decline in the production of surplus-value - of surplus-value relative to constant 
187 For theories of declining profitability/productivity that rely on the power relations between the classes, 
see e.g. Philip Armstrong, Andrew Glyn, and John Harrison, Capitalism Since 1945. (Oxford: Basil 
Blackwell, 1991); Samuel Bowles, David M. Gordon, and Thomas E. Weisskopf, After the Wasteland: 
Democratic Economics for the Year 2000 (London: Sharpe, 1990). 
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capital - only as a relative decline in wealth for this or that class. Yet the empirical 
evidence suggests that there was just such a system-wide decline in surplus-value. The 
distributive struggle was only secondary to this. This will be examined in more detail 
below. The political upshot of my analysis is that "the crisis is an economic expression 
of the exploitative capital-labour relations" built into the very heart of the capitalist 
accumulation itself. 188 
In the next section, I will examine the 1990-92 crisis (in Chapter 3, I will explain how 
the subsequent depression ushered in one of the longest periods of stable accumulation in 
Canadian history, 1993-2008). I will demonstrate that the crisis of 1990-92 was a 
necessary consequence of capitalist accumulation itself; not the fault of the banks, short-
sighted regulators or irresponsible speculators. The political upshot of this analysis is 
that there are only so many ways capitalist accumulation can get back on track after a 
crisis of absolute overaccumulation, and these always have negative repercussions for 
workers. The terms of the recovery are simultaneously challenges to labour. In other 
words, periods of crisis and recovery are periods of heightened class struggle, because the 
import of the distributional struggle for continued accumulation grows. For this reason, 
there are many lessons to be learned from the crisis of 1990-92 that are relevant for 
ongoing struggles in the world economy today. 189 Let us now turn to our analysis of the 
1990-92 recession and subsequent slump. 
The Great Canadian Slump 
188 Paul Mattick, Marx and Keynes: The Limits of the Mixed Economy (London: Merlin Press, 1980): 72. 
189For more on the world economy, see David McNally, Global Slump: The Economics and Politics of 
Crisis and Resistance. (Black Point: Femwood, 2011). 
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Following seven years of robust economic growth, 190 the Canadian economy 
entered into a protracted period of financial and industrial turmoil in the spnng of 
1990.191 After months of deflection, the federal government finally acknowledged in the 
autumn that "sustainable growth can't go on forever." 192 Minister of Finance, Michael 
Wilson, reassured the public that he did "not expect this to be a severe recession."193 
Others were less optimistic, but surely more realistic. "The party's over," confessed CIBC 
senior economist, John Clinkard. 194 
The OECD called the downturn "unusual," for it preceded the dip in the U.S. by 
six months. 195 Previous business cycles had been synchronous. For this reason, it was 
eventually dubbed a "made-in-Canada recession."196 It was also deeper and longer than 
the recession in the U.S. and other major trading partners. 197 While the downturn lasted 
only eight months in the U.S., it persisted for twenty-seven months in Canada. In fact, it 
was the longest economic decline in postwar history. In its 1992 economic survey, the 
OECD noted that "while in all previous business cycles since the 1950s output had 
returned fo its pre-recession level within three quarters, in early 1992 real GDP was still 
190 Output grew by 4.5 percent in 1988. See CANSIM Table. 379-0023. 
191 Robert Kozak, "Canada's Recession Deepens as Economy Shrinks." Reuters, Feb. 28, 1991. 
192 Kenneth Kidd, "Jelinek Says Canada in a 'Slowdown' Agrees with Conference Board's Gloomy 
Forecast, but Refuses to Call It a Recession." The Globe and Mail, Oct. 12 1990. 
193 
"Canada Announces Recession Is Official." Chicago Tribune, Nov. 15 1990. 
194 Fred Langan, "Canadian Bank Anticipates Long, Tough Recession.'~ The Christian Science Monitor, 26 
December 1990. 
195 
"Canada Announces Recession Is Official." Chicago Tribune, Nov. 15 1990; "The Recession and 
Expected Recovery." OECD Publications and Information Centre, 1991, p. 11 and 33; Warren Potter, 
"Let's Call It as It Is: A Recession." Toronto Star, Oct. 27 1990. 
196 Brian Milner, "Canada in Its First Home-Made Recession Conference Board Stops 'Equivocating,' 
Changes Its Views." The Globe and Mail, Oct. 11 1990. 
197 OECD, OECDEconomic Surveys, Canada. OECD Publications and Information Centre, 1991, 35-6. 
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about 2 per cent below the peak registered in early 1990."198 By the end of 1991, TD 
Bank Chief Economist, Douglas Peters, pronounced that "we've almost put the economy 
in a pine box."199 And by the beginning of 1996, cumulative output losses surpassed $400 
billion and continued to grow "at an annual rate of $75 billion.'~200 
The "made-in-Canada recession" soon became known as "the worst slump since 
the Great Depression."201 Employment and output losses resulting from the slump 
exceeded "everything we have known since the Great Depression of the 1930s."202 Job 
losses grew at three times the pace of those in the United States, and by 1993 the official 
unemployment rate reached 12.5 percent. 203 By 1996 cumulative employment losses in 
Canada amounted to "30 per cent of the corresponding losses of the 1930s" and double 
those from 1982 to 1986.204 Moreover, there was little sign of the storm letting up.205 
Instructively, the employment-to-population ratio would not recover to pre-crisis levels 
until the new millennium. Indeed, the "jobless recovery" after 1993 prompted Canadian 
Labour Congress President, Ken Georgetti, to name the 1990s "the worst decade for 
198 OECD, OECDEconomic SunJeys, Canada. OECD Publications and Information Centre, 1992, 11. 
199 Mary Williams Walsh, "Canada's Recession Deepens Slump Is Worse Than in U.S." Los Angeles 
Times, Dec. 29 1991. 
200 Pierre Fortin, "The Great Canadian Slump." The Canadian Journal of Economics 29, no. 4 (1996): 783. 
201 Walsh, "Canada's Recession Deepens Slump." 
202 Fortin, "The Great Canadian Slump," 761. 
203 John Urquhart, "Canada's Recession Is Getting Worse, New Reports Show." The Wall Street Journal, 
Feb. 11 1991; and CANSIM Table 2820085. 
204 Timothy Lewis, Jn the Long Run We're All Dead: The Canadian Turn to Fiscal Restraint. (Vancouver: 
UBC Press, 2003), 147. 
205Fortin, "The Great Canadian Slump." 783. 
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Canadians in our history. "206 In economics circles, the 1990s are now known as the years 
of the Great Canadian Slump.207 
In this chapter, I use the theoretical framework developed by Henryk Grossman 
(1929) to account for the slump. From a classical standpoint, I argue that the slump in 
Canada was the result of overaccumulation. For this reason, it was deeper and longer than 
the downturn in the U.S. In the first section, I compare and contrast some key economic 
indicators for the 1990-92 recession in the U.S. and Canada. In the second section, I 
critically examine mainstream explanations for the crisis. In the third section, I outline an 
alternative theorisation with reference to relevant empirical data. Finally, I conclude by 
highlighting the importance of this type of analysis for understanding current global 
economic turmoil. 
Anatomy of the 1990-92 recession 
As I noted in the introduction to this chapter, the crises in the U.S. and Canada 
were significantly different, both in terms of magnitude and duration. As Figure 
14demonstrates; real output los~ in the U.S. was miniscule compared to that in Canada. It 
is worth taking note that real GDP growth in Canada began shrinking in the third quarter 
of 1989, well before the crisis erupted in the spring of 1990, and that it did not return to 
its pre-recession levels until 1994, almost four years later. The Bank of Canada was well 
aware that a slowdown was forthcoming when it formulated its controversial monetary 
policy at that time. We will return to this fact later. 
206Norman Caulfield, NAFTA and Labor in North America.(Chicago: University of Illinois Press, 2010), 
133. 
207Fortin "The Great Canadian Slump." 
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The contraction of output was led "by a decline in final domestic demand,"208 
which was "focused most sharply on business investment."209 In other words, the 
dynamics of the crisis must be sought in the domestic economy, and on the so-called 
supply side. In sectoral terms, manufacturing led the recession. Geographically, this 
means it was "felt most in Ontario,"210 which was also the centre of capital accumulation 
in Canada before the crisis broke out. 
The importance of- Ontario to Canada's economy in this period cannot be 
overstated. The rate of investment measures gross investment over straight-line end-year 
net capital stock. In 1987, the year before the economy started to run into serious trouble, 
the rate of investment in Ontario led all the provinces at 13.26 percent.211 Viewed from 
the standpoint of the rate of investment, the tiny province of Prince Edward Island was a 
2080ECD, OECD Economic Surveys Canada, 1991, 15. 
209 Russell Blinch, "Canada in Recession with Two Quarters of Negative Growth." Reuters, Nov. 30 1990; 
and CANSIM Table 380-0002. 
2100ECD, OECD Economic Surveys Canada, 1991, 14. 
211 CANSIM Table 031-0002. 
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close second to Ontario. This highlights the importance of examining not just the rate of 
investment, but also the mass of investment dollars. 
In Ontario, raw investment in dollars greatly exceeded all other provinces in this 
period. In 1987, Ontario businesses invested over $27 billion - almost double the volume 
of investment of the runner-up, Quebec, at $14.6 billion.212 These figures indisputably 
demonstrate that Ontario was the centre of capital accumulation in Canada before the 
1990-92 crisis occurred. This fact will be important when we examine the effects of the 
exchange rate on accumulation further below. 
Bankruptcies 
Bankruptcies are an important factor in any economic crisis. As profitability and 
the availability of credit declines, businesses have difficulty meeting their financial 
obligations. Generally speaking, more bankruptcies occur during deeper and longer 
recessions. The unavailability of profit and the high cost of credit mean that firms have 
greater difficulty staying afloat for longer periods of time. Figure 15 shows the business 
bankruptcy patterns in the U.S. and Canada during the course of the early 1990s 
recession. In the U.S., the number of bankruptcies remained below its 1987 level 
throughout the early 1990s. In Canada, on the other hand, the number of bankruptcies 
rose throughout the early 1990s. In this country, the number of bankruptcies in 1992 was 
88 percentage points higher than the number in 1987. These divergent patterns point to 
the unique character of the slump in Canada. They also demonstrate that the Canadian 
212CANSIM Table 031-0002. 
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economy started to run into trouble well before the outbreak of recession in the spring of 
1990, as we have seen in the real GDP figures above. 
Figure 15. Bankruptcy indices {1987=1) 
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Source: CANSIM Table 177-0004 and ABI Quarterly Business Filings213 
Financial institution failure 
Crises also issue in financial institution failures. As firms and workers file for 
bankruptcy, banks and other credit intermediaries lose important assets. Due to high 
levels of leveraging (banks in Canada are leveraged about twenty times), the result is 
often insolvency. 
It is notable that the majority of Canadian financial institution failures occurred in 
boththe 1980s andthe 1990s. In the U.S., on the other hand, the bulk occurred in the 
1980s, while failures declined substantially throughout the early 1990s. This highlights 
the fact that the crisis of the early 1990s was worse in Canada than in the U.S. By the end 
213 American Bankruptcy Institute, "Quarterly Business Filings by Year (1980-1993)." Accessed August 
20, 2012. 
http://www.abiworld.org/AM/Template.cfm?Section=Home&TEMPLATE=/CM/ContentDisplay.cfm&CO 
NTENTID=59253. 
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of the early 1990s, the wave of financial institution failures in the U.S. had more or less 
subsided. In Canada, on the other hand, it continued into the mid-1990s.214 Significantly, 
the two largest financial institution failures in Canadian history occurred in 1991 and 
1992, during the worst of the recession. In April 1991, Standard Trust filed for 
bankruptcy. The following year, Central Guaranty Trust Co. collapsed, and the size of the 
subsequent rescue was the largest in Canadian history. 215 
Unemployment 
As firms file for bankruptcy, close up shop, restructure or lay off workers, 
unemployment, too, increases during the course of a recession. Employment patterns 
were significantly different in the U.S. and- Canada throughout the 1990s. The 
employment-to-population indices in Figure 16below measure the ratio of persons 
employed to persons of working age. The early 1990s crisis barely made a dent in this 
ratio in the U.S. In Canada, on the other hand, this ratio slumped significantly and did 
not regain its pre-crisis level until the new millennium. 
214 FDIC Table BF02 and CDIC History of Member Institution Failures 
215 Pierre L. Siklos, Money, Banking & Financial Institutions: Canada in the Global Environment. Fifth ed. 
(Toronto: McGraw-Hill Ryerson, 2006), 317. 
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Figure 16. Employment-to-population indices 
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The employment-to-population ratio captures changes in population. However, if 
we look at the raw number of jobs lost and the time it took to recoup those losses, the 
story is equally troubling. The number of jobs lost in the 1990-92 crisis and ensuing 
slump were not recovered until 1998.216 These facts fit the textbook definition of a 
depression, in which a "downturn in the business cycle" is accompanied by "sustained 
high unemployment" lasting for years. 217 
To sum up, the crisis of 1990-92 resulted in a depression. Real GDP would not 
recover until 1994, and employment would not recover until the new millennium.218 
Financial instability rocked the country, as financial institutions imploded and 
bankruptcies spread like wildfire. Importantly, the crisis was principally endogenous to 
Canada (we shall see below in which particular ways this was so). It began in the 
216 CANSIM Table 282-0001 
217The Economist Dictionary of Economics. Fourth ed. (New Jersey: Bloomberg Press, 2003), 95. 
218 Employment here signifies the employment-to-population ratio. 
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manufacturing sector in Ontario, the centre of capital accumulation in Canada. Finally, 
and most significantly for the purposes of the following analysis, the crisis was driven by 
declining business investment. The significance of this fact will become apparent in the 
classical analysis of the slump to follow. 
After having reviewed some of the characteristics of the early 1990s recession in 
the U.S. and Canada, we will now turn our attention to the explanations that have 
emerged for the Great Canadian Slump. 
Explanations for the slump 
There are two clusters of explanations for the Great Canadian Slump. The first 
cluster of explanations emphasises government inflation control and the high interest 
rates that accompanied it as the principal cause for the crisis. For instance, in the 
mainstream media, high interest rates stemming from central bank policy were seen as 
the principal "villain of the recession."219The Toronto Star ran a piece in September 1990 
entitled "Canada winning inflation war, but paying big price," noting that "Canadian 
manufacturing has borne the brunt .of. these. extremely destructive high interest· rate-
exchange rate policies," a point we shall return to later.220 
In the parliamentary realm, New Democratic Party finance critic, Steven 
Langdon, asked whether Finance Minister, Michael Wilson, would "admit it is a made-
in-Canada recession, that he is responsible and what he intends to do about it?"221 And 
219 Deborah Dowling, "This Recession Could Well Be Deeper Than Predicted." Kitchener-Waterloo 
Record, Feb. 18 1991. 
220 Arthur Donner, "Canada Winning Inflation War, but Paying Big Price." The Toronto Star, IO September 
1990. 
221 
"Wilson Refuses to Call Slump a 'Recession."' Kitchener-Waterloo Record, Oct. 11, 1990. 
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Liberal Party industry critic, Jim Peterson, fumed that "the government's incompetence 
and mismanagement have wrung our economy dry."222 
This view was upheld amongst private research firms as well. Michael 
McCracken, president of the Canadian economic research firm, Informetrica, noted that 
the policy makers had "finally broken the backs of consumers and businesses," placing 
the blame for the recession squarely on the shoulders of the Bank of Canada and its 
interest rate policy.223 The Conference Board of Canada's Chief Economist, James Frank, 
reinforced this view, explaining that monetary policy "was too tight too long."224 
Similarly, president of the Canadian Economics Association, Pierre Fortin, wrote 
a piece in which he identified the Bank of Canada as the key culprit behind the recession. 
According to Fortin, the principal cause of the slump was a decline in domestic demand 
resulting from "monetary contraction and . . . induced fiscal contraction." He argued that 
"the public finance crisis of the 1990s is ... a product of the monetary contraction and the 
economic crisis." Higher interest rates led to higher debt-servicing costs and the recession 
itself.led to lower tax revenues. The· resulting fiscal retrenchment alongside high interest 
rates further depressed output and employment. 225 These policies were the result of the 
unaccountability of central bank policy makers. To be sure, according to Fortin, the 
structural inadequacies of the Bank of Canada cocoon central bankers in "an anti-
222KonradYakabuski, "Recession Now Certain, Fresh Data Tell Analysts." The Toronto Star, 1 September 
1990. 
223Yakabuski, "Recession Now Certain." 
224 Milner, "Canada in Its First Home-Made Recession." 
225Fortin, "The Great Canadian Slump." 762-773. 
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inflationary temple" with too little accountability to the public. Fortin concluded that 
"the Bank of Canada must be brought to reflect the preferences of the general public. "226 
A similar position is adopted by economic historian, Timothy Lewis. For him, the 
Bank of Canada's high interest rates "caused all manner of fiscal problems in 1989, and 
were the cause of the shocking depth of the 1990-1 recession." To be sure, "monetary 
policy is the only reasonable explanation for the depth and timing of the recession in 
Canada. "227 High interest rates were the cause of the recession, and the central bank was 
the malefactor. 
Canadian Auto Workers economist, Jim Stanford, holds a similar view. In his 
book Paper Boom, he writes that "interest rates, both short-run and long-run, are clearly 
an outcome of deliberate policy, not a result of the operation of a free market for loanable 
funds."228 He writes that "largely thanks to this extreme policy course, Canada 
experienced uniquely high interest rates between 1989 and 1992, and suffered a recession 
that was far worse than those experienced by its trading partners. "229From this standpoint, 
the Central Bank interest rate hike in the early 1990s was akin to the 1979 "Volcker 
shock" in the U.S. 
A second cluster of arguments maintains that high interest rates and the ensuing 
recession were the result of a combination of central bank policy and factors outside of its 
control, laying particular emphasis on the latter. For instance, the OECD notes that "the 
causes of the recession can be traced back to the emergence of intense pressure on 
226Ibid., 781. 
227 Lewis, In the long run, 132-134. 
228Jim Stanford, Paper Boom: Why Real Prosperity Requires a New Approach to Canada's Economy. 
(Ottawa: Canadian Centre for Policy Alternatives, 1999), 211 (emphasis added). 
229Ibid., 195-96. 
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resources in the late 1980s, evidenced by the growth of domestic demand persistently in 
excess of output growth." Product and labour market slack was absorbed by 1988, and 
"the resulting inflationary pressures were seen by the authorities as a threat to satisfactory 
medium-term performance of the economy." As a result, policies "were geared towards 
curbing excess demand." Monetary policy caused a "severe tightening of monetary 
conditions" and the resulting "rapidly deteriorating corporate and household financial 
positions looked unsustainable and business and consumer confidence fell. ,,23o Other 
factors contributing to high interest rates at the time include "the constitutional debate" 
and "the exchange rate and future inflation performance. "231 
Laidler and Robson of the conservative C.D. Howe Institute attribute the 
recession in 1990-92 to the legacies of previous decades, including a deteriorating fiscal 
situation, a slowdown in productivity growth (which began in the 1970s), and the signing 
and inauguration of the Canada-U.S. Free Trade Agreement (CUFTA), whose adjustment 
costs contributed to a period of slower growth. Nevertheless, and like all accounts thus 
far, "the· single most important influence" on the economy in the early 1990s was 
monetary policy, which became "seriously contractionary" at the beginning of 1990.232 
Freedman and MacKlem of the Bank of Canada argue that unusually high interest 
rates in Canada at that time reflected a "risk premium" resulting from rising levels of 
government debt and political uncertainty.233 In particular, the interest rate premium rose 
230 OECD, OECD Economic Surveys, Canada 1990-1, 12-13 
231 OECD, OECD Economic Surveys, Canada, 1992, 11. 
232David E.W. Laidler and William B.P. Robson.Two Percent Target: Canadian Monetary Policy since 
1991. Toronto: C.D. Howe Institute, 2004, 10-12. 
233Charles Freedman and Tiff Macklem."A Comment on 'the Great Canadian Slump."'The Canadian 
Journal of Economics 31, no. 3 (1998): 646-65. 
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in Canada because of rising domestic and international debts and structural deficits. "The 
debt build-up in the 1980s and 1990s was" a structural problem, resulting in high interest 
rates. 234 According to the authors, ascribing unusually high interest rates in Canada to 
monetary policy is "an overstatement. ,ms We will return to the question of debt and 
deficit further below. 
In each of the arguments above, high interest rates, whether the result of 
ideologically-driven policy, pure and simple, or a more complex interaction of processes, 
were the main cause of the recession. Indeed, "the fact that Canadian interest rates were 
too high for too long is universally acknowledged."236 There are, however, some 
problems with the above accounts. 
First, the interest-rate explanation for the crisis cannot account for both the depth 
and persistence of the slump. Indeed, despite substantial easing of monetary conditions in 
1991-92 the economy remained in dire straits.237 In fact, from May 1990 to February 
1991 short-term interest rates fell by over 3 .5 percent, but the economy had "little 
response" to these changes.Z.38 Likewise,. between- 1990 and 1992 long-term rates· fell 
substantially, remaining well below their 1980s levels, but there were no signs of 
improved economic performance. 239 
234Ibid., 662. 
2351bid., 651. 
236Fortin, Pierre. "Interest Rates, Unemployment and Inflation: The Canadian Experience in the 1990s." 
The Review of Economic Performance and Social Progress l, June (2001): 118. 
237 OECD, OECD Economic Survey, Canada, 1992, 11. 
238Urquhart, "Canada's Recession ls Getting Worse"; Blinch, "Canada in Recession with Two Quarters of 
Negative Growth." 
239CANSIM Table 176-0041. 
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Second, these explanations do not account for the long-run rise in real interest 
rates that began much earlier, in the mid-l 970s. Certainly this secular rise had something 
to do with the way the crisis in 1990-92 unfolded. In other words, these explanations do 
not relate the long-run patterns of economic development in Canada to the early 1990s 
crisis. A more theoretically convincing argument can be made for the 1990-92 recession 
and subsequent slump by examining how the long-run patterns of development relate to 
the dynamics of crisis in 1990-92 and the subsequent slump. 
Finally, Stanford et al. attribute too much power to the central bank in the 
determination of interest rates. Central bank policy is an important factor in interest rate 
determination, but not the principal factor. This will become clear in the analysis below. 
Instructively, policy makers were surprised at the extent to which the economy took a 
tum for the worse when they raised interest rates. Deputy Governor Freedman of the 
Bank of Canada notes that "although the consensus forecast at the time was for a soft 
landing of the economy, the downturn in 1990-91 was much deeper than had been 
anticipated, the rate of inflation came down much faster· than planned, and the recovery. 
was slower than expected. "240 This underlines the fact that the Bank of Canada does not 
exert as much control as Stanford et al. suggest. We must take other factors into 
consideration when examining interest rate movements. In so doing, we must avoid 
methodological eclecticism and empiricism. In other words~ we must remain sensitive to 
24
°Cited in Fortin 2001, (emphasis added). 
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the levels of analysis, always specifying the internal relations governing the dynamics of 
the crisis.241 
We have thus far examined the characteristics of the recession in the U.S. and 
Canada. We have established that the crisis in Canada was much worse than that in the 
U.S., and that it was in fact for Canada the worst slump since the Great Depression (and 
remains so). We have examined existing explanations for the crisis, noting that each of 
these roots the crisis in high interest rates, either the result of Bank of Canada policy, 
pure and simple, or a combination of historically specific events and central bank policy. 
We have examined some of the weaknesses of these approaches. The purpose of the next 
section is to provide an alternative account of the 1990-92 recession. The account below 
integrates the long-run interest rate movements into a more convincing theoretical 
framework that is in keeping with the historical dynamics of capital accumulation in 
Canada. It will be shown that inflation in this period,interest rate movements andthe crisis 
itself can be explained by reference to movements in the rate and mass of profit. 
Theoretical interlude 
In the next section, I demonstrate concretely how the 1990-92 crisis of 
overaccumulation unfolded. First, however, a brief review of some of the notable features 
of Henryk Grossman's theory of "overaccumulation" or "failed valorisation" is required, 
as this forms the basis for the analysis to follow. 
241 This approach is informed by Henryk Grossman's procedure of successive approximations 
(Annahrungsverf ahren ). See Henryk Grossman, "The Change in Marx's Original Plan for Capital and Its 
Causes." Translated by Geoffrey McCormack.In Economic Studies of Henryk Grossman, edited by Rick 
Kuhn. Leiden: Brill, forthcoming. 
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First, in capitalism nothing is produced unless it can be produced at a profit. 
Grossman remarks that the capitalist process of production is "a labour process for the 
production of commodities ... and ... a valorisation process for obtaining ... profits. Only 
the latter process forms the essential driving force of capitalist production, whereas the 
production of use values is for the entrepreneur only a means to an end, a necessary 
evil."242Moreover, profit is both the endgame of production and the source of growth. 
Indeed, "expanded outlays on production, or accumulation, are only a function of ... the 
magnitude of profits. "243 
Second, in competition businesses are compelled to seek out ways to take market 
share from their competitors. The principal means of competition is the cheapening of 
commodities. For this reason, entrepreneurs are forced to find ways to cut costs. To this 
end, they must invest a portion of their profit into research and development, new 
technologies, the expansion of production and so on. The upshot is that capitalists must 
accumulate capital to stay competitive. 
Third, because technological innovation in capitalism has a· labour-saving bias, 
capital accumulation depends more and more on machinery and equipment. In other 
words, capitalist production displays "a tendency to replace human labour with 
machines."244 Capital deepening increases with accumulation and, all other things being 
equal, this induces a declining rate of return on total investments. 
242Henryk Grossman, The Law of Accumulation. Translated by JairusBanaji.(London: Pluto Press, 1992), 
61. 
243 Ibid. 
244 Rinehart, James W. The Tyranny of Work.(Toronto: Nelson, 2006), 154. 
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Fourth, the falling rate of return on total investments itself is not a sufficient cause 
for crisis. Grossman rightly points out that "breakdown" cannot be derived from this. 
"How could a percentage, a pure number such as the rate of profit produce the breakdown 
of a real system? ... An explanation is only possible when we relate the breakdown not to 
the rate of profit, but to its mass. "245 In fact, as the rate of profit falls, the mass of profit 
can continue to expand for a time. As long as this expansion occurs, accumulation will 
continue. In other words, accumulation depends upon a growing mass of profit. Once the 
mass of profit begins to stagnate or shrink, however, the rate of return on the marginal 
unit of capital turns zero or negative. To be sure, new investments are not producing any 
additional profit. At that point, entrepreneurs stop investing in new machinery and 
equipment. 
Fifth, because it is no longer profitable to invest in new machinery and 
equipment, demand for fixed capital drops. Therefore, a crisis of overaccumulation first 
manifests itself as a realisation crisis in the economic sphere responsible for the 
production of capital equipment. Only later does it spread to the rest of the economy, 
especially to those sectors responsible for the provision of consumer goods and services. 
In this sense, it manifests itself simultaneously as a disproportionality crisis. In what 
follows, I demonstrate that our theoretical expectations are confirmed empirically in the 
course of events leading up to the 1990-92 slump. 
245Grossman, The Law of Accumulation, 102-3. 
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Classical political economic explanation for the slump 
In this section, I demonstrate concretely how the 1990-92 crisis of 
overaccumulation unfolded. To this end, let us first turn to our fundamental indicators of 
economic stability and instability, comparing the rate and mass of profit in the U.S. and 
Canada.246Figure 11 shows indices for the rate of return on total investment in the U.S. 
and Canada from 1962 to 2010 (measuring corporate profits and interest payments over 
gross fixed capital stock of the previous year). 
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The rate of return fell from 1974 to 1992 in Canada. In the U.S., however, it fell 
from the mid-1960s until 1982 and then began to rise again until approximately 1997. 
This points to the fact that the rates of return in the U.S. and Canada have been following 
different paths. In other words, each of these economies has its own dynamics of 
246Corporate profits and interest payments over gross fixed capital stock of the previous year. 
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accumulation and development, despite the close connection between them. Importantly, 
the long-run movements in the rate of return on total investment in Canada are strongly 
correlated to those of the capital-output ratio for the same period, just as the theory 
suggests. In other words, there is good reason to believe that the rising capital-output 
ratio from 197 4 to 1992 underlay the falling rate of profit in this period. 
As we have seen above, the rate of return on total investment does not drive 
accumulation directly. This is why it is important to examine the mass of profit as well. 
This point is worth dwelling on, as there is a popular "reflex" amongst many political 
economists to focus exclusively on the rate of profit.247 As I have shown above, the mass 
of profit is the key determinant in crisis formation. 248 As the mass of profit stagnates or 
declines, the rate of return on the latest investments (i.e. the marginal unit of capital) 
turns zero or negative. At that point investment must stop, unless it can be prolonged by 
the provision of credit. 
Figure 12 shows indices for corporate profits between 1987 and 1992. The mass 
of profit in the U.S. continued to grow throughout theyears ·1990-92, whereas in Canada 
it began shrinking from the third quarter of 1988 until the first quarter of 1991. It then 
stagnated throughout 1991-92 period. Continued accumulation in Canada until the spring 
of 1990 was only possible because of the provision of credit. The perverse effects of 
credit expansion in the context of slowing growth will be examined below in the section 
dealing with inflation and the interest rate. 
247 For such an analysis, see e.g. Robert Brenner, The Economics of Global Turbulence. (New York: Verso, 
2006). 
248As I shall argue below, this does not mean the rate of profit is altogether irrelevant. For instance, the 
importance of the latter will become clear in our discussion of interest rate determination. 
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Figure 18. Profit magnitude indices, 1987-1992 
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In the period leading up to the 1990-92 crisis, the centre of accumulation in 
Canada was Ontario, both in terms of the investment rate and the magnitude of dollars 
invested, as was demonstrated above. It was also the centre of overaccumulation. 
Investment slowed down first in manufacturing in Ontario. In the first instance, this was 
the result of a shrinking mass of profit (secondary influences - e.g. the exchange rate -
will be examined below). In the country as a whole, the mass of profit began to shrink in 
1988.249 Consistent with the theory discussed above, investment growth slowed 
substantially from 8 percent in 1988 to 1.5 percent in 1989.250 
The slowdown began first in the manufacture of machinery before spreading to 
the rest of the manufacturing sector and, subsequently, the rest of the economy. This was 
249 Importantly, accumulation between 1986 and 1988 was highly intensive. In other words, investment in 
labour-saving technology was greater in this period than investment in expanding production at a given 
technological level. · 
25
°CANSIM Table 031-0002. 
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a result of declining investment in (and therefore demand for) fixed capital after the rate 
of return on the marginal unit of capital turned negative. To be more precise, in Ontario 
between 1988 and 1989, value added stagnated or declined in fuel, primary metals, 
machinery, chemical products and non-metallic products industries due to a decline in 
demand for capital equipment, semi-finished goods and raw materials. All other 
manufacturing industry value added began declining after 1989 for the same reason.251 In 
other words, stagnation and decline occurred first in the production of fixed and 
circulating capital before spreading to the production of consumer goods. This pattern is 
consistent with the theory of overaccumulation discussed above. 
Figure 19. Final demand indices (1987=1) 
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Figure 19 shows that demand for machinery began to slow down between 1988 
and 1989 as the mass of profit began to shrink. It then began to shrink in 1990 along with 
251CANSIM Table 301-0001. 
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the demand for construction services. The demand for personal as well as government 
goods and services, on the other hand, continued to grow in the initial phase of the slump. 
To be sure, this demonstrates that the crisis was not caused by a decline in consumer 
demand. It unambiguously began in the sphere of production responsible for capital 
equipment and only later spread to the sphere responsible for consumer goods. To repeat, 
declining investment in means of production was the primary factor slowing GDP growth 
during the recession. This is a classic case of overaccumulation in which capital 
accumulation - investment - cannot continue because both the means to invest and 
profitability in general have declined to such an extent that the rate of return on the latest 
investments has begun to stagnate or turn negative. The only way for this situation to 
'\. 
persist until the spring of 1990 was by means of the credit system, a fact we shall return 
to below. 
The order of events is· important to our analysis. In the classical political 
economic framework, profits are both the incentive to and the means of investment. The 
mass of profit began to shrink in the third quarter .of 1988. As a result, investment slowed 
and total output began to shrink a year later in the third quarter of 1989. Finally, after 
slowing down since 1988, aggregate wages in the economy as a whole began to shrink in 
the third quarter of 1990 as workers became redundant. The delay in wage adjustment 
and the concomitant wage pressure was an added - secondary - effect of 
overaccumulation that accentuated the crisis. 252 It should be noted that this order of 
events runs counter to the Keynesian idea that aggregate demand drives investment and 
252 CANSIM Table 380-0001 and CANSIM Table 326-0020. 
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growth. It reinforces the point that profit drives investmentand therefore growth. In other 
words, the limit to growth is not aggregate demand, it is profitability. The demand for 
consumer goods is necessarily of secondary importance, for employment (both private 
and public) itself depends upon investment. Hence, when we analyse the unwinding of 
the economy below and in particular the effect of reduced government expenditures on 
the economy, we will see that this is an important but secondaryinfluence on economic 
growth and contraction. 
Until now, we have shown the importance of the mass of profit for sustained 
accumulation. We have demonstrated that the mass of profit began to shrink in 1988 and 
that slowing investment was the result. This accounts for the difference in the depth and 
duration of the slump in Canada relative to the recession in the U.S. The "made-in-
Canada" slump was a result of a shrinking mass of profit. In the U.S., the mass of profit 
continued to grow throughout the period. 
Overaccumulation and wage movements 
· In the context of overaccumulation wage pressures intensify. In a letter to a 
colleague in the U.S. dated June 21 1931, Henryk Grossman noted that as ~e capital-
output ratio increases, a relatively increasing portion of profit must be used in order to 
sustain accumulation. Hence, the consumable portion of profit, the part intended for 
additional workers and for the consumption of the entrepreneurs themselves, becomes 
ever smaller, absolutely and relatively. If workers receive the previous portion, then not 
enough remains for the entrepreneurs, and vice versa. The necessaryresult of this 
objective situation is the intensification of wage pressures on accumulation - or 
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increasing competition over output.253 This is the phenomenological foundation for the 
so-called "wage-push profit squeeze" doctrine, in which declining profitability is seen to 
be a result of a rising wage share of output. We can get at this dynamic empirically by 
examining the output-capital ratio for the historical moment in question. 
Figure 20. Output-capital ratio, 1987-92 
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Figure 20demonstrates that the magnitude of output relative to capital stock began 
declining after 1988. In other words, the "pie" available for consumption and further 
accumulation got smaller, despite the addition of new capital equipment. In this context, 
wage pressures began to mount just before the crisis erupted. This is an important, 
secondary factor in crisis formation. If real wages are successfully reduced, it is possible 
for accumulation to continue. If workers successfully resist, accumulation will grind to a 
halt. In the period in question, the existing wage level increasingly got in the way of 
accumulation. 
Keeping in mind that output began shrinking in the second quarter of 1989, Figure 
21 below illustrates that the rising wage share of GDP was relatively insignificant in this 
253Henryk Grossman, "Letter to Paul Mattick." June 21 1931. The competitive struggle 
betweenentrepreneurs intensifies in this context as well. 
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period. However, profits (before taxes) as a share of GDP declined substantially between 
the second quarter of 1988 and the first quarter of 1990. In the second quarter of 1988, 
profits as a share of GDP stood at 11.02 percent, whereas wages stood at 53.07 percent. 
In the first quarter of 1990, profits as a share of GDP had declined by 3.41 percentage 
points, whereas wages had only risen by 0.67 percentage points. In other words, and to 
repeat what was said above, profits declined absolutely and relatively. Therefore, the 
given wage level increasingly got in the way of further profit-driven growth because total 
output was shrinking. In this context, distributional stress over output intensified as 
entrepreneurs struggled to keep production going. 
Figure 21. Wages and profits as shares of GDP 
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In a revealing analysis of labour cost advantage in Canada, economists at Woody 
Gundy Inc. reported that Canada's labour cost advantage declined dramatically (relative 
to the U.S.) from a double-digit advantage in the mid-1980s (e.g. 20 percent in 1986) to a 
3.6 percent disadvantage in 1989. Importantly, labour costs are defined here as worker 
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compensation per unit of real output. If labour costs remain approximately the same and 
real output declines, the labour cost advantage decreases. In this situation, the solution for 
business is to increase output, reduce wages or both. In keeping with the theory, the 
report states that "at this point, Canadian businesses .. . face the very unpleasant task of 
saying 'no' to rising compensation demands, indeed of finding a way to reduce 
compensation increases." The apparent culprit behind this "unpleasant" situation was 
declining output growth relative to wage growth. 254 In the context of declining total 
output resulting from the dynamics of accumulation as illustrated by Henryk Grossman, 
competition over output necessarily increases. 
Fo.r business as a whole, the only apparent way out of this kind of situation is to 
reduce wage growth or to increase the rate of growth of output. Increasing the output 
growth rate requires investment. Therefore, short of the devaluation of capital, improved 
profitability and therefore increased incentive to invest that a series of bankruptcies 
would bring, businesses were left with only one option - to reduce wages. The 
unmediated effect of this process was for the competition over output to intensify, and. 
this is precisely what happened in the period in question.255 One writer for The Globe 
and Mail reported in no uncertain terms that "corporate profits must recover, even at the 
expense of governments and working Canadians ... Unless they do, no risks will be taken 
and no investments made in new plants or better equipment, or in the modernization of 
254 James Rusk, "Canadian Finns Losing Labor Cost Edge." The Globe and Mail, June 5 1990. 
255 Don McGillivray, "Only a Bigger Economic Pie Will Stop Us Fighting About Slice Sizes." The 
Hamilton Spectator, December 5 1991. 
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existing plants, or in future jobs."256 To be sure, overaccumulation necessarily ushers in 
intensifying competition over output, and the only way to overcome the problem within 
the confines of profit-driven growth is by devaluing capital, reducing wages or both. The 
upshot is that wages persistently got in the way of continued capital accumulation in this 
period. 
To this point we have examined the fundamental causes of the crisis and have 
identified the slowing and then shrinking mass of profit as the principal reason for the 
slump. We examined the intensification of competition over output as it relates to the 
fundamental dynamics of accumulation, and showed how wages got in the way of 
accumulation not through any inherent dynamic of their own, but because further 
accumulation required their reduction. In the next section, we will examine the general 
effects of these dynamics on state finances, and how the state's response compounded 
unemployment problems. 
Dynamics of accumulation and government debt 
Throughout the. mid-1970s and· early 1980s, secular economic decline and 
structural deficitswere not yet seen as such by policy makers. As a result, government 
officials continued to operate within the bounded Keynesian framework adopted in the 
Department of Reconstruction's 1945 White Paper. In particular, they sought to stimulate 
growth by tax reductions and fiscal deficits. As Timothy Lewis notes, "fiscal shortfalls 
would not have been nearly as severe without the combination of the deteriorating 
economy and the views that this deterioration was both temporary and at least partly 
256 Cook, Peter. "When the Big Need Is for Bigger Profits."The Globe and Mail, December 2 1991, 
emphasis added. 
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amenable to Keynesian fiscal remedy. "257 In the 1980s and 1990s, the government was 
becoming increasingly concerned about the escalating level of debt and its negative effect 
on interest rates and therefore growth. 258 Government expenditures consistently exceeded 
revenue throughout the 1980s and most of the 1990s. In 1981, for instance, for every 
dollar of revenue received, the government spent $1..03. By 1993, this number reached 
$1.20. The difference was being papered over by debt. 
However, the problem of government debt consists of more than the difference 
. between expenditures and revenues. The interest on debt must also be taken into 
consideration. The growth of government debt is a function of the debt stability 
condition. Mathematically, the debt stability condition can be expressed in the following 
way, where !!iD stands for the change in the debt burden,D stands for existing debt 
burden, ristands for the real interest rate, rg stands for the real growth rate and B stands 
for the operating balance. 
fj,D = D · (ri - rg) + B 
If the real . interest rate is greater than the real economic growth rate, then the 
government debt burden will grow automatically, even if the government receives 
sufficient tax revenues to cover the cost of its operations.259 The only way for 
government to put a break on the growth of debt in this circumstance is to create an 
257 Lewis, In the long run, 68. 
258Ibid., 76. 
259 As we have seen above, real interest rates fundamentally reflect a paucity of loanable funds in relation to 
the mass of accumulated capital. Since profitability governs accumulation, rising real interest rates often 
accompany slowing real growth. In this way, government debt is fundamentally linked to the dynamics of 
accumulation. 
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operating surplus, either by cutting services or by increasing revenues. It can then use the 
surplus to pay down the debt burden. 260 
In the period in question, slowing accumulation and decelerating overall growth 
reducedthe growth rate of government revenues andcoincided with rising real interest 
rates, as we have seen above. Jim Stanford notes that the average real interest rate on 
federal debt between 1981 and 1997 was 7 .5 percent, whereas the average growth of real 
GDP in the same period was 2.4 percent.261 As a result, government transactions in 
liabilities grew secularly, and the growth rate of government income began to slow down. 
Likewise, government saving turned negative and remained so throughout the 1970s and 
1980s. Lewis notes that from 1990 to 1996, net public debt in the U.S. rose by 48 percent 
of GDP from 38 percent in the 1980s. In Can<l;da, on the other hand, it rose from 40 
percent to 70 percent. The dramatic increase of the public debt to GDP ratio in Canada 
relative to the U.S. can be accounted for by slower economic growth and higher real 
interest rates.262 As we have seen, slower growth and rising real interest rates are 
internally related to capital accumulation via movements in the rate and mass . of profit. 
Therefore, state finances, too, are fundamentally related to the dynamics of capital 
accumulation. 
To sum up, real interest rates were increasing, real growth was decreasing and the 
operating balance was negative. As a result of all this, government was taking on more 
debt. The situation was bad for government debt levels. Indeed, consistent with the 
260Stanford, Paper boom, 199-200. 
261 Ibid., 201. 
262 Lewis, In the long run, 14 7. 
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theory, interest on government debt grew throughout the 1980s and 1990s.263 The only 
immediate way out of this situation for government was to achieve a positive operating 
balance by increasing revenues, decreasing expenditures, or some combination of the 
two. It is important to note that efforts to increase the operating balance were not 
merelythe result of ideology, nor were they merely a policy choice. To the contrary, from 
Ottawa's perspective, government expenditures had to be reduced because they were 
causing unsustainably high interest rates, due to a large risk premium on government 
bonds.264 The only question was how this reduction of debt was to be achieved. This was 
a political question, dependent upon the particular historical constellation of relations at 
the time. 
In 1984, with the election of the Brian Mulroney Conservatives, "neo-liberal 
ideology increasingly supplanted the embedded liberalism that supported postwar 
Keynesianism in Canada."265 This followed years of bounded Keynesian fiscal policy 
under Pierre Trudeau, where in the context of economic stagnation "persistent rather than 
countercyclical deficits emerged. "266 The federal government made a concerted effort to 
eliminate the deficit in 1995, after concern about fiscal restraint emerged more generally 
in Canadian society.267 But even in the early 1990s, state retrenchment compounded 
unemployment problems emerging from the 1990-92 crisis. To be sure, the particular 
263CANSIM Table 384-0004. 
264 Lewis, In the long run, 76. 
265Ibid., 5. 
266Lewis, In the long run, 3, 39. 
267 Ibid.,11. On p. 145 he notes: "Experiencing deep economic insecurity, people felt their economic 
situations to be precarious; people conceptualized the state, and particularly its welfare functions, as the 
problem; and people supported parties that promised to restore control over their economic lives by 
eliminating the deficit and retrenching the state." 
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strategy adopted by the government to eliminate the deficit was to raise taxes on 
consumers and reduce public expenditures. 
Ottawa relieved pressure on the manufacturing sector by shifting the tax burden 
from capital onto consumers by means of the Goods and Service Tax (OST), which 
replaced the Manufacturers' Sales Tax (MST) on January 1, 1991. And the principal 
means by which expenditures were reduced was by cutting social programs. 268 In 
particular, this took the form of a freeze on Established Program Financing transfers 
(freezing transfers to finance provincial healthcare and post-secondary education) and a 
five percent cap on Canada Assistance Plan transfer growth to Ontario, Alberta and 
British Columbia (transfers for social assistance).269 This compounded fiscal 
retrenchment already put in place in the 1989 budget and was particularly hard on 
working people.270 In the winter of 1991-92, 2.5 million Canadians were dependent on 
le. d" 271 government we 1are spen mg. 
Later on, further retrenchment was reflected in a massive reduction of government 
employees. Armine Y alnizyan of the Canadian Centre for Policy Alternatives notes that 
"reduced operational spending became more widespread by 1992. "272 Lewis remarks that 
"from 1992 to 1999 Canada's total government sector ... experienced the most dramatic 
fiscal turnaround and the sharpest reduction in program spending in the G-7. "273 In fact, 
268 Stanford, Jim. "The Economic and Social Consequences of Fiscal Retrenchment in Canada in the 
1990s."The Review of Ecnomic Pe1formance and Social Progress 1, June (2001): 141-60. 
269 Lewis, In the long run, 133-4. 
270Ibid., 132. 
271 Peter Raymont, "Voices from the Shadows." National Film Board of Canada, 1992. 
272ArmineYalnizyan, "Exposed: Revealing Truths About Canada's Recession." Ottawa: Canadian Centre 
for Po1icy Alternatives, April 2009, 14. 
273 Lewis, In the long run, 148. 
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between March 1993 and January 1997 (at approximately the time the budget was finally 
balanced), the number of government employees was reduced by a staggering eight 
percent (a reduction of 206,256 jobs). In the same years, payments of government wages 
and salaries were reduced by $439 million.274 This retrenchment began under the 
Conservative Party's Brian Mulroney at the end of his term in 1993 and continued under 
the short tenure of Kim Campbell and the much longer tenure of Liberal Party leader, 
Jean Chretien. Naturally, these measures "had the unavoidable side effect of prolonging 
the sluggishness of domestic spending and output," by reducing disposable income, both 
for government workers directly and for workers indirectly (by reducing non-cash 
transfers in the form of government services).275 This is all to say that economic 
stagnation - measured in terms of unemployment - was prolonged by both government 
employment loss and the reduction of domestic demand resulting from fiscal 
retrenchment. 
Fortunately for government policy makers, capital accumulation had already 
gotten restarted ·by 1993. As a result, real .interest rates began· to sink and real growth 
started to pick up in the same year.276 As we have seen above, interest rates play an 
important role in determining government debt levels. We will see below how interest 
rate movements are fundamentally related to the dynamics of capital accumulation in 
Canada. The upshot is that the tendencies of decline started to go into reverse around 
1993. In this context, and in combination with severe cuts to spending and significant 
274CANSIM Table 183-0002. 
275 Pierre Fortin, "Interest Rates, Unemployment and Inflation: The Canadian Experience in the 1990s." 
The Review of Economic Performance and Socia/Progress l, June (2001): 116. 
276CANSIM Table 380-0022. 
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restructuring of social services, expenditures and revenues were balanced by 1997, well 
ahead of Finance Minister Paul Martin's 1995 deficit-reduction schedule.277 Indeed, as 
Lewis notes, "it is no coincidence that with precipitous declines in interest rates 
budgetary balance was quickly achieved in the latter of half of the 1990s. "278 By 1999 
there was a positive operating balance and much self-congratulation in government 
circles. 279 
Until now, we have examined movements in the rate and mass of profit. We have 
compared the characteristics of the 1990-92 crisis in the U.S. and Canada. After 
reviewing mainstream explanations for the crisis, I proposed an alternative classical 
political economic approach based on the work of Henryk Grossman. In particular, I 
identified a shrinking mass of profit as the ·principal reason for the depth and breadth of 
the crisis. We examined the role of competition over output and government fiscal policy 
in compounding the slump, and how each is internally related to the dynamics of 
accumulation. The analysis of the causes and character of the slump would be 
incomplete, however, without taking into account interest rate movements; as these were 
seen by most to be the primary cause of the crisis. In the next section, I will demonstrate 
that high interest rates were the proximate cause of the slump, but not the principal cause. 
Interest rate determination 
Henryk Grossman's Anntihrungsverfahren,or procedure of successive 
approximation, informs this work. This method reproduces "the concrete" in thought by 
277Stanford, "The Economic and Social Consequences," 153. Canada was the first G7 country to balance its 
budget in this period. 
278 Lewis, In the long run, 135. 
279CANSIM Table 384-0004. 
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establishing definite levels of analysis and highlighting the internal relations connecting 
phenomena. 280 Like all concrete historical phenomena, interest rates are complexly 
determined. Analysis must avoid pursuing an eclectic and ad hoc approach when 
considering them. In what follows, I move from the abstract tendencies of capitalist 
development and their internal relation to interest rates to the concrete,historically 
contingent determinants of interest rates. In so doing, I also demonstrate the 
phenomenological foundation for the idea that the central bank interest rate policy stance 
was the principal reason for the crisis. In this sense, this section is in keeping with the 
analysis in this chapter so far, as it proceeded along these lines, from examining the 
movement of more abstract economic categories to analysing the concrete dynamics of 
accumulation and crisis as they affect business investment. With the above in mind, let us 
proceed to examine interest rate determination. 
Here I summarise the relationships before examining each of the factors more 
closely and in greater detail in the sections to follow. In order of importance, and 
beginning at the most abstract level, the interest rate increase after 1988 reflects the long.-
run secular decline in the mass of profit relative to capital seeking it (i.e. increasing 
demand for investment funds) that began in the mid-1970s and, eventually, the steep 
increase in interest rates that a shrinking mass of profit in 1988 implies. At a lower level 
of abstraction, the rise in interest rates after 1988 reflects high inflation rates resulting 
280 This term was used by Paul Sweezy in his Theory of Capitalist Development. An essential difference 
between Sweezy's approach and Grossman's is that the latter develops the "internal relations" among the 
different "levels" of analysis. Sweezy was unclear about this. See Paul M. Sweezy, The Theory of 
Capitalist Development: Principles of Marxian Political Economy. (New York: Monthly Review Press, 
1970), pp. 18-20. For a good explanation of the alternative view, see Ernest Mandel's Introduction to Karl 
Marx, Capital, Vol. I (New York: Penguin, 1976): 19-20. 
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from the provision of credit after the mass of profit began to shrink. This credit sustained 
accumulation until the outbreak of the crisis in the spring of 1990. At a still more 
concrete level, government debt, too, contributed to high interest rates. At the most 
concrete level, the interest rate increase reflects commodity price increases due to the 
Gulf War, a political risk premium resulting from constitutional turmoil at the time, and, 
finally, government anti-inflation policy. The high interest rate policy stance of the Bank 
of Canada was seen to be the reason for the recession, but the recession itself was already 
a long time in the works, and had more fundamental causes, as outlined earlier in this 
chapter. The central bank's interest rate hike took place in the context of 
generalisedeconomic instability. For this reason, the unexpected crisis that its policy 
induced was particularly deep and long. The increasing cost of borrowfog alongside 
worsening conditions of profitability had a negative effect on business investment. High 
interest rates also stimulated an appreciation of the Canadian dollar and, as a result, 
export-based manufacturing in Ontario was especially adversely affected. Finally, Paul 
Mattick notes that crises of overaccumulCI:tion can manifest themselves in either sneaking 
stagnation or a sudden collapse.281 A high rate of accumulation before the recession was 
sustained in part by credit. This explains the suddenness of the "breakdown" once the 
mass of profit began its descent and the central bank raised interest rates. These factors 
will be examined more closely below. 
281Paul Mattick, Marx and Keynes: The Limits of the Mixed Economy. (London: Merlin Press, 1969): 84. 
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Accumulation and the interest rate 
The classical approach employed in this chapter identifies the supply of and 
demand for loanable funds as the key determinant of the interest rate in the context of 
overaccumulation. To be sure, the endogeneity of money is central to this analysis. The 
quotation below summarises the approach succinctly. 
We have seen that although it is a category absolutely different from the 
commodity, interest-bearing capital becomes a commodity sui generis with 
interest as its price, and this price, just like the market price of an ordinary 
commodity, is fixed at any given time by demand and supply. The market 
rate of interest, though in constant flux, thus appears at any given moment as 
every bit as fixed and uniform as the momentary market price of any 
commodity. The money capitalists supply this commodity, and the 
functioning capitalists buy it; they constitute the demand for it.282 
At the most abstract level, this section argues that the rising cost of borrowing 
throughout the 1970s, 1980s and early 1990s reflects the paucity of profit available for 
investment relative to the capital seeking valorisation. The rising rate of interest was the 
result of a squeeze on the supply of loanable funds. In the terms of classical political 
economy, too much capital was chasing too little profit in the form of interest-bearing 
capital. As a result, the costof borrowing increased. Following from this perspective, 
rising real interest rates throughout the 1970s and 1980s were a result of the declining 
rate of return on investments, and the "uniquely high interest rates between 1989 and 
1992"283 were fundamentally the result of an absolute decline in loanable funds, itself the 
effect of the shrinking mass of profit. The specific connections between falling profits. 
and rising interest rates will be explored in greater detail below. 
282Karl Marx, Capital, Volume 3. (New York: Penguin Books, 1991), 489. 
283Stanford, Paper boom. 
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Figure 22. Real interest rate for 3-month T-Bills 
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To repeat, the ratio of profits to capital stock, i.e. the rate of return on total 
investment, is a good proxy for the supply of and demand for loanable funds. The growth 
of the mass of capital in relation to the profit available to valorise it pushes up interest 
rates. When the mass of capital declines relative to profits, interest rates fall. In other 
words, th~ supply of and demand for loanable funds is, in the first instance, internally 
related to capitalist accumulation. It is not related to central bank policy in this 
fundamental sense. As we have seen above, the rate of return fell from 1974 to 1992. 
Accordingly, there was a secular rise in real interest rates in the same period (see Figure 
22). This rise occurred despite different policy regimes, i.e. rising interest rates began 
before the advent of "neoliberal" policy in Canada.284This calls into question the idea 
284 The Bank of Canada switched from a "loose money" regime in the 1970s to a ''tight money" regime in 
the early 1980s. The central bank began to set high interest rates "as early as 1988." See Fortin 2001, p. 
118. This is around the same time John Crow made his 1988 Hanson lecture, in which he explicitly stated 
the bank's aim of monetary stability. See Paul Jenkins and Brian O'Reilly. "Monetary Policy and the 
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that "interest rates, both short-run and long-run" are "clearly'~· the result of "deliberate 
policy," and have nothing to do with the market for loanable funds, as CAW economist 
Jim Stanford maintains. 285 Indeed, the coincidence of a secular rise in interest rates and a 
decline in the rate of profit highlights the fact that interest rates are first and foremost 
internally related to the dynamics of capital accumulation, not merely the result of this or 
that central bank policy. To be sure, central bank policies influence interest rates only in 
a secondary way. 
As is shown in Figure 23 below, the ratio of interest paid to corporate profits rose 
throughout the 1970s and 1980s as the rate of profit fell. 286 This long-run rise in interest 
payments was reversed only once accumulation got back on track after the 1990-92 
recession and subsequent restructuring. To repeat, the falling rate of return was the 
principal factor raising interest rates (and interest payments)throughoutthewhole period 
leading to the 1990-92 crisis. 
Economic Well-Being of Canadians."In The Review of Economic Performance and Social Progress, edited 
by Keith Banting, Andrew Sharpe and France St. Hilaire. 89-112. (Montreal: The Institute for Research on 
Public Policy (IRPP), 2001), 94. 
285Stanford, Paper boom, 211. 
286The rate of profit here is defined as corporate profits after interest and dividends payments (net profits) 
over gross capital stock from the previous year. I have chosen this ratio because it utilizes the quantity of 
funds immediately available to entrepreneurs after making required interest payments. The profits available 
to business enterprise after these payments are made will influence the demand for loanable funds. 
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Figure 23. Rate of profit gover~s magnitude of 
interest payments, Canada, 1961-2011 
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Until now we have examined the relationship between the rate of profit and 
interest payments. The rate of profit fell from the 1970s until the early 1990s, but the 
mass of profit did not begin to grow negatively until the third quarter of 1988. As the 
mass of profit stagnates or shrinks, the demand for loanable funds increases further 
relative to their availability. As a result, the interest rate rises. From the second quarter of 
1988 to the second quarter of 1990, the mass of profit shrank. Quarterly profits peaked in 
the second quarter of 1988 at $17 billion. In the first quarter of 1990 - just before the 
crisis broke out- profits stood at $12.3 billion. In other words, the mass of profit shrank 
by an incredible 27.6 percent in fewer than two years, well before the outbreak of the 
crisis in the spring of 1990. As I have shown above, firms began to increase their 
borrowing as a result. For this reason, the interest rate rose sharply. Short-term interest 
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rates peaked in May 1990 (e.g. treasury bills reached 1°3.88 percent). Once the recession 
hit, however, interest rates began a secular decline thanks to, first, the recession itself and 
the concomitant reduction of demand for loanable funds, and later, due to an increase of 
the ratio of profit in the form of loanable funds relative to the magnitude of capital 
seeking valorisation. 287 
On the one hand, already in 1989 business had slowed down investment 
substantially because the rate of return on the marginal unit of capital had turned 
negative. On the other hand, the tighter financial situation beginning in 1988 is reflected 
in a decline in cash on hand for most firms before the . crisis broke out in the spring of 
1990. In fact, between the third quarter of 1987 and the first of 1990, the period just 
before the outbreak of the crisis, cash on hand and demand deposits shrank by 
approximately 26 percent.288 As the availability of profits contracted sharply -and so too 
cash on hand - credit sustained growth until the spring of 1990.289 As Grossman notes, 
once the accumulation fund is in deficit, this is "initially covered by borrowings. This in 
turn reduces the total mass of available loan capital ... until ... the loan is completely 
exhausted." The crisis begins once there is no longer enough surplus value to continue 
accumulation, "even after borrowings. "290 In this case, this was reflected in a sharp 
increase in the real interest rate between 1988 and 1990. It is important to repeat, 
287CANSIM Table 176-0043. 
288CANSIM Table 187-0005. Demand deposits are funds that can be withdrawn without any notice to the 
depository institution. 
289 We shall examine the empirical indicators for this below. The sharp decline in interest rates after 1990 
Q2 was a result of the recession itself. Firms stopped investing, employment and output dropped and the 
demand for loanable funds decreased. In other words, rising interest rates contributed to the economic 
slump, but were not its fundamental cause. 
290Grossman, The Law of Accumulation, 114. 
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however, that accumulation became increasingly difficult throughout the entire period 
due to the falling ratio of profits to capital seeking valorisation. To sum up, the declining 
rate of profit and, eventually, a shrinking mass of profit were the principal (but not the 
only) factors behind rising interest rates in the period in question. 
Inflation and the interest rate 
The shrinking mass of profit affected interest rates further by issuing in inflation. 
Classical theories of inflation remain in a relatively underdeveloped state. Alfredo Saad-
Filho notes that "the extra money approach can provide the basis for the systematic 
development" of a classical approach to inflation and "can incorporate, when this is 
warranted, some of the best insights of the other approaches. "291 The theory of inflation 
deployed in this work situates the particular occurrence of inflation between 1988 and 
1990 in an increase in the quantity of money in circulation relative to value produced. In 
this section, I use this approach to demonstrate how the falling rate of return and 
shrinking mass of profit reduce the quantity of value in circulation relative to money, 
which is another. way of signaling inflation. 
291 Alfredo Saad-Filho. "Inflation Theory: A Critical Literature Review and a New Research Agenda." 
Value, Capitalist Dynamics and Money 18 (2000): 345-346. 
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Figure 24. Rate of inflation increases after 1988 
1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 . 
Source: CANSIM Table 326-0021 
Figure 18 shows the percent change in the Consumer Price Index (i.e. the rate of 
inflation) for 1984 to 1994. As is apparent, there was a significant rise in the CPI growth 
rate after 1988, from 3.9 to 5.1 percent in 1989. This is precisely when "Canada 
experienced uniquely high interest rates" beginning 1989 (and persisting until 1992). 292 
These high rates were both the result of overaccumulation and a shrinking mass of profit 
(as specified above), but also reflected a risk premium associated with higher levels of 
inflation. Let us examine the dynamics of overaccumulation and inflation more closely, 
including their connection to rising interest rates. 
292 Despite multiple attempts, long-term interest rates could not be brought down until after 1992 because 
both the recession had taken hold and the risk premium on borrowing had increased substantially. 
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Figure 25. Magnitude of credit increases after 1987 
I lliD± -~Iii.. ! I -: -
''\ .. I """""~ 
........... 
"-~ .. ~r -
~ltli..... ~ . II' ~ .. 
\-~\. ~~ n F ~! 
I 
-
I 
I 
i 
I II llllV I 11 llllV I 11111 IV I 11111 IV 11111111 IV I 11111 IV I ·11111 IV 
1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 I 1989 1990 
- Liability to asset ratio 
Source: CANSIM Table 187-0005 
In the period in question, "exc~ss money" was introduced into the system by 
credit intermediaries (see Figure 25). In turn, credit sustained businesses in the short run. 
As a result of increasing demand for loanable funds in the context of a paucity of the 
latter, interest rates increased. To be sure, rising interest rates were the result of firms 
borrowing in the context of the general unavailability of loanable. fonds due. to a shrinking 
mass of profit. 
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As I have shown above, the rate of profit fell from 1974 until 1990-92. However, 
the mass of profit only started to shrink in 1988. Since the latter determines whether 
accumulation and therefore growth can continue (i.e. if the rate of return on the marginal 
unit of capital will be positive or negative), it is decisive for economic stability. Figure 
26 shows the growth rate for the broadest measure of money in the system (M2++) and 
for GDP. In 1988, just as the mass of profit began to shrink, GDP growth dropped off, 
but the growth of money did not follow. Money broadly conceived grew faster than GDP 
in this period, as credit intermediaries lent to firms in need in the context of slowing 
output growth. Or, to put it differently, the quantity of money increased relative to the 
quantity of exchange-values produced. Therefore, by 1989 Canada experienced a strong 
increase in inflation. Interest rates rose in response to this increase, as creditors demanded 
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a premium to compensate for the declining real value of their loans.293 To be sure, 
overaccumulation and the concomitant provision of credit instigated inflation after 1988 
and this caused interest rates to rise. In this way, inflation is linked to the dynamics of 
growth via the rate and mass of profit as well as credit. 294 
Inflation contributed to sustained business stability in two ways. First, inflation 
was the necessary outcome of the provision of credit in the context of slowing output 
growth. In other words, inflation was the indirect result of the credit that was sustaining 
business activities. Second, inflation chipped away at real wages and therefore provided 
some - but not much - relief to real business profits. For instance, real wages in 
manufacturing began declining as early as July 1989, well before the crisis broke out in 
the spring of 1990.295 Lower real wages contributed to higher real business profitability 
and the provision of credit helped to sustain business investment. 
Figure 27 below demonstrates the aggregate net financial investment of firms in 
Canada from 1984 to 1994. If the number is positive, it means firms are lending more 
than they are borrowing. If it is negative, it means finns .are borrowi11g more than they 
are lending. The graph shows that firms were borrowing heavily to finance their 
operations in the period leading up to the 1990-92 crisis. In other words, the conditions 
for a slowdown were not only building up because of the long-run dynamics of 
293 Generally speaking, for lending to occur the interest rate must exceed the inflation rate. 
294 It is important to note that the growth of Ml++, a narrower definition of money that does not include 
close substitutes for money (e.g. Canada Savings Bonds), grew at a slower pace in this period, much more 
in keeping with the rate of economic growth. This signals that credit was the primary factor driving 
inflation after 1988. 
295CANSIM Table 382-0001 and CANSIM Table 326-0020. 
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accumulation (represented by downward movements in the rate and mass of profit), but 
also because of the growth of corporate debt. 296 
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Figure 27. Private and goverment business enterprises 
increased borrowing after 1988 
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The foregoing analysis demonstrates that high inflation and high interest rates 
after 1988 were fundamentally the products of slowing accumulation, itself the result of 
the falling rate of profit and the eventual shrinking mass of profit. The situation was 
sustained at the expense of credit-driven inflation. As we will see below, central bank 
monetary policy simply added fuel to the fire by raising interest rates. 
After having established the complex relationship between the falling rate of 
profit, the shrinking mass of profit, credit-driven inflation and the interest rate, let us now 
proceed to examine the relationship between accumulation, government debt, inflation 
296For more on debt-driven dynamics, see Anwar Shaikh "Accumulation, Finance, and Effective Demand in 
Marx, Keynes and Kalecki." In Financial Dynamics and Business Cycles: New Prospects, edited by 
Willi Semmler. Armonk, (New York: M.E. Sharpe, 1989). 
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and the interest rate, before moving on to examine even more concrete, historically-
specific reasons for rising interest rates in the period in question. 
Government debt and the interest rate 
As we have seen above, the growth of government debt is a function of the debt 
stability condition. The facts of rising real interest rates, declining real GDP growth and a 
negative operating balance meant that there was a resulting build-up of government debt 
which, as we have noted above, contributed to increasing interest rates in this period by 
increasing the risk premium associated with lending to government.297 Keeping in mind 
that the interest rate must exceed the rate of inflation, the associated premium in this 
period contributed to higher interest rates. 
Gulf War 
Our figures above demonstrate that the rate of inflation began rising significantly 
after 1988. A contributing factor to inflation, beginning in August 1990, was the Gulf 
War, when the price of oil rose dramatically (see Figure 28). This contributed to overall 
inflation in the period, but· must be considered a. secondary factor adding steam to an 
already existing problem rooted in the dynamics of capital accumulation. In any case, this 
added effect further increased the rate of interest by contributing to the already-existing 
inflation premium. 
297 Lewis, Jn the long run, 14 7. 
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Figure 28. The effects of the Gulf War on inflation in Canada 
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This brings us to the political turmoil associated with the Meech Lake Accord. In 
1985, Prime Minister Brian Mulroney initiated constitutional talks aimed at further 
integrating Quebec (which had not signed the 1982 constitution) into the Confederation. 
The deadline for ratification was set for June 23, 1990. For a variety for reasons - not the 
least of which was the absenceof aboriginal representatives in the talks - the period 
between the conclusion of negotiations and the ratification deadline was quite 
tumultuous, and it became unclear whether the accord would be ratified. This prompted 
Bank of Canada governor John Crow on June 13, 1990 to rightly point out that "there is a 
risk premium" associated with Meech Lake.298 The failure of Meech Lake would add 
considerable political fuel to Quebec separatism, subjecting investments in the country to 
increased risk. As a result, a political risk premium was added to already-rising interest 
298 
"Crow Blames 'Spending Surge' for High Rates." Business Today, 13 June 1990. 
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rates. 299 As it turns out, however, when all was said and done, the inability of politicians 
to push through the accord did not negatively affect the economy. Indeed, markets were 
left "unruffled" by its failure. 300 
Exchange rate 
After having examined the concrete determinants of the rise in interest rates in the 
period in question, and before examining the effect of the Bank of Canada interest-rate 
hike on the dynamics of capital accumulation and crisis, one final dimension of this story 
must be examined - i.e. the effect of exchange rate dynamics on accumulation. As was 
examined above, the centre of accumulation in Canada in the period in question was 
Ontario, and the crisis itself began in the manufacturing sector before spreading to the 
rest of the Canadian economy. The export of goods made up 22.67 percent of GDP at its 
peak in the second quarter of 1988.301 Since these made up such a large part of output at 
that time, it is necessary to examine the effects of movements in the exchange rate on 
exports. 
Generally speaking, U.S. importers will be able to purchase more Canadian goods if 
the value of the U.S. dollar is greater than that of the Canadian dollar (the same applies to 
the local currency units of Canada's other trading partners). In the case we are 
examining, the Canadian dollar began to appreciate relative to the U.S. dollar in late 
1986. In fact, between October 1986 and April 1990, just before the crisis erupted, the 
Canadian dollar appreciated by 16 percent relative to the U.S. dollar. 302 As a result, 
299 Lewis, In the long run, 14 7. 
300 
"Meech Lake Setback Leaves Canadian Markets Unruffled." Financial Times, 26 June 1990. 
301CANSIM Table 380-0002. 
302CANSIM Table 176-0049. 
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increased pressure was put on Canadian producers to remain competitive with American 
producers. This pressure was compounded by the introduction of the Canada-U.S. Free 
Trade Agreement (CUFTA), which came into effect on January 1, 1989. 
Like the interest rate, the exchange rate is complexly determined. It is not possible 
here to go into every facet of exchange rate determination. For the purposes of this 
chapter, only the internal relation between the domestic dynamics of accumulation and 
the exchange rate will be considered. 
I have noted above how the interest rate was affected by movements in the rate and 
mass of profit, government debt, inflation and historically specific events. In turn, rising 
interest rates attracted foreign portfolio investment into the Canadian economy and 
therefore pushed up the value of the Canadian dollar relative to other currencies. This is 
the fundamental dynamic at play in the appreciation of the Canadian dollar relative to the 
U.S. dollar in this period. Indeed, interest rates were persistently higher in Canada than 
in the U.S'.~03 For instance, when the crisis broke out, interest rates in Canada were five 
percentage points higher than u~s. rates.304 In other words, the appreciation of -the 
Canadian dollar is internally related to the dynamics of accumulation via the interest rate. 
As such, the exchange rate must be considered a secondary factor in the outcome of the 
crisis, a factor compounding pre-existing problems of profitability that began much 
earlier, in the mid-1970s, by negatively impacting the export sector. 
303CANSIM Table 176-0043. 
304 Fred Langan, "Bank of Canada Blamed for Recession." The Christian Science Monitor, 1990. 
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The Bank of Canada, the interest rate and the Great Unravelling 
Anwar Shaikh notes that "capitalist history is always enacted upon a moving 
stage. "305 Until now, we have considered the dynamics of capital accumulation as they 
occur behind our backs. 306 Our "moving stage" is in play. We have considered the effect 
of the abstract categories on both the rate of inflation and the interest rate. And we have 
further concretised our analysis by examining the effects of credit on inflation and the 
interest rate. Finally, we have considered a number of historically-specific influences on 
the interest rate, influences beyond the central bank's control. The above circumstances 
demonstrate the limits of the Bank of Canada's ability to influence economic outcomes. 
In these ways, essential context has been given to examine Bank of Canada interest rate 
policy. 
A new phase of monetary policy began after the 1981-82 recession. The Bank of 
Canada "would tolerate or even encourage high interest rates if they were necessary to 
stem inflation. "307 The Bank of Canada believed that persistently high interest rates 
reflect, in part at least, a .risk premium meant to offset the- adverse effects of inflation on 
loanable funds. 
To attract funds, financial institutions and markets need to compensate savers 
for inflation. Interest rates therefore are higher by an inflation premium that 
savers demand as an offset for the declining value of their money. But since 
future inflation is highly uncertain, interest rates in countries with a history of 
inflation also carry a further premium to cover the risks caused by uncertainty 
about inflation. As a result, it is more costly for borrowers to obtain funds to 
carry out their spending plans. 308 
305Shaikh, "The First Great Depression of the 21st Century," 45. 
306 Capitalist production occurs according to laws beyond the purview of individual actors. See e.g. Karl 
Marx, Capital, Volume 1. New York: Penguin Books, 1990, 135. 
307Siklos, Money, Banking & Financial Institutions,440. 
308 Paul Jenkins, Fred McMahonet al."Bank of Canada Review." March 1991. 
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Both the government and the Bank of Canada believed that lower inflation rates 
would result in lower interest rates, better conditions for conducting business and 
therefore stronger growth. After replacing Michael Wilson as Finance Minister on April 
21, 1991, Don Mazankowski decisively stated that "we have to attack the root causes of 
inflation and bring inflationary expectations down so you can bring interest rates down 
... And when you bring interest rates down you encourage growth and job creation 
activity."309 In this connection, the Governor of the Bank of Canada, John Crow, 
similarly noted that "the lower the rate of inflation, the better. The lower the rate of 
inflation, the less severe the losses from inflation ... In other words, the sensible long-run 
objective and anchor for monetary policy is one of stable prices in our economy."310 To 
be sure, "to avoid the burden that inflation imposes on the economy requires a monetary 
policy that is firmly directed to reaching and maintaining price stability."311 The 
government and the bank were in full agreement as to what Bank of Canada policy ought 
to be. As we have seen above, rising interest rates were in fact a result of a falling rate of 
profit, shrinking mass of profit, inflation, risk premiums and a number of other concrete 
factors. In this context, the Bank of Canada raised interest rates to stem inflation, which it 
saw as the principal challenge to medium-term growth.312 
The central bank controls the interest rates and hence inflation by setting a target 
for the overnight interest rate (i.e. the Bank Rate). The Bank of Canada can keep the 
overnight interest rate within an operating band by announ~g specific rates at which it 
309 Robert Kozak, "Canada's Finance Minister Sees Recession Ending This Year." Reuters, May 14 1991. 
310Terence Corcoran, "Crow's Words Put Value in Zero lnflation."The Globe and Mail, Oct. 26 1990. 
311Bank of Canada, "Monetary Policy Report."Ottawa, May 1995, 24. 
312 OECD, OECD Economic Surveys, Canada, 1990-1, 12-13 
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is willing to lend and borrow in unlimited quantities.313 If the central bank seeks an 
overnight rate of, say, 10 percent, it will lend to commercial banks in unlimited quantities 
at 10.25 percent and borrow from them at 9.75 percent. This operating band effectively 
sets the overnight rate. 
When the central bank lowers its overnight target rate, it influences (as we have 
seen above, it does not determine) the entire range of market rates at which commercial 
banks lend. As a result, businesses and workers increase their borrowing, stimulating 
banks to increase the magnitude of credit available. Businesses and workers satisfy their 
need for cash by making withdrawals from the commercial banks. As the demand for 
money increases and the bank notes commercial banks have on hand decrease, 
commercial banks begin selling government securities to the Bank of Canada. In this 
way, the central bank introduces money into the system. The opposite occurs when the 
central bank increases the overnight interest rate operating band. 
To understand the effect of central bank interest rate policy on the economy, it is 
worth keeping. in· mind the state of the -business sector when these policies were 
implemented. Shrinking profits alongside rising debt levels and debt-service payments 
made the economy fundamentally unstable. Indeed, the long-run problems of profitability 
intersected with the accumulation of debt to create ever more difficult financing 
circumstances for business. In the context of rising interest rates, growing debt and 
shrinking profits, debt servicing became increasingly difficult. 
313Bank of Canada, "The Economy and Economic Policy."Accessed August 18 2012. 
http://www.bankofcanada.ca/monetary-policy-matters/1-economy/. 
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In the eyes of the central bankers, the oncoming economic slowdown would be 
insufficient to cope with what they perceived as demand-driven inflation. In this context, 
tight monetary policy would ease inflation and restrictive fiscal policy would facilitate 
price stability by reducing demand.314 To be sure, the Bank of Canada increased interest 
rates to squeeze out excess money. However, by reducing inflation, the central bank 
reduced profits and therefore business investment. And by increasing interest rates, the 
bank cut loose the lifeline that was keeping business investment going. It made further 
business borrowing impossible, as debt servicing became unmanageable. As one 
mainstream journalist noted at the time, corporate profits had "been falling for six 
consecutive quarters while high interest rates" made it "difficult to finance . new 
projects."315This is why the recession was, first and foremost, caused by a reduction of 
business investment. This is also why the central bank was taken by surprise at how the 
economy reacted to the increase in interest rates. Finally, this is why interest rate policy 
appeared to most as the "cause" of the recession, when in fact it was more of an "effect" 
of underlying profitability problems intersecting with the downturn in the busine~s c_y~le. 
To be sure, high interest rates were the proximate cause for the recession, but the 
economy was fundamentallyfragile to begin with, both in terms of underlying 
profitability and business debt levels. Had the mass of profit not been shrinking, high 
interest rates most certainly would not have resulted in an economic catastrophe of the 
breadth and depth we saw. 
314 Lewis, In the long run, 133. 
315Blinch, "Canada in Recession with Two Quarters of Negative Growth." 
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After a "very tight" monetary policy stance in 1989, the central bank switched to 
a "mildly tight" stance in 1990.316 At that point, however, relaxed monetary conditions 
did not translate into lower long-term interest rates. In part this reflected the difficulty of 
maintaining the value of the Canadian dollar. In January 1990, Crow attempted to reduce 
interest rates "by more than a quarter percentage point, but he had to back track after 
foreign investors took that as a signal he had gone soft on inflation and the dollar 
plunged."317For this reason, Laidler and Robson note that "paradoxically, the proximate 
cause of the squeeze was an attempt by the Bank of Canada to loosen the stance of 
policy." Investors believed the Bank of Canada's "resolve to bring inflation down was 
weakening." This initiated a run on the Canadian dollar and a dramatic reversal in policy. 
After its failed attempt at a reduction, the central bank raised rates above 13 percent and 
held them there throughout the summer.318 This was the proximate cause for the 
recession. However, to repeat, more fundamentally, the crisis reflected the dynamics of 
capitalist accumulation, manifesting themselves in a shrinking mass of profit and 
concomitant rising interest rates. This overaccumulation was part of the long-run 
dynamics of capitalist accumulation, beginning in the mid-1970s when the rate of return 
on investment began to decline. It was fundamentally rooted in capital deepening 
throughout the period. In this way, Bank of Canada monetary policy sparked the crisis, 
but the flammable material had been gathering for over one and a half decades. 
316Ben S.C. Fung and Mingwei Yuan."Measuring the Stance of Monetary Policy."Government of Canada 
Publications, 1999, 260. 
317 
"Interest Rate Drops Again." Kitchener-Waterloo Record, 28 December 1990. 
318Laidler and Robson, Two Percent Target, 13. 
160 
Conclusion 
In this chapter, we examined the long-run tendencies of capital accumulation and 
scrutinised in great detail the reasons for the depth and breadth of the 1990-92 recession 
in Canada. We explored the characteristics of the crisis in the U.S. and Canada, noting 
the greater severity in the latter. After reviewing existing explanations for the crisis, 
which lay the blame primarily on the interest rate, we provided an alternative classical 
political economic account of the crisis, centering out the rate of return on investment and 
the mass of profit in our analysis, and particularly pointing to the increasing deepening of 
capital as the main reason for the sinking of the latter. We showed that the depth and 
breadth of the crisis was due to a shrinking mass of profit, which was compounded by 
high interest rates and, later, by government retrenchment in the context of government 
debt instability. We also discussed the linkages between the rate of return and the mass 
of profit, historical contingency and the interest rate. We showed that the interest rate is 
complexly determined, and cannot be considered simply a result of Bank of Canada 
monetary policy. In so doing, we noted the phenomenological foundation for the 
popularity of the idea that interest rates were the primary culprit behind the recession. 
We also explained how these acted as a trigger for the latter, when the central bank 
attempted to stem inflation by raising rates. We showed that inflation itself was in the 
first instance a result of stagnating growth in the context of the continuing growth of 
credit. We examined the relationship between interest rates and the exchange rate. 
Finally, we have shown that the fundamental cause of the recession was an 
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overaccumulation of capital relative to the availability of profit, or failed valorisation, as 
was discussed in the theoretical section. 
This historical study of the Great Canadian Slump showcases the explanatory 
power of the theoretical framework developed by Henryk Grossman. It demonstrates how 
the profound dislocation and social torment of the 1990s was inextricably woven into the 
very fabric of capitalist accumulation itself. In many respects, the current global 
economic turmoil - now in its fifth year - bears a striking resemblance to Canada in the 
1990s, especially in the advanced capitalist economies of America and Europe. In light 
of this, a revival of Grossman's theory and methodology seems both appropriate and 
timely. 
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Corporate profits must recover, even at the expense of governments and working 
Canadians.319 . 
- Peter Cook, The Globe and Mail, December 2, 1991 
Chapter 3: The Long Upturn and Recent Economic Developments, 1993-2008 
The previous chapter dealt with the question of the long, tumultuous downturn, which 
began in the mid-1970s and persisted until the point of absolute overaccumulation in the 
spring of 1990. From a social standpoint, the crisis of 1990-92 brought with it a great deal 
of torment and turmoil. From the standpoint of capital, however, it ushered in a period of 
extensive industrial restructuring and the renewal of accumulation. In this chapter, I 
argue that the dynamics of this crisis themselves led to an improvement in the conditions 
for accumulation. In particular, the drop in demand for fixed capital led to a dramatic 
reduction in the price of new capital equipment. This led to an increase in the marginal 
efficiency of capital, and by 1993 business investment in new capital equipment picked 
up again. The intervening twenty-seven month recession ushered in a series of 
bankruptcies and increased the pliancy of labour. In turn, the pliancy of labour and the 
centralisation of capital allowed for . significant restructuring in the economy. In 
particular, "just-in-time" production became consolidated in this period at the same time 
as ever cheaper computing and information communication technologies usage spread 
throughout the economy. This process was facilitated by the introduction of the Canada-
U.S. Free Trade Agreement and the restructuring that was its result. These 
transformations produced a shrinking organic composition of capital, a reduction of 
turnover time and an increase in the rate of surplus-value, which together combined to 
319 Peter Cook. "When the Big Need Is for Bigger Profits."The Globe and Mail, December 2 1991. 
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.create a rising rate and growing mass of profit, reflected in a high average MEC for the 
period. The latter was the fundamental condition for the stability of capitalist 
reproduction in this period. 
The purpose of this chapter is to demonstrate how the growing mass of profit and 
hence relatively high levels of MEC were achieved. The first section of this chapter 
looks at the long-run changes in the MEC. It demonstrates that the low MEC in the 
period 197 4-1989 was the reason for instability in that period. Likewise, the high MEC in 
the period 1993-2008 underlay the stability of that period. The second section examines 
how the crisis of the early 1990s affected the MEC and therefore investment. The third 
section examines the effects_ of industrial restructuring on the organic composition of 
capital. In the fourth section, we look at how the crisis augmented the pliancy of labour, 
thereby facilitating restructuring and how the rate of surplus-value was improved (in 
favour of capital). In the fifth section, we examine how the implementation of just-in-
time production and information communication technologies affected the turnover time 
of capital throughout the· period. In the sixth section, we· examine how all of these factors 
combined to increase the rate and mass of profit, as well as th~ MEC. 320 Hence, this 
chapter deals almost exclusively with the overcoming of the crisis and how specific 
transformations in production and distribution affected the long-run dynamics of 
accumulation. In Chapter 4, we will see how these modified the short-run dynamics. Let 
us now examine the long-run movements in the MEC as the fundamental condition for 
32° For the methods used in calculating the organic composition of capital, the rate of surplus-value, the 
turnover time of capital, the rate and mass of profit as well as the marginal efficiency of capital, see 
Appendix. 
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unstable and stable capitalist reproduction m the periods 1975-89 and 1993-2008, 
respectively. 
Long-run movements in the MEC as the condition for capitalist stability 
As we have seen in the previous chapters, long-run stability or instability in 
capitalism are both functions of the marginal efficiency of capital. In this chapter, when I 
refer to the MEC, I mean the MEC minus the interest rate. As we have seen previously, 
this is the driver of active investment and hence capital accumulation. The formula for 
the MEC, then, can be expressed as follows: 
MEC = t - i ( !JP ) L1 Ct-1 + L1 Wt-1 
To re-iterate the point made in the previous chapter, the above formula shows that the 
marginal efficiency of capital is equal to the profits (L1P) made at time t over the 
investments in additional capital (L1C) and labour-power (L1 W) made at time t-1 minus the 
interest rate (i). In other words, the MEC is the rate of return on the marginal unit of 
capital minus the interest rate. 
The formula above allows us to measure the MEC using Statistics Canada's 
national accounts, in particular its GDP as well as flows and stocks of fixed non-
residential capital time series data. The measure employed in this paper uses corporation 
profits before taxes and gross fixed capital stock as well as wages, salaries and 
supplementary labour income to make its estimates of the MEC. It should be noted, 
however, that this measure is imperfect. To be sure, because it uses gross fixed capital 
stock figures to estimate the marginal unit of capital, it does not take into account the 
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effect of depreciation. Nevertheless, two phases of accumulation clearly emerge from my 
estimates. 
Figure 29. The marginal efficiency of capital in Canada 
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The first phase (1975-1989) is characterised by a low average MEC and widespread (and 
increasing) volatility as we have seen in Chapter 2. The second phase (1993-2008) is 
characterised by a higher average MEC and generalised stability-. For the purposes ofthis 
discussion, we shall call 1975-1989 the "late" phase of capital accumulation, as it 
occurred after the long postwar boom and is characterised by escalating problems of 
profitability and instability. We shall name 1993-2008 the "early" phase of accumulation, 
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as it is characterised by a substantial period of capitalist "cleansing" (as we shall see 
below) and a long upswing in profits and accumulation. In the late phase of accumulation 
of the 1970s and 1980s, the average growth rate of the mass of profit was 9.43 percent 
and the average MEC was -2.6 percent. In the latest early phase of accumulation, the 
average growth rate of the mass of profit was 13.65 percent and the average MEC was 
13.6 percent. Whereas the late phase is characterised by generalised instability, the early 
phase is characterised by stability. 
We can examine the two phases in greater detail by disaggregating the MEC 
figures. In the graphs below, I have charted out the MEC for the years 1975-1989 and 
1993-2008 separately. Since we are here dealing with the question of generalised 
instability leading to crisis formation (but not the crisis itself), I exclude the data for the 
years 1990-92, the depths of the Great Canadian Slump (which we examined in detail in 
Chapter 2). 
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The graph above shows the MEC for the years 1975-1989. There are several 
notable features of this period. First, the trend line for the MEC slopes downward 
throughout the whole period. In other words, despite up-and-down movements in the 
MEC resulting from the cyclical fluctuations of the investment cycles and other shocks to 
the economy the MEC trends downward. This is consistent with the theory outlined in 
Chapter 1. We would expect that as the rate of growth of the mass of profit begins to 
slow, the MEC too begins to slope downward. Second, the average MEC for this period 
was -2.6 percent. The three highest points achieved in this period were 1979 at 7.5 
percent, 1984 at 8.7 percent and 1987 at 7.9 percent. As discussed in Chapter 1, 
instability increases when the MEC is low because it becomes increasingly likely that 
endogenous and exogenous shocks to the economy will produce a negative MEC. Since 
the latter is the driver of accumulation and growth, these shocks become increasingly 
disruptive to economic reproduction. Of course, once the MEC trends to zero, further 
economic reproduction becomes impossible - a crisis of overaccumulation or failed 
· valorisation erupts,. as we -saw in Chapter 2. The low ·and downward trending MEC 
contributed to economic instability and crisis in this period. In these years, we can 
identify two severe recessions. The recession of 1981-82 came in response to an external 
shock resulting from the economic downturn that began in the U.S. at this time. The 
shock caused a severe recession in Canada because the MEC was already low and 
business investment was precarious at best. Third, as we saw in Chapter 2, the slump of 
1990-92 was a result of the endogenous process of capital accumulation in Canada 
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leading to absolute overaccumulation. The MEC trended to zero and caused a 
"breakdown" in the dynamics of capitalist reproduction. 
Figure 31. MEC, 1993-2008 
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The period of instability 1975-1989 was followed by a period of relative stability. 
In this period, the average MEC was 13 .6 percent. This means that the difference in 
averages between these two periods isaround 16.2 percentage points. In other words, if 
we use MEC as a measuring stick for capitalist stability, the economy was significantly 
more stable in the period 1993-2008 than in the period 1975-1989. In this period, the 
three highest MEC points achieved were 1994 at 39 percent, 2000 at 28 percent and 2004 
at 80 percent. In other words, the highest point in the period 1993-2008 was over nine 
times greater than the highest point in 1975-1989. In addition, the slope of the MEC 
trend line in the period 1993-2008 is positive. Therefore, not only was the economy 
clearly stable, but it appears it was becoming more stable. This finding is consistent with 
our falling composition of capital and rising rate of profit figures for the same period, as 
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we will see below. Let us now proceed to our examination of the relationship between the 
crisis, the marginal efficiency of capital and the renewal of accumulation after the early 
1990s recession. 
Crisis, the marginal efficiency of capital and the renewal of accumulation 
As we have seen in Chapter 2, the high and rising organic composition of capital 
was the principal cause of breadth and depth of the 1990-92 crisis, as were the falling rate 
and shrinking and stagnating mass of profit (MEC :::; 0) that were its result. The rate of 
return on the marginal unit of capital sloped downward throughout the 1970s and 1980s 
before its long-run trend turned negative. In Chapter 1, we saw how crises of absolute 
overaccumulation can be overcome for long-run growth in two ways; namely, the 
reduction of wages or the "destruction" of value represented in capital. As the theory 
suggests, the principal "exit" from the crisis occurred by means of the forcible reduction 
of the price of new capital equipment and by the reduction of total compensation to 
workers per hour worked, which were reflected in an improvement in the MEC. These 
were the first and second steps towards the renewal of accumulation, necessary but not 
sufficient conditions for long-run stability. The MEC rebounded significantly in 1993, 
jumping from -18.53 percent in 1992 to 16.84 percent the following year. A temporary 
recovery in the MEC, the result of conjunctural factors was enough to restart 
accumulation. However, sustained accumulation after this initial phase was the result of 
restructuring and a reduction of the organic composition of capital over the whole period. 
The organic composition of capital was reduced by shrinking its constant capital 
component. To be sure, bankruptcy and the reduction of wages were the principal means 
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by which accumulation got restarted (as these had an immediate effect on the MEC) and 
a declining organic composition of capital was how it was sustained throughout the 
whole fifteen-year period. The reduction of wages was necessary to get accumulation 
going, but they were not the reason for sustained accumulation, for wages began to grow 
again in the 1995. Finally, a massive reduction in turnover time facilitated profitability 
throughout the period. These processes resulted in an upward sloping MEC. In this way, 
the 1990-92 crisis was an important turning point for capital accumulation in Canada. 
To be sure, the increasing paucity of surplus-value in the system resulting from 
the dynamics of accumulation in the 1970s andl 980s made the conditions for 
accumulation increasingly unstable. Once the crisis broke out, bankruptcies became 
common. When a firm files for bankruptcy, it must liquidate its assets in order to pay off 
its creditors. More often than not, this takes the fonn of auctions in which machinery, 
equipment and inventories are sold below their value. In this way, the value represented 
in these commodities is reduced. The result for the system as a whole is an increase in 
the MEC .. To be sure, because of the surplus of capital equipment and the sudden drop in 
demand, the price of the latest equipment drops relative to the available profit, and this 
acts as a spur to investment. Moreover, if bankruptcies are sustained for a whole period, 
this will act to reduce the organic composition of capital itself. Finally, as firms buy up 
capital equipment cheaply, funds equivalent to the value destroyed in this process are 
freed up for further investment. In this chapter I argue that this is what occurred in 1990-
92, and what led to the renewal of investment around 1993. 
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Figure 32. Bankruptcies in Canada 
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The graph above demonstrates that the number of bankruptcies rose drastically 
during and subsequent to the 1990-92 slump and persisted at high levels until the new 
millennium (after declining somewhat after 1996). Business bankruptcies occurred 
principally in Quebec and Ontario, and were concentrated mostly in retail, construction, 
services, manufacturing, wholesale, transportation and storage. At the height of the 
recession in 1992 - just before accumulation got restarted around 1993 - Quebec's share 
of total bankruptcies in Canada stood at 37 percent, and Ontario's share stood at 30 
percent. Thirty-eight thousand bankruptcies occurred between 1990 and 1992 alone.321 
To put it into relative terms, between 1989 and 1992 bankruptcies in Canada rose by 67 
percent. Despite the spur to investment in 1993 owing to an improvement in the MEC, 
an additional thirteen thousand firms went bankrupt in that year. Bankruptcies remained 
at historically high levels until the new millennium. 
321 CANSIM Table 177-0004 
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In addition to the underlying economic turmoil that swept through the Canadian 
economy in the 1990s, a contributing factor to the rise in bankruptcies was the 
introduction of the Canada-U.S. Free Trade Agreement (1989) and the intensified 
restructuring that accompanied it. Norman Caulfield notes that "in 1989, when CUFTA 
went info affect [sic], the largest wave of corporate restructuring in Canada took off. 
From 1989 to 1993, in Ontario alone ... 452 major manufacturing firms closed their 
facilities."322 As a result of both the slump itself and the new free trade agreement, 
bankruptcies rose and tremendous downward pressure was put on the price of machinery 
and equipment in the early 1990s. In this way, the ground was cleared for a period of 
renewed accumulation. 
To be sure, the immediate effect the large number of bankruptcies in this period 
was to improve the rate of return on the marginal unit of capital by reducing the cost of 
new capital equipment. This was essential to the re-initialisation of accumulation 
beginning around 1993. The radical reduction of the price of machinery and equipment in 
this period is a result of both the decline in demand for fixed capital and the increase in 
supply resulting from liquidation sales. In this way, bankruptcy helped to improve the 
rate of return on the marginal unit of capital. The demand for fixed capital declined by 
10 percent after the recession broke out. 323 This is reflected in a significant decline in the 
machinery and equipment price index. The decline principally took place in office 
furniture, mechanical power transmission equipment, tanks, industrial trucks and tractors, 
322 Norman Caulfield, NAFTA and Labor in North America (Chicago: University of Illinois Press, 2010): 
135. 
323 CANSIM Table 381-0010 
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refrigeration and air conditioning equipment, conveyors, escalators, elevators and 
hoisting machinery, fans, air circulators and commercial trailers and semi-trailers.324 In 
sectoral terms, the price declined little in agriculture and forestry, but fell significantly in 
mining, manufacturing, transportation, construction, trade, finance, business and personal 
services, public administration and fishing. 325 The price decline is best captured by the 
quarterly Machinery and Equipment Price Index (MEPI) time series below. 
Figure 33. Machinery and equpiment price index (MEPI) 
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The radical decline in demand for fixed capital and the fire-sale of existing assets 
by bankrupt firms resulted in a reduction in the price of new machinery and equipment. 
Between the first quarter of 1990 and the fourth of 1991, the price of new machinery and 
equipment fell by 6.86 percent. And it remained below pre-recession levels until 1994. 
To repeat, this decline reflects both the fact that insufficient surplus-value was available 
324CANSIM Table 327-0013 
325 CANSIM Table 327-0016 
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for profitable investment in new machinery and equipment and the fact that business 
bankruptcies were forcibly devaluing capital equipment through the fire-sale of business 
assets. As a result of these complimentary processes and the dynamics of the recession 
itself, the demand for these commodities declined relative to their supply and so too did 
their prices. 
Keeping in mind that a positive rate of return on the latest investments is essential 
to accumulation (i.e. MEC 2:: 0), as was explained in great detail in Chapter 1, a radical 
reduction in the price of new machinery and equipment in the context of zero or negative 
marginal returns would result in favourable conditions for renewed accumulation. In this 
case in particular, a reduction of 6.86 percent in the price of fixed capital would 
significantly improve the rate of return on the marginal unit of capital. It is important to 
note, however, that this process is not the same as a dramatic reduction in the organic 
composition of capital that an extended and sustained period of accumulation requires. A 
reduction of the organic composition of this sort would only occur after accumulation got 
restarted, and would be. the result of the cheapening of the means of production and on-
going restructuring of the sort that occurredthroughout the 1990s to be discussed below. 
To be sure, the 1990s crisis did not directly lead to a significant reduction of the organic 
composition of capital. The latter was the result of the restructuring that this crisis made · 
possible. It was a necessary, but not a sufficient cause for the declining organic 
composition of capital in the period 1993-2008. 
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Crisis, restructuring and the organic composition of capital 
As argued above, the renewal of accumulation around 1993 was principally the 
result of a radical reduction in the price of fixed capital and the concomitant rise in the 
rate of return on the marginal unit of capital. Contributing to increased profitability was a 
reduction in real wages. Once accumulation got restarted, the organic composition of 
capital began to fall (see Figure 34 below). In other words, it was taking less capital to 
produce the same magnitude of output. This provided the underlying basis for the long 
period of growth beginning around 1993 and lasting until 2008. Explaining the decline in 
the organic composition - the fundamental condition for sustained accumulation - is the 
purpose of this section. 
Figure 34. Organic composition falls, 1993-2008 
Source: See Appendix 
Once accumulation got restarted after the initial phase of the crisis, the price of 
machinery and equipment began to stagnate and then fall, a result of bankruptcies, new 
176 
forms of work organization and a reduction of the abstract labour-time represented by 
these commodities. Especially after 1997, the cheapening of the inputs of production was 
a large contributor to the sinking organic composition of capital.326 Notably, the five 
major categories in which the price of business supplies declined in the period 1997-2011 
were computers, communication and transportation equipment. The cost of business 
computing sank by 71 percent, that of communication equipment by 34 percent, and cars, 
trucks and vans by 29, 28 and 20 percent, respectively.327 The significance of price 
declines in these areas lies in the important role they played in the JIT and ICT 
revolutions that occurred in this period. The cheapening of these commodities 
contributed to reducing the organic composition of capital and was part of the massive 
organizational and technological restructuring associated with JIT in the period. 328 We 
will examine these further below. Figure 35 below demonstrates that the price of 
machinery and equipment fell by an extraordinary 28.37 percent between the fourth 
quarter of 2002 and the third of 2011. Next to the crisis of 1990-2, the stagnating and 
326 Circulating capital here includes raw materials, goods in progress and finished goods. These are 
available as monthly data from Statistics Canada's CANSIM Series v801800, v802263 and v802726. 
Statistics Canada has produced data for circulating capital from 1992 onward. The data we have been 
using to this point have been for fixed capital only. Since circulating capital is another form of constant 
capital, we can more accurately estimate the organic composition of capital in Canada for the period after 
the 1990-92 crisis by including it in the numerator. I have presented the measure for the organic 
composition of capital (without circulating capital) above to make it comparable to the measure for the 
period before 1990-92. The difference after adding circulating capital is negligible and does not affect the 
overall downward sloping trend. 
327CANSIM Table 3270041. Note that this was part of a secular decline in the prices of these commodities 
across the period. For instance, between, 1997 and 2007, the price of business computers fell by 59 
percent, the price of communication equipment by 24 percent, and the prices of cars, vans and trucks by 18, 
17 and 11 percent, respectively. 
328 It is interesting to note that the "only private-sector industry to have union density substantially above 
the national average is transportation and warehousing, at 41 percent." See Harvey J. Krahn, Graham S. 
Lowe and Karen D. Hughes, Work, Industry and Canadian Society Sixth Edition (Toronto: Nelson, 2011): 
371. 
177 
then declining cost of fixed capital was the most significant contribution to sustained 
accumulation in this period. 
Figure 35. Machinery and equipment price index 
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Here a word about the form and character of accumulation in this period is 
necessary. First, it is important to remember the difference between extensive and 
intensive accumulation. Extensive accumulation represents accumulation on a given 
technological level (and therefore implies a relatively stable relation between the number 
of workers and the quantity of capital each worker employs), whereas intensive 
accumulation represents the accumulation of capital in labour-saving technologies (and 
therefore implies increasingly fewer workers relative to the value of the capital 
equipment employed). Second, as we have seen above, accumulation can only continue if 
the mass of profit is growing. Hence, extensive accumulation is a more stable form of 
accumulation because it employs more workers on given technological basis, thereby 
allowing the mass of profit to grow. Therefore, extensive accumulation is more amenable 
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to continued capital accumulation. Of course, neither of these "types" of accumulation 
exists in pure form. The particular "mix" of intensive and extensive forms of 
accumulation is always a theoretical-empirical question. 
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The graph above shows the ratio of investment in machinery and equipment as 
well as buildings ·and structures to total investment. · · These ratios are good proxies for 
intensive and extensive forms of accumulation.More investment in machinery and 
equipment indicates intensive accumulation, whereas investment in buildings and 
structures to house workers and machinery indicates extensive accumulation. These 
figures come with a few caveats. First, it is important to note that accumulation is always 
more intensive than it is extensive, as evidenced by the higher absolute level of 
investment in machinery and equipment relative to that in buildings and structures. This 
is a necessary result of the competitive imperative and the labour-saving bias of 
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technological innovation in capitalism, as discussed in Chapter 1. Second, the figures 
above are imperfect, for they do not take into account the cheapening of the means of 
production that was a salient feature of the period. Therefore, the figures for the level of 
investment in machinery and equipment relative to buildings and structures are not 
perfect proxies for intensive accumulation. Moreover, the reduction of storage costs 
associated with JIT surely played a part in reducing investment in buildings and 
structures in this period. Therefore, our measure for extensive accumulation should be 
taken with a grain of salt. 
With the above caveats in mind, the graph seems to demonstrate that the character 
of accumulation from 1974 to 1982 was more extensive than it was in the subsequent 
period from 1992 to 2000, during which time the level of investment in machinery and 
equipment rose relative to that in buildings and structures, and therefore marked a period 
of intensive accumulation. As we have seen in Chapter 2, the employment-to-population 
ratio did not recover from the Great Canadian Slump until approximately the year 2000. 
This would certainly be consistent with intensive accumulation, where more ·labour-
saving technologies are adopted at the expense of workers. This does not, however, 
necessarily imply a rising organic composition of capital in this period, for investment in 
buildings and structures were falling relatively and the price of new capital equipment 
was shrinking, thereby acting to reduce the constant capital component of the organic 
composition. After 2000 and until present, the intensity of accumulation has slowed 
down, but it has still been relatively more intensive than extensive. The slowing intensity 
of accumulation after the year 2000 may account for the productivity gap between 
180 
Canada and the U.S. But it certainly contributed to the stability of the Canadian economy 
relative to that of the U.S., since the organic composition of capital has not been growing 
as quickly. This also accounts for the different rates of employment in the U.S. and 
Canada that we saw in Chapter 2. The introduction of labour-saving technology is 
notably slower when extensive accumulation occurs. This acts to slow down the growth 
of the organic composition of capital (thereby prolonging accumulation) and to employ 
more workers. The result is slower productivity growth relative to countries undergoing 
intensive accumulation. Finally, the graph demonstrates that the percentage of total 
investment devoted to buildings and structures declines from around 20 percent before 
the 1990-92 crisis to around 17 percent after. This reflects in part the introduction of JIT 
distribution systems and the reduction of storage costs. The result was to reduce the 
organic composition of capital by reducing its constant capital component. This will be 
explored further below in the section dealing with the specificities of the 1990s 
restructuring. 
Unemployment and the rate of surplus-value 
When firms go bankrupt, workers are laid off. One of the irrationalities of 
capitalism is that it produces circumstances in which perfectly functioning, productive 
equipment lies idle while masses of unemployed workers cannot find work. As noted in 
the previous chapter, the official rate of unemployment in Canada rose from 6.7 percent 
in 1989 to 12.5 percent in 1993.329 The increase in the reserve army of desperate workers 
acted both to discipline those who still had work and to lower real wages. The result was 
329 CANSIM Series V2440389 
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a relatively pliant workforce alongside an increasing rate of surplus-value. As Norman 
Caulfield notes, between 1989 and 1993 companies blamed factory closures "on 
increased competition" due to CUFT A, but for those workers who were spared 
unemployment "employers demanded concessions in wages and benefits and in work 
organization, all in an attempt to lower costs. "330 
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Workers were laid off and by 1993 employers had successfully lowered 
compensation for those remaining employed. In the second quarter of 1990, $166 billion 
(2005 dollars) were paid out in wages and salaries. By the first quarter of 1991, this had 
fallen $14 7 billion. It continued to fall throughout the period and finally bottomed out in 
the first quarter of 1997 at $13 8 billion. Most of this decline was achieved by reducing 
33
° Caulfield, NAFTA and Labor in North America, 135, emphasis added. 
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the number of workers employed by means of new forms of work organization and the 
implementation of labour-saving technologies. Additionally in this period, real wage 
payments declined by 20 percent.331Importantly, however, in the initial phase of the 
recession total compensation per hour worked continued to rise. In other words, for those 
workers who were able to keep their jobs, compensation continued to grow in the initial 
phase of the slump. It was only in 1993 that a reduction in this ratio was achieved. In 
other words, the reduction of wages of employed workers was an important component in 
the establishment of the long phase of capital accumulation beginning around 1993. In 
fact, total compensation per hour worked remained below its first quarter 1993 level for 
seven quarters. It did not begin to improve until 1995. All of this took place in the context 
of the ever-increasing productivity of labour, as is shown in Figure 38 below. From the 
standpoint of labour's share of output (i.e.labour compensation divided by current dollar 
output), the latter declined by eight percent between the second quarter of 1992 and the 
first quarter of 1995.332 The legislated wage freeze for public sector workers in the 1990s 
contributed~ to the downward pressure on. wages, as did the "trigger-happy" usage of 
back-to-work legislation.333In short, the crisis helped to re-establish a rising rate of 
331 IHS Global Insight, "Historical Wages and Salaries and CPI, Quarterly, Canada."Accessed March 5, 
2011. 
332 CANSIM Table 383-0008 
333Leo Panitch and Donald Swartz, "Neo-Liberalism, Labour, and the Canadian State." In Vivian Shalla 
(Ed.) Working in a Global Era: Canadian Perspectives (Toronto: Canadian Scholars' Press, 2006): 348-
351. Back-to-work legislation was just one aspect of the attack on labour in this period. This was 
complemented by austerity measures in Ontario, where the newly ·elected New Democratic Party imposed 
the so-called "Social Contract," a three-year plan designed to make deep cuts to the public sector. The 
austerity agenda inc1uded the reopening of public sector union collective agreements, the implementation 
of a wage freeze for public servants and forced unpaid leave for public sector workers (the infamous "Rae 
Days," named after Ontario's Premier, Bob Rae). Virginia Galt, "Public workers face further pay restraint 
Government to limit arbitration awards." The Globe and Mail, Nov. 30, 1995. 
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surplus-value. All of this contributed greatly to the renewal of accumulation around 1993 
and the restructuring that followed it, as the theory outlined in Chapter 1 suggests. 
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Figure 38. Effects of the slump on labour 
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Recovery and restructuring 
Accumulation re-initialised around 1993 owing to an increase in the MEC, improvements 
in the organic composition of capital and the rate of surplus-value. As a result, the rate 
and mass of profit began to grow (see Figure 29 below).334 
334 The mass of profit is adjusted for inflation. See CANSIM Table 3260021. 
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In turn, increased profitability, in combination with a pliant labour force and a complicit 
labour leadership, allowed for the implementation of new technological and 
organizational changes throughout the period. Labour leadership justified these changes 
in the name of international competitiveness. As the labour historian Normal Caulfield 
notes: 
In their pursuit of partnership with the transnationals, the unions have assisted 
employers in the slashing of wages, the imposition of speedup, and the 
elimination of millions of jobs. These actions are justified on the grounds 
that sacrifices by workers are necessary to help their "national" businesses 
make profits and compete with foreign rivals. 335 
335 Caulfield, NAFTA and Labour in North America, 141. 
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Below I will show how changes in technology and organization led to a further 
reduction of the organic composition of capital and significantly decreased turnover time, 
thereby further improving profitability, the MEC, and prolonging the period of sustained 
growth. 
Research, development and innovation 
Innovation in manufacturing in this period is captured in the OECD figures on 
manufacturing business investment in R&D and patent applications. Figure 40 below 
shows indices for expenditure on R&D in both the U.S. and Canada in the period in 
question. In Canada, expenditures in R&D did not increase much between 1987 and 
1992. After 1993, however, investment in R&D began to grow steadily. In the U.S., 
R&D trended flatly and remained at 1987 levels until 1993, after which it grew, but at a 
slower rate than in Canada. Whereas R&D investment continued in Canada after 1997, it 
stagnated in the U.S. In other words, increasing investment in innovation in Canada 
coincided with the renewal of accumulation around 1993. 
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Figure 40. Manufacturing expenditure on R&D indices 
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Another means by which we can capture innovation is by examining the OECD 
patent data. Figure 41 below shows indices for the total number of patent applications in 
Canada and the U.S. Patent applications trended upward throughout the 1990s and 
2000s. In Canada, patent applications peaked in 2007. And since the turn of the 
millennium, patent applications patterns in the U.S. and Canada have diverged somewhat, 
indicating a greater growth of innovation in Canada than in the U.S. 
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Figure 41. Patent application indices 
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Importantly, this divergent pattern is most pronounced in ICT innovation. The 
indices in Figure 42 below demonstrate that Canada has been doing much more 
innovation relative to its 1990 level than the U.S. has relative to its own 1990 level. In 
fact, innovation appears to have been stagnating in the U.S. since about 2000. In Canada, 
on the other hand, innovation took a hit between 2000" and 2003 (likely the result of the 
bursting of the IT bubble), but began to grow again thereafter - and significantly so 
relative to the U.S. 
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High levels of ICT innovation have been an important aspect of the just-in-time 
revolution in Canada. This is an important point we shall return to below. For now it is 
sufficient to say that the innovation indicators we examined above show signs of 
improvement throughout the 1990s in Canada. This was part of the overhaul in the 
economy that the crisis of 1990-92 facilitated and that the renewal of capital 
accumulation in Canada required. 
Just-in-time production and distribution 
The implementation of new forms of work organization and technologies 
occurred in the wake of both the 1982 and 1990-92 crises. 336 These developments 
contributed to a rise in the rate of surplus-value, a fall in the organic composition of 
capital and the reduction of turnover time. Constant capital shrunk because overhead 
336 A full account of the restructuring of the nineties is beyond the scope of this chapter. For a more 
extensive treatment of this topic, see James Rinehart, The Tyranny of Work: Alienation and the Labour 
Process Fifth Edition (Toronto: Nelson, 2006): 148-168. 
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costs were reduced as JIT methods of organization became consolidated in the economy. 
To be sure, the consolidation of JIT contributed to a growing mass of profit in this period 
and hence to a high and stable MEC. 
The "JIT revolution" began after the 1982 recession,337 but did not become 
consolidated in the economy until after the 1990-92 crisis.338 In fact, organizational 
restructuring along these lines "occurred in close to half of Canadian firms with 100 or 
more employees between 1991 and 1996. "339 In a 1993 economic survey of Canada, the 
OECD wrote that the 1990-92recession "has been followed by an unusually slow 
recovery." The drag was in part a result of industrial restructuring which had "adverse 
short-run impacts on employment." It was precisely this restructuring that underlay the 
vigorous investment in machinery and equipment - exceeding pre-recession levels. 
Indeed, business "fixed investment has shown surprising strength" as firms "used the 
opportunity to install inventory-monitoring technology." In turn, the implementation of 
JIT and JCT was "reflected in tighter inventory management."340 As a result, "scheduling 
of JIT workforces is now standard practice in a wide r~nge of offices" in _primary, 
secondary and tertiary sectors.341 
JIT has been one-sidedly characterized as a technique to reduce the storage costs 
associated with maintaining large inventorie·s. One mainstream author notes that 
337 OECD, OECD Economic Surveys: Canada, 198911990 (Paris: OECD Publications and Information 
Centre, 1990): 19. . 
338 Joseph D. Blackbum, Time-Based Competition: The Next Battleground in American Manufacturing 
(Homewood, Illinois: Business One Irwin, 1991): 18. See also OECD, OECD Economic Surveys: Canada, 
1992 (Paris: OECD Publications and Information Centre, 1992): 17-18. 
339Krahnet al., Work, Industry and Canadian Society, 259. 
340 OECD, OECD Economic Surveys: Canada, 1993 (Paris: OECD Publications and Information Centre, 
1993): 11-18. 
341 Rinehart, The Tyranny of Work, 164. 
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"inventory reduction is a benefit of JIT, but not its raison d'etre. Time is the elemental 
concept that transfers to other functions within the organization. "342 In other words, JIT 
is principally a means whereby the time between production and consumption is reduced. 
This involves the reduction of inventories (and hence capital "tied up" in warehouses) in 
favour. of "just-in-time" shipments, but also the reduction of non-production activities 
(activities that do not produce surplus-value). The point is to "eliminate all time waste in 
the production of a product or delivery of a service." As a result, JIT "is characterized by 
small production runs, quick changeovers, and low inventories - all of which escalate 
product velocity. "343 In the language of classical political economy, this means that JIT 
serves to reduce the tum~ver time of capital; i.e. to speed up the production and 
circulation of commodities. To be sure, the benefits of JIT for capital are: (a) the 
reduction of constant capital; (b) the reduction of non-production activities; ( c) the 
reduction of turnover time; and ( d) the reduction of uncertainties associated with 
inventory investment. 
ICT andnT 
The implementation of JIT was greatly facilitated by the spread and consolidation 
of ICT in the 1990s, as we have mentioned above. The effects of the revolution in 
information communication technologies on production should not be underestimated. 
For example, the introduction of the banal and seemingly innocuous Blackberry has 
dramatically increased work time and therefore the extraction of absolute surplus-value. 
A recent survey found that 80 percent of Americans spend an extra seven hours a week 
342 Blackburn, Time-Based Competition, 7. 
343 Blackburn, Time-Based Competition, 21. 
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checking e-mail and answering phone calls. That is equivalent to a month and a half of 
unpaid overtime annually.344 Unfortunately, no similar surveys have been done for 
workers in Canada. However, given the wide proliferation of ICT throughout the country 
(as we will see below), a similar figure is not unlikely. 
The proliferation of ICT has profoundly affected the manufacturing and service 
industries. ICT supports the sharing of JIT schedules and the establishment of integrated 
information links.345 In turn, these reduce shipment discrepancies, which allows for the 
reduction of inventories. 346 The reduction of inventories is of central importance in 
reducing constant capital. The reduction of warehousing costs decrease per unit overhead 
costs by spreading the costs over more units out output.347 Firms with low inventory do 
better than firms with high inventory. Indeed, "firms with abnormally high inventories 
have abnormally poor long-term stock returns."348 
Getting JIT right requires sophisticated, centralized coordination. ICT serves this 
function. These technologies allow for the instantaneous tracking and coordination of 
shipments. In this connection, James Rinehart notes: 
344 Good Technology, "Good Technology Survey Reveals Americans Are Working More, but on Their 
Own Schedule." http://wwwl.good.com/news/press-releases/current-press-releases/161009045 .html. 
Accessed January 2, 2013. 
345 It is important to note that technological innovations in capitalism are not neutral. As James Rinehart 
notes, "labour process changes associated with the implementation of new technology are constructed by 
managers and specialists in the employ of business enterprises. Consequently, their goal is not to provide 
jobs that are more complex and challenging, easier to perform, healthier, and safer, but to raise productivity 
and cut costs ... [Indeed], computers have enhanced managers' ability to coordinate, monitor, and, hence, 
control the activities of their subordinates in a wide range of industries and occupations." See Rinehart, 
The Tyranny of Work, 157-158. 
346KannanSrinivasan, Sunder Kekre and TridasMukhopadhyay, "Impact of Electronic Data Interchange 
Technology on JIT Shipments," Management Science 40, no. 10 (1994): 1291-1304. 
347 Blackburn, Time-Based Competition, 9. 
348 Hong Chen, Murray Z. Frank and Owen Q. Wu, "What Actually Happened to the Inventories of 
American Companies between 1981 and 2000? ,"Management Science 51, no. 7 (2005): 1015-1031. 
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Giant retail firms like Sears and Wal-Mart now rely on information 
technology to cut costs and employees. Wal-Mart uses data gathered by 
scanners at the point of sale and transmits it electronically to its suppliers, 
who then decide what and how much to ship. Suppliers send their goods 
directly to Wal-Mart stores, thus eliminating storage at warehouses. These 
procedures have eliminated purchase orders, bills of lading, and large 
inventories. They also have cut costs by eliminating both the manual and the 
clerical labour needed to handle orders, shipping, and storage. 349 
Figure 43 below demonstrates the radical reduction in the inventory-to-shipment 
ratio.35° Keeping in mind that turnover time is equal to production and distribution time, 
the inventory-to-shipment ratio is a good proxy for it. Figure 43 demonstrates that 
turnover time fell steeply in 1982 and 1990-92, coincident with the recessions of those 
years. In other words, as the economy went into recession, commodity sales slowed 
down. As. a result, inventories were not being replenished. We see, however, that during 
the period of renewed accumulation around 1993, the inventory-to-shipment ratio 
remained low. This fact points to structural changes in the production and distribution of 
commodities. JIT was clearly consolidated in the mid-1990s as many firms "used the 
opportunity to install inventory-monitoring technology."351 Moreover, not only did 
inventories decline relativeto shipments, but inventories declined absolutely from 2000 to 
2011. 352 To be sure, firms were now holding lower levels of inventories. 
349 Rinehart, The Tyranny of Work, 155. 
350IHS Global Insight, "Historical Index oflnventories to shipments, Quarterly, Canada."Accessed October 
19, 2010. 
351 OECD, OECD Economic Surveys: Canada, 1992 (Paris: OECD Publications and Information Centre, 
1992): 18. 
352 CANSIM Series v433l199 
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Figure 43. JIT consolidated by the mid-1990s 
Source: CANS IM Table 3 77-0008 
If we take into consideration the effect of the introduction of JIT and ICT on 
investment over the period 1961-2011, a clearer picture of the processes at work emerges. 
Table 4 below shows average investment by type as a share of GDP for the years 1961-
1981 and 1982-2001. The table demonstrates that average investment in buildings as a 
share of GDP has been lower after 1982 than in the period before. Likewise, investment 
in machinery and equipment has been higher. As concerns inventories, investment in 
inventories as a share of GDP has averaged 0.32 percent since 1982, well below the 
1961-1981 average of 0.80 percent. The reduction in investment in buildings and 
inventories reflects the adoption of JIT and ICT in the recent period. Nevertheless, the 
total share of GDP devoted to investment has actually increased from 10.37 percent in 
194 
1961-1981 to 11.96 percent in 1982-2011. As can be gleaned from the table, the 
difference is a result of greater investment in machinery and equipment. 
Table 4. Averaee investment by type 
Type 1961-1981 1982-2011 
Machinery 358% 6.54% 
Buildings 5.99% 5.10% 
Inventories 0.80% 0.32% 
TOTAL 10.37% 11.96% 
Source: CANSIM Table 380-0017 
The effect of JIT in the manufacturing sector is even more striking. Figure 44 
below shows investment in machinery and equipment as well as buildings and structures 
in the manufacturing sector in Canada. The graph demonstrates a clear downward trend 
in investment in buildings accompanying an upward trend in investment in machinery 
and equipment. 
Figure 44. JIT and investment in manufacturing 
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Interestingly, for this sector end-year gross capital stock in manufacturing shrank by 
about 17 percent from 2000 to 2011. To be sure, the rate of growth of gross capital stock 
has been negative since the beginning of the new millennium. Nevertheless, the trend for 
the rate of investment has been positive and growing. If we disaggregate the figures for . 
investment, the reason for the apparent decline in the magnitude of capital stock is the. 
reduction in investment in buildings and structures. Machinery and equipment investment 
has been high and increasing. This is a clear sign of the place of JIT in the manufacturing 
sector. 
Finance 
In addition to their effects on JIT, advancements in computing and information networks 
have allowed for the development of new financial instruments and information flows 
that "speed financial transactions" in the economy.353 It is beyond the scope of this 
chapter to enter into the rich debate regarding recent developments in finance. However, 
certain characteristics of finance in contemporary capitalism must be addressed as they 
concern the development o~ the .argument being made .in this dissertation; First, the 
increasing capacity to distribute credit via ICT channels encourages disintermediation 
(the exclusion of credit intermediaries from the dynamics of the demand for and supply 
of credit). The result is increasing competition over the supply of credit as firms tap into 
money markets directly and as needed. It is important to note, however, that increasing 
competition in finance is not a result of the quantity of organizations issuing credit, but 
rather of the competitivetechnological innovations that ease access to credit. Second, the 
353 Alfredo Saad-Filho, "Crisis in Neoliberalism or crisis of neoliberalism?" In Leo Panitch, Greg Albo and 
VivekChibber (Eds.) Socialist Register 2011 (London: Merlin Press, 2010): 247. 
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above processes contribute to the reduction of interest rates when the conditions for 
accumulation warrant it. Third, these developments facilitate the flow of commercial and 
bank credit within and between countries. In this way, they contribute to the decline of 
turnover time by channelling the flow of idle surplus-value into profitable avenues (when 
they exist). As Itoh and Lapavitsas note, "commercial credit can foster the expansion of 
capitalist production as a whole. By economising on the amount of idle capital held 
overall, and by speeding up the turnover of capital, commercial credit can raise the 
general rate of profit."354 Moreover, in Capital, Vol. 3 Marx writes that "credit 
accelerates the velocity of the metamorphosis of commodities, and with this the velocity 
of monetary circulation."355 ICT has facilitated this process. To be sure, idle surplus-
value is more easily put to use in turning over existing capital owing to technological 
advancements in finance. 
354 Makoto Itoh and Costas Lapavitsas, Political Economy of Money and Finance (London: MacMillan, 
1999): 90. 
355 Karl Marx, Capital, Vol. 3 (New York: Penguin, 1991): 567. 
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Effects on turnover time 
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Figure 45. Turnover time decreases, 1994-2008 
~ 
~ ! 
I 
\.0 ,...... 00 
Cl'\ Cl'\ Cl'\ 
Cl'\ Cl'\ Cl'\ 
...-4 ...-4 ...-4 
Cl'\ 
Cl'\ 
Cl'\ 
...-4 
...... _. ,---... 
0 ...-4 N m 
0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 
N N N N 
Source: See Appendix 
I 
I 
........... 
-, 
q- i.n \.0 
0 0 0 
0 0 0 
N N N 
,...... 00 
0 0 
0 ·O 
N N 
As the theory suggests, turnover time fell throughout the 1990s as ICT and JIT 
organizational changes became consolidated and the price of machinery and equipment 
declined. The crises played an important part in this process by improving profitability, 
freeing up investment funds and creating a pliant labour force. Moreover, the 
restructuring involved in the implementation of ICT and JIT made possible "a 
downsizing spree" in which workforces were continually reduced and reabsorbed. 356 As 
Moody notes, "speed-up and job loading" as well as "management-by-stress" reduce 
employment "more or less continuously over time even if the market holds up or 
expands."357 For workers, it was as if the recession of 1990-92had never ended.358 As late 
356 The official unemployment rate fell more-or-less consistently from 1993 (12.5 percent) to 2007 (5.3 
percent). See CANSIM Series v2440389. 
357 Kim Moody. Workers in a Lean World: Unions in the International Economy (New York: 
Verso, 2001): 100. 
358 Rinehart, The Tyranny of Work, 156. 
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as 1998, firms continued to undergo significant organisational change, especially larger 
firms, as Table 5 below demonstrates. 
Table 5. Percent of firms undergoin2 organizational change in 1998 by firm 
size359 
Firm size 1-19 20-99 100-499 500+ 
em lo ees 
Downsizing 7.7 16.0 22.4 33.8 
Despite sustained economic growth after the recession, employment vulnerability 
was widespread, reflecting "very high levels of employment insecurity."361 The world 
confronting workers, which was seemingly in a perpetual crisis,lent itself to a 
"recessionary psyche," which eased the resistance of the labour movement, contributed to 
higher rates of surplus-value extraction and fortified technological and organizational· 
changes. 362 For instance, Lewis notes that, in this period, two out of three Canadians 
believed they had "lost control over their economic future," and that "this despair 
continued even as the economy and fiscal position started to improve in the mid-
1990s. "363 
Contrary to all historical experience, these changes to workers' lived experiences 
were reflected in lower strike rates despite economic growth. As Brym points out, the 
359Statistics Canada, "Workplace and Employee Survey Compendium 1999, Table 2" 
http://publications.gc.ca/Collection/Statcan/71-585-X/71-585-XIE1999001.pdf.Accessed January 2, 2013. 
360 Re-engineering is "the radical redesign of a firm's entire business process to achieve maximum output 
and quality with the least labour by tightly integrating technology and tasks." See Krahnet al., Work, 
Industry and Canadian Society, 278. 
361 Rinehart, The Tyranny of Work, 166. 
362 Thom Workman, If You're In My Way, I'm Walking: The Assault on Working People Since 1970 
(Halifax: Femwood, 2009), 67. 
363 Timothy Lewis, In the long run we're all dead: the Canadian turn to.fiscal restraint. (Vancouver: UBC 
Press, 2003): 146. 
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historical relationship between the rising rate of employment and the rising strike rates 
broke: 
In the 1987-2000 period, the inverse relationship between the unemployment 
rate and weighted strike frequency nearly disappeared. The business cycle 
had little effect on workers' propensity to strike. The reason? Actions taken 
by employers and governments from the mid 1970s to the late 1990s-
introducing free trade, cutting budgets for a wide range of government 
assistance programs, passing laws and regulations that undermined unions-
disempowered workers and rendered the strike a less effective weapon. 364 
The upshot of the above processes is that restructuring encountered less resistance 
from workers and so became easier for capital to accomplish. The result was a reduction 
in turnover time, due to a decline in constant capital, an overall speed-up in the 
production, distribution and realization of values, and the smoother flow of financial 
capital throughout the economy. This allowed for a quicker pace of accumulation and an 
improved yearly rate of profit. These changes contributed to the overall stability of 
Canadian ·capitalism in this period, reflected in a rising rate of accumulation (see Figure 
46 below). 
364 Robert J. Brym, "Affluence, Power and Strikes in Canada, 1973-2005." In Robert J. Brym (Ed.) Society 
in Question, Sixth Edition (Toronto: University of Toronto, 2011 ): 55. 
200 
9% 
8% 
7% 
6% 
5% 
4% 
3% 
2% 
1% 
0% 
Figure 46. Rate of accumulation rises, 1993-2008 
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The consolidation of JIT also contributed to smoothing out the inventory cycle. 
To be sure, the inventory cycle is a function of fluctuations in inventory investment. As I 
have shown, inventory-to-shipment ratios stabilized in the 1990s. Inventory investment 
became increasingly stable, and this stabilization was due to the implementation of JIT 
and ICTs. W~_will explore these dynamics in greater detail in Chapter 4. 
To sum up, we have seen that the stability of a given period is a function of the 
average MEC. The latter is a function of the growth rate of the mass of profit, which is 
determined by movements in the Marxist variables, such as the organic composition of 
capital, the rate of surplus-value, turnover time and the rate of profit. We have seen how 
the crisis of 1990-92 ushered in a period of extensive restructuring, which included the 
introduction of new technologies and forms of work organisation. The latter, it was 
shown, have thrown into reverse the tendencies of decline experienced in the 197 4-1992 
period. A falling organic composition of capital and turnover time, accompanied by a 
201 
rising rate of surplus-value created the conditions for the growth of the rate and mass of 
profit and therefore the MEC. The result was a long period of stable capital accumulation 
beginning around 1993 and interrupted by the 2008-09 global financial crisis. Until now 
we have dealt only with the long-run tendencies of development in the Canadian 
economy. The next chapter examines the effects of the aforementioned processes and 
transformations on the shorter business cycles discussed theoretically in Chapter 1. It 
argues that the wide adoption of JIT and ICT in production and distribution, linking up 
firms flexibly along the supply chain along with the radical reduction of inventory levels 
and the increase in inventory control, all this has stabilized the inventory investment 
environment and therefore inventory investment itself. The result has been a dampening 
of the inventory investment cycle. It is to these processes that we now turn. 
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Chapter 4: The long upturn, ICT, JIT and the inventory cycle 
As I have shown in the previous chapter, the introduction of just-in-time production and 
information communication technologies in the period 1993-2008 dramatically changed 
the way surplus-value was produced and realised. These were structural changes 
particular to the neoliberal phase of capitalism in Canada. On the one hand, these changes 
affected the magnitude of surplus-value produced in any given year by reducing turnover 
time. On the other hand, the realisation of surplus-value embodied in these commodities 
was facilitated by tighter linkages in the supply chain. Whereas the previous chapter 
dealt with the questions of accumulation and long-run trends in profitability relating to 
these changes, this chapter deals with short-run developments in conjunction with 
structural changes particular to the last two decades. In particular, it deals with the 
problem of the realisation of surplus-value in the context of the theory of effective 
demand, the business cycle, and the effects of JIT-ICT on the latter. In this chapter, I 
argue that to the extent that JIT-ICT permeates the Canadian economy it contributes to 
stabilizing the inventory investment environment. As the OECD notes,· "just-in-time 
delivery practices and computerised inventory management have allowed firms to 
respond more quickly to changes in demand."365Quicker response times have reduced 
discrepancies in production. I argue that fewer disruptions along the supply chain have 
reduced fluctuations in inventory investment. In this way JIT-ICT has contributed to 
smoothing out the inventory investment cycle as well as the overall pattern of growth. 
This accounts for the smoother pattern of GDP growth after 1990-92 in Figure 4 7 below. 
365 OECD, OECD Economic Surveys: Canada, 1991 (Paris: OECD Publications and Information Centre, 
1991): 20. 
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In particular, in the above graph, notice the erratic pattern of growth in the period 1983-
1990. It is marked by sharp up-and-down movements. After the recession of 1990-92 the 
pattern became smoother with fewer erratic fluctuations annually. This is both the result 
of a higher average MEC after the recession, which provided a certain level of buoyancy 
against shocks to the economy, and the result of the JIT-ICT structural transformations 
that took place in this period. The preceding chapter focused on the role of the MEC in 
smoothing out GDP growth. This chapter focuses on explaining the relationship between 
JIT-ICT, smoother inventory investment and the reduction of fluctuations in the 
inventory investment cycle. 
In the first section of this chapter, I reiterate the theory of the inventory investment 
cycle, which was first examined in Chapter 1. In the second section, I discuss the 
theoretical linkages between information communication technologies, just-in-time 
production and the business cycle in contemporary capitalism. In the final section, I 
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provide supporting empirical evidence for my argument that the introduction of JIT-ICT 
has contributed to a smoother pattern of economic growth in Canada in the 1993-2008 
period. 
The inventory investment cycle 
Before proceeding, it is worthwhile repeating the essential elements of the 
business cycle theory informing this work (these are discussed in greater detail in Chapter 
1 ). First, there is no assumption that supply and demand are in equilibrium. In fact, the 
opposite is assumed. Capitalism is an anarchic system where supply persistently 
overshoots and undershoots demand. This results in situations of excess demand, which 
spurs additional investment resulting from above-average profitability. Second, 
increasing investment to meet excess demand is financed by credit. In other words, 
expansions are fuelled by credit. Contractions, on the other hand, are caused by the 
growing debt burden caused by financial leakages. To be sure, the expansion must come 
to an end once the debt burden becomes unsustainable. This basic logic applies to the 
inventory investment cycle as well as to the fixed capital investment cycle. It is the 
former that is the focus of this chapter. In particular, we will see how the stabilisation of 
the inventory investment environment reduces the shocks to which the system is 
subjected. As a result, a smoother pattern of growth emerges. Let us now proceed to 
examine how changes in production and distribution have altered the character of the 
business cycle in the recent period by stabilising the inventory investment environment. 
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Theoretical effects of JIT-ICT on the circulating capital investment cycle 
The analysis in this section is limited insofar as it does not seek to explain lean 
production in its entirety.366 Rather, it only seeks to explain the effects of JIT-ICT on the 
shorter business cycle. With this caveat in mind, the principal means by which JIT-ICT 
modifies the business cycle is by reducing the number of random endogenous shocks to 
which the system is subjected, especially along the supply chain. To be sure, in this 
section, it will be argued that JIT alters growth by tightening the supply chain, 
therebyreducing supply chain disruptions and making investment in inventories more 
stable. As was outlined in Chapter 1 and the pi·evious section, excess demand drives 
additional investment in circulating capital, but investment cycles around an endogenous 
growth trend because of the financial drag additional investment implies. These, 
respectively, are the boom and bust phases of the business cycle. To be sure, investment 
in circulating capital to meet excess demand is financed by bank borrowing. For this 
reason, if investment in circulating capital becomes more stable, . then the concomitant 
reduction of debt servicing payments will raise internally available finance relative to 
potential profit and allow investment to continue for a longer time. This accounts for the 
lengthening of these cycles in the recent period. However, more stable investment in 
circulating capital implies a more stable investment environment in which excess demand 
is reduced. In the previous chapter we saw how JIT-ICT improves the average rate of 
profit and improves accumulation. In this chapter, I will show how an unintended 
366 For an extensive analysis oflean production, see Kim Moody, Workers in a Lean World: Unions in the 
International Economy (New York: Verso, 2001): 85-113. 
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consequence of JIT-ICT is to stabilize accumulation by stabilizing inventory investment. 
In short, JIT-ICT reduces the endogenousdiscrepancies between supply and demand 
generated by the anarchic character of production in capitalism. In this way, it reduces 
(but does not eliminate) the stimulus of excess demand. This is made possible by new, 
tighter network linkages resulting from JIT-ICT. Let us explore this further. 
JIT and kanban 
Of particular importance to our analysis is kanban. In principle, kanban is 
employed by JIT firms to reduce waste. It is a "pull planning system that authorizes 
manufacturing based on the state of the production system." In this system, signals are 
sent "to the preceding production phases that authorize a specified component batch 
delivery for production."367 By producing on demand, kanban results in the reduction or 
outright elimination of buffer inventories while communicating "customer demand 
upstream to trigger process steps just-in-time to meet demand."368 Since inventories are 
smaller, firms can react more quickly to changes in patterns of demand. Consequently, 
the gap between supply and demand narrows. Therefore, in practice kanban. has the 
unintended consequence of tightening the integration of the supply chain and reducing 
discrepancies between supply and demand. 
Kanbanis designed to combat several types of waste, including overproduction, 
inventory, waiting, transportation, wasted motion and defects. Of particular importance 
to us are the first four types. Overproduction and inventory waste are, of course, linked. 
367I.A. Kouri, T.J. Salmimaa and I.H. Vilopola, "The Principles and Planning Process of an Electronic 
Kanban System." In T. Sobhet al. (Eds.) Novel Algorithms and Techniques in Telecommunications, 
Automation and Industrial Electronics (New York: Springer, 2008): 99. 
368 Stephen Cimqrelli, Kanban for the Supply Chain: Fundamental Practices for Manufacturing 
Management, Volume 1 (New York: Productivity Press, 2006): Chapter 1. 
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Kanbanemphasises "producing only what your immediate internal or external customer 
needs" so as to eliminate commodities for which there is no current demand and to save 
inventory storage space. 369 From the standpoint of the supply chain, however, this means 
that supply becomes more responsive to demand. The tight linkages between the demand 
for and supply of inputs results in fewer discrepancies. In principle, and this is worth 
emphasising, the result is to reduce gluts and associated shocks to profitability.Kanban 
also aims to reduce waiting time, which is unproductive and wasteful from the standpoint 
of capital (from the standpoint of workers, on the other hand, it is often a welcome relief). 
For this reason, management strives to "pull signals to ensure that a product from the 
supplying operation arrives when it is needed by the ordering process."370 On the one 
hand, if the product arrives too early, inventories grow and wasteful storage costs 
increase. Remember, JIT firms attempt to keep inventory levels low. On the other hand, 
if the product arrives too late, workers idle unproductively. As was seen earlier on, the 
synchronisation of supply and demand has the effect of reducing circulation time for 
commodities, and hence turnover time. · In. other words, commodities spend less time 
sitting in warehouses. The unintended consequence for the system as a whole is to 
decrease the response time to problems in the supply chain; e.g. to more quickly reduce 
or increase inventory investment depending upon the needs of the supplying and 
receiving firms or, to put it differently, the state of the production system. Moreover, the 
reduction and better timing of transportation acts to further buttress the integration of the 
supply chain by ensuring that inputs arrive in a timely and orderly fashion. Finally, to 
369Cimorelli, Kanban for the Supply Chain, Chapter I. 
37
°Cimorelli, Kanban for the Supply Chain, Chapter 1. 
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reduce errors and improve the flow between units of production, it is important that both 
the supplier and receiver firms be able to "see" into each other's operations. Not only 
does this mean that "suppliers, assemblers, and distributors [should] form networks 
within which information and technologies are shared,"371 but that supplier and receiver 
"organizations should map the current value stream, and together create a future value 
stream in the procurement process."372 The integration of the production schedules of 
diverse firms acts to further integrate the supply chain, by better matching up demand and 
supply. Indeed, if suppliers fail to integrate sufficiently, they may be replaced. All of this 
implies the technological capacity to perform these planning functions. Indeed, the 
dictates of capitalist competition imply an increasing technological capacity to plan. 
This brings us to the role of computers and ICT in JIT processes. So far we have 
examined the theory of the business cycle and the theoretical role of JIT in integrating the 
supply chain. In the next section we will examine the theoretical relationship between 
ICT and JIT before investigating limitations of JIT on the supply chain. 
ICT, JIT and kanban 
It is important to note that lean business does not generally use ICT for the 
collection of statistics and the centralized coordination of information. To the contrary, it 
finds and addresses problems by direct observation on the shop floor, seeks continuous 
371 Tony Smith, Technology and Capital in the Age of Lean Production: A Marxian Critique of the ''New 
Economy" http://www.public.iastate.edu/-tonys/: 40. Accessed January 2, 2013. 
372 Bruce Tompkins. Lean Thinking/or the Supply Chain 
http://www.tompkinsinc.com/publications/competitive _ edge/aiticles/06-04-Lean _Supply_ Chain.asp. 
Accessed January 2, 2013. 
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improvement (kaizen) and disseminates information by decentralized means.373For this 
reason, "computing intelligence is dispersed throughout the enterprise, rather than being 
centralized in a host computer only."374 Continuous improvement implies flexible work 
teams and computer-programmable machinery, all features of lean production. It also 
means that intra- and inter-firm departments must be functionally integrated. 
Importantly, "information technologies now aid in breaking down the bureaucratic 
barriers separating design, production, marketing, and administration functions."375 
Finally, lean production is founded upon sub-contracting arrangements in which each 
firm focuses on its "core competencies. "376 This implies the development of complex 
inter-firm supply chains, and the constant scouring for riew, more efficient suppliers. To 
this end, firms use various benchmarking techniques. ICT facilitates all of these 
processes, and the dramatically falling price of business computing over the past decade 
has helped its dispersion. For instance, in 1997 the price of computers and peripherals 
for business stood at 102.4 on Statistics Canada's Machinery and Equipment Price Index 
(MEPI). In 2008, it stood at 36.8 .. By 2011, the price of business computing had fallen to 
29.8 on the MEPI. That's a decrease in the costs of business computer equipment of 71 
percent in fewer than fourteen years.377This decline was followed by a decline in 
communications equipment by 34 percent in the same period. This helps to explain the 
extensive proliferation of computers and communications equipment in all walks of 
373 Thomas Houy, "ICT and Lean Management: Will They Ever Get Along?" MPRA Paper No. 2502 
(September, 2005), http://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/2502/: 64. Accessed on January 2, 2013. 
· 
374Smith, Technology and Capital in the Age of Lean Production, 3 7. 
375Smith, Technology and Capital in the Age of Lean Production, 41. 
376 Smith, Technology and Capital in the Age of Lean Production, 38-39. 
377 CANSIM Series v41232478 
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business life. The most important consideration for us, however, is how ICT facilitates 
the flow of information and semi-finished products within and between firms. Hence, 
this section will examine the effects of ICT, JIT and kanbanon inter-firm supply chains. 
According to the principles of JIT "the aim of an information system is to indicate 
at all times and to each operator what type of piece to produce, when to produce it and in 
what volume."378 In this sense, the operational information flowing through ICT 
channels concerns production processes, work standards and ways to increase 
productivity.379When information arrives regarding demand for a particular product, this 
information is 
transmitted back to final assembly; requests for the different parts required 
for final assembly are transmitted back to the sites where partially finished 
goods are produced; and so on, all the way back to the transmission of 
requests to suppliers to deliver raw materials and other inputs to the plant. 
Each step in the production and distribution process completes its task on an 
as needed basis, that is, "just-in-time" for the results to be used by the next 
stage in the process. 380 
In the kanban system, a label is placed on batch pieces. The document contains 
the quantity of articles in the container, its destination, a description of said articles, its 
location in the storage area, information concerning its route and so on.381 The "aim of 
this label is to send a signal that enables the company to produce only parts to replace 
parts which have just been used and in the order of their use." In this way, operators are 
informed '"about what he or she must do, when this must be done and the volumes 
378Houy, "ICT and Lean Management", 59. 
379Houy, "ICT and Lean Management", 60. 
380 Smith, Technology and Capital in the Age of Lean Production, 39-40. 
381Houy, "ICT and Lean Management", 61. 
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required. "382 All the while, ICT allows for the sharing of information between operators 
and managers to ensure problems are corrected quickly. Interestingly, however, 
traditional kanbanlabelling is often considered adequate for internal operations, and as a 
result, several businesses have resisted moving to an electronic system. Nevertheless, 
throughout the late 1980s and 1990s countless firms adopted electronic kanban, including 
Rover in 1986, General Motors in 1990 and Toyota in 2000. BMW now uses the 
technology as well. These businesses use Radio Frequency Identification Technology 
(RFID), wireless communication systems and bar-codes in production batch 
identification instead of the old labelling system. Significantly, this technology is more 
often applied in inter-firm transactions rather than within any individual firm, as in the 
case of Toyota, which limited the technology "only to pull the materials from the 
suppliers." Indeed, as of 2008 Toyota still used"card-based kanbans in its own 
manufacturing operations. "383 
The advantages of the electronic kanbansystem involve removing the problems of 
lost cards, eliminating the unproductive activity of handling cards, on-time delivery of 
demand needs, quick modification of electronic kanbanschedules when applicable, 
minimization of material shortages, increased transparency of the supply chain and· better 
analysis of supplier efficiency.384 To be sure, electronic kanban allows for quicker 
reaction times to changes in the state of production system and the supply chain. In 
382Houy, "JCT and Lean Management", 61. 
383Kouriet al., "The Principles and Planning Process of an Electronic Kanban System", 100. 
384Kouriet al., "The Principles and Planning Process of an Electronic Kanban System", 101. 
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combination with multi-functional machines and a flexible workforce, the result is 
increased responsiveness of supply to demand. 
Another important application of computers to lean production is in the field of 
planning. Enterprise Resource Planning (ERP) software deals with production 
scheduling, the automatic receipt and delivery of products, and the monitoring of 
inventory movements. It is also applied to manage capacity and finances. 385 Computer 
software is central to smoothing out production and creating small inventories so business 
can readily meet demand as it arises. Houy notes that "the size of batches and, 
accordingly, the breakdown of the. mix is determined by a formula which, linked to 
storage costs and the cost of changing the production run, determines the optimal size of 
the batches to be produced."386ICT antloomputer software like ERP are the solution to 
these complex real-time calculations. 
Additionally, ICT allows firms to track final consumer behaviour and demand in 
all of its nuances. This is important because "the greatest profits today are won from 
tailoring goods or services to the specific needs of particular customers in a way that 
cannot be easily duplicated by others."387 To be sure, competition over market share is 
increasingly taking place on the basis of customer-specified product differentiation. One 
only need think of the user-specific advertisements on Facebook or Google+ and the 
continuous polling of the user base to see the role of ICT in tracking consumer tastes. 
These tracking technologies, in combination with tighter relationships between suppliers 
385Houy, "ICT and Lean Management", 66. 
386Houy, "ICT and Lean Management", 67. 
387Smith, Technology and Capital in the Age of Lean Production, 40. 
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and receiver firms, allow for faster reaction times to shifts in consumer demand. 
Moreover, the forms of work organization and types of technology involved in lean 
production allow firms to respond more quickly to new information as it arrives. As a 
result "a greater range of products is offered to consumers than in F ordism, and product 
runs tend to be of significantly shorter duration. "388 
Furthermore, software is used for forecasting future needs. Although this runs 
counter to the "philosophy" of lean production (i.e. the idea that the "pull" of demand 
ought to stimulate supply), businesses see forecasting as necessary. Moreover, a firm may 
need to "push" to create demand. Indeed, auto manufacturers are extensive users of lean 
production methods, but they are also intensely involved in advertising campaigns. This 
is an important limitation of JIT in capitalist society. It means that investment decisions 
(for both circulating and fixed capital) are not governed solely by the "pull" of demand in 
existing supply chains.So, while JIT reduces some discrepancies associated with supply 
and demand, it cannot eliminate them entirely. For, to paraphrase Keynes, businesses 
ultimately make i~vestment decisions in a world of radical uncert'1:inty. ~ 89The basic 
anarchic character of production in capitalism prevails even amongst JIT firms. Let us 
now turn to some of the limitations of JIT-ICT in smoothing out inventory investment. 
Limitations of JIT-ICT and the business cycle 
There are a number of limitations to JIT production and distribution systems. For 
instance, situations may arise in which the buyer firm exaggerates its future need for 
unfinished products from the supplier firm because it anticipates but cannot be sure of 
388Smith, Technology and Capital in the Age of Lean Production, 39. 
389 J.M. Keynes, The General Theory of Employment, Interest and Money (London: Harvest, 1964): 148. 
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increasing demand. The supplier firm, anticipating this behaviour, may produce less than 
the quantity initially requested, to ensure that its inventories do not become overstocked. 
Therefore, though the range for error may be reduced owing to JIT-ICT, it is still 
present.390 This situation may result in too much or too little supply. Under- and over-
shooting persists even in the context of JIT production and distribution. 
The situation above may be offset by the power relations inherent in lean 
production sub-contracting systems. Suppliers compete for contracts from assembling 
firms. Hence, assembling firms have a certain amount of control over their supply and 
the conditions of its provision. If the former is unsatisfied with the quantity or quality of 
parts shipped, the supplying firm may lose its contract in the next round. Indeed, a 
significant reduction in the costs of production, including for example lower inventory 
storage costs, lower computing costs and so on, have significantly reduced the barriers to 
entry for lower-tier production. This is reflected in the growth of "archaic forms of labor 
organization common in the nineteenth century" like. homework.391 To be sure, 
competition is fierce and·lower-tier firms. ha':'e an interest in meeting the specifications of 
the assembling firm. 
In the preceding sections we examined the theory of the business cycle, the 
theoretical linkages between the supply chain, JIT, ICT and the limitations of the latter. 
In the following section we will examine the empirical evidence for the integration of the 
supply chain, ICT usage and the smoothing out of the inventory investment cycle. 
390 Guido Voigt, Supply Chain Coordination in Case of Asymmetric Information: Information Sharing and 
Contracting in a Just-in-Time Environment (New York: Springer, 2011): 37-38. 
391Kim Moody, Workers in a Lean World: Unions in the International Economy (New York: Verso, 2001): 
97. 
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Has the introduction of JIT-ICT led to a smoother pattern of growth? Empirical 
evidence 
Figure 48 below demonstrates that investment in inventories within each 
yearfluctuated much more considerably in the period prior to 1990-92 than in the period 
after. Shorter variations in inventory investment are also noteworthy, as well as lower 
overall levels of investment. 
Figure 48. Inventory investment (2002 dollars) 
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Longer cycles are notable in the period after 1990-92 with less frequent interruptions and 
higher overall levels of investment. The growing mass of profit contributed to the 
character of growth by allowing for a greater mass of overall investment in the period 
after the Great Canadian Slump. Greater profitability (reflected in a high average MEC) 
and more tightly integrated supply chains resulted in the smoother character of growth in 
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this period. This pattern of investment is reflected in the rate of GDP growth as well, as 
we have seen above. 
ICT, JIT and the supply chain in Canada 
In the previous chapter, I outlined how the crisis of 1990-92 played a pivotal role 
in restarting accumulation on a new foundation. Notably, in this period, technologies 
essential for the reorganisation of production and distribution became increasingly 
cheaper. The cheapening of computer, communications and transportation equipment 
eased firm reorganisation along the lines of lean production. Figure 49 below 
demonstrates the degree to which the essential elements of lean production have become 
cheaper throughout the period in question. In the fourteen-year period 1997-2011 for 
which these data are available, the price of business computing declined by almost 60 
percent, the price of transportation vehicles by 10-18 percent and communications 
equipment by almost 24 percent. Importantly, contrary to equipment intimately bound up 
with JIT-ICT, the prices of most other machinery and equipment in fact rose in this 
period. Let us look more closely at the place of these elements of lean production in 
Canadian society. 
217 
0% 
-10% 
-20% 
-30% l 
-40% 
-50% 
-60% 
-70% 
Figure 49. Percent Change in Machinery and Equipment Price Index 
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To get a sense of the increasing importance of transportation for inter-firm 
exchanges, it is notable that total monthly railway tonnage rose by 27.17 percent between 
1999 and 2007.392 Moreover, post-secondary college enrolment in transportation studies 
increased by 56. 7 percent between 1990 and 1998. 393 . Between 1993 and 2011, the 
absolute number of transport and equipment operators rose by 32 percent (from 512,200 
.to 677,100). Interestingly, in the initial phase of JIT-ICT restructuring, the number of 
employees dedicated to transportation and warehousing as a percentage of total employed 
workers rose from 4.68 percent in 1992 to 5.36 percent in 2000. In other words, 
transportation and warehousing jobs rose as a share of total jobs in Canada. After 2000, 
however, the number began to decline. Nevertheless, truck transportation contribution to 
GDP has risen consistently from 1.14 percent in 1997 to 1.34 in 2011. Overall, these 
trends reflect the rising importance of transportation subsequent to the 1990-92 crisis. 
392 CANSIM Series v74870 
393 CANSIM Series v1445326 
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Cheaper access to information communication technology and the requisite 
skillsets required to run it was equally important for Canadian JIT systems. Notably, 
enrolment in mathematics and computer science increased by an astounding 132 percent 
between 1990 and 1998, whereas enrolment in electronic and electrical technologies 
increased by 29 percent in the same years. 394 This rising trend was the same in 
universities as in colleges, and continued until the IT bubble burst in 2001.395 This 
reflects the increasing importance of ICT in the Canadian economy in the period in 
question. 
In 2004 the OECD reported that Canada had one of the highest rates of ICT 
diffusion in the world (along with the U.S., New Zealand, Australia, the Nordic countries 
and the Netherlands).396 However, what interests us here is not the general diffusion of 
ICT throughout Canadian society, but the role of ICT in integrating supply chains and 
reducing discrepancies between supply and demand. In Canada, large ICT networks are 
in place throughout the business sector. In fact, the rate of accumulation of !CT-based 
fixed· capital has significantly outpaced the rate of accumulation of general machinery 
and buildings and structures from the early 1980s until today (see Figure 50 below). 
394 CANSIM Series v1445296 and v14453 l 1 
395 CANSIM Series v312 l 5400 
396 OECD, The Economic Impact of JCT: Measurement, Evidence and Implications (Paris: OECD 
Publications and Information Centre, 2004): 26. 
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According to a 2009 Industry Canada survey, 13.5 percent of all firms used 
"advanced information and communication technologies" for information integration ~d 
control, whereas 28 percent used them for communication. In manufacturing alone, these 
figures stood at 19.7 and 23.7 percent, respectively.397 Importantly, in 2000 Statistics 
Canada found that 42.81 percent of firms used the Internet to access the databases of 
suppliers.398 According to a 2007 Statistics Canada survey, 86.66 percent of Canadian 
enterprises used the Internet for business, 76.68 percent used wireless communication, 
21.22 percent used an internal network and, most significant for our purposes, 15.64 
percent used Electronic Data Interchange (on the Internet).399 
The EDI indicator is of particular importance for our analysis, as it is a useful 
proxy for the use of ICT on the supply chain. Importantly, however, the statistics are not 
397Industry Canada, "Survey of Innovation and Business Strategy 2009", http://www.ic.gc.ca/eic/site/eas-
aes.nsf/eng/h_ra02092.html.Accessed January 2, 2013. 
398 CANSIM Table 3580013 
399 CANSIM Table 3580007 
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available for EDI usage on non-Internet channels. In this sense, we can expect EDI usage 
to be greater than indicated in t~ese figures. The low percentage of firms that use EDI 
reflects the fact that principally large firms are more likely to employ the technology. The 
latter require the technology because of the scope and scale of their operations.400 They 
"use the technologies to redesign information and communication flows within the firm, 
and to integrate these flows throughout the production process."401 Small firms, on the 
other hand, are less likely to use JCT for these purposes. To be sure, large firms are more 
likely to use EDI than small firms.402 It is notable that large firms make up a smaller 
percentage of total businesses in the Canadian economy than smaller firms, but employ 
more people and have a larger impact on private sector GDP. According to a 2011 
Statistics Canada report, small private businesses (here defined 1-99 employees) made up 
98% of businesses in Canada, whereas medium to large private firms (100-500+ 
employees) made up 2% of Canadian businesses. However, whereas small businesses 
employed 48.3 percent of private sector employees, medium and large firms employed 
51.7 percent.403 In terms of private-sector GDP, in 2005 small firms contributed· 41.9 
percent, whereas medium and large firms contributed 58.1 percent.404 For these reasons, 
and despite the relatively small number of large- and medium-sized firms, the latter play 
400 Large firms are more likely to integrate functional departments internally as well. The Workplace and 
Employee Survey Compendium for 1999 produced by Statistics Canada shows that 53.2 percent large firms 
(500+ employees) increased internal integration iri 1998, whereas only 11.0 percent of very small firms (1-
19 employees) and 25.2 percent of sma11 firms (20-99) did so. See Statistics Canada, Workplace and 
Employee Survey Compendium 1999, http://publications.gc.ca/Collection/Statcan/71-585-X/71-585-
XIEl 99900 l.pdf. Accessed January 2, 2013. 
401 Dirk Pilat, "The JCT productivity paradox: Insights from micro data," OECD Economic Studies, No. 38 
(2004): 55. 
402Pilat "The JCT productivity paradox: Insights from micro data", 55. 
403Statistics Canada, "Key Small Business Statistics", 
http://www.ic.gc.ca/eic/site/061.nsf/eng!Home.Accessed January 2, 2013. 
404 Statistics Canada, "Key Small Business Statistics" 
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a disproportionality larger role in the Canadian economy. Therefore, since large business 
is more likely to be a user of EDI, the relatively small number of firms using EDI (15.64 
percent) should not lead us to underestimate the importance of this technology to the 
Canadian economy.405 
Throughout the period 1993-2008, firms have become increasingly reliant on 
external suppliers. In 1998, large firms were 24.9 percent more dependent on external 
suppliers than in the previous year, whereas firms with 20-99 and 100-499 employees 
were 20.3 and 24.9 percent rriore dependent, respectively. Three years later, in 2001, 
large firms reported being 16.4 percent more reliant than the previous year, whereas firms 
with 20-99 and 100-499 were 11.1 and 12.5 more dependent than the previous year, 
respectively. 
A limited measure of the degree of inter-firm integration via sub-contracting 
networks is captured in Table 6 below for the years 2001-2003. The latter measures the 
percentage of service-oriented business units whose operations were part of a larger firm. 
In other words, it measures the number of service-based firms who were sub-contracted 
out to by a larger firm. The figures demonstrate that a significant number of firms 
belonged to an inter-firm production network. 
405 In any economy there will be a mix of traditional JIT and !CT-enhanced JIT firms. Therefore, the 
application of EDI is not an indicator of the total number of JIT firms. 
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Table 6.Percentage of business units whose operations were part of a larger 
firm, 2001-03 
Industry 
Rail transportation 
Water transportation 
Airport operations 
Geophysical surveying and mapping services 
Scientific research and development services 
Information and communication technology (ICT) service 
industries 
Other machinery, 1equipment and supplies wholesaler-
distributors 
Air transportation. 
Testing laboratories 
Other support activities for mining 
Contract drilling 'except oil and gas) 
Truck transportation 
Management, sci~ntific and technical consulting services 
Engineering services 
Port and harbour operations 
Industrial design services 
Surveying and mapping (except geophysical) services 
Support activities for forestry 
Source: CANSIM Table 358-0027 
Percent 
73.3 
62.5 
48.8 
48 
46.2 
40.3 
39.6 
38.8 
35.l 
32.7 
32.1 
30.7 
30.2 
29.4 
27.6 
26.6 
25.6 
11.7 
Unsurprisingly, given the growing importance of transportation in the context of more 
complex supplier networks, the most significant sub-contracting occurred in rail and 
water transportation (77 .3 and 62.5, respectively). This was followed by airport 
operations (48.8) and geophysical surveying and mapping services (48). To be sure, those 
industries with the highest percentage of firms whose operations were part of a larger 
firm were those responsible for transportation in one way or another. To repeat, this is 
consistent with the growing importance of transportation in ICT-JIT production and 
distribution processes. Unfortunately, given our limited empirical data, it is not possible 
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to determine conclusively to what extent integration with external suppliers has increased 
in recent years, but it is likely significant.406 
In this context, inter-firm EDI messages are important because they replace bills 
of lading and allow the dynamic sharing of JIT schedules with suppliers. This 
technology is used by JIT producers to dynamically send pull messages to suppliers and, 
importantly, this has proven to reduce discrepancies in shipments. Indeed, "suppliers can 
promptly react to messages from their customers since the internal systems of suppliers 
can adjust to customer requests dynamically." Moreover, "the higher degree of electronic 
coupling helps the synchronizing of material flows." To be sure, suppliers who employ 
ICT in receiving shipment schedules and who integrate that information into their 
production systems have "sharply lower shipment errors."407In this way, JIT-ICT "forges 
a stronger alliance between a firm and its suppliers, and makes it easier to change 
d . .fi . ,,408 pro uctlon spec1 1cabons. 
In addition to EDI, it is important to emphasize the role of geospatial technology 
in supply chain management (SCM) as well. Indeed, geospatial technology was used by 
15.2 percent of management consulting service business units in 2003.409 This highlights 
the important role of geospatial technology in SCM. Above we have seen the growing 
406 Statistics Canada, Workplace and Employee Survey Compendium 1999 and 2001, 
http://www5.statcan.gc.ca/bsolc/olc-cel/olc-cel?catno=71-585-X&chropg=l&lang=eng. Accessed January 
2, 2013. 
407Srinivasan, et al. "Impact of Electronic Data Interchange Technology on JIT Shipments." Management 
Science 4, No. 10 (Oct. 1994): 1292. 
408 Harvey J. Krahn, Graham S. Lowe and Karen D. Hughes, Work, Industry and Canadian Society Sixth 
Edition (Toronto: Nelson, 2011): 274. 
409 CANSIM Series v32726904 
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importance of transportation in JIT-ICT. Geospatial technologies allow for the better 
coordination of just-in-time shipments. 
In addition to its contribution to coordinating the production and distribution of 
. semi-finished and finished goods, the application of ICT to management practices also 
allows for a reduction in the size of management bureaucracies and the costs associated 
with them. For instance, in 1995management made up 9 .4 percent of the total labour 
force. However,by 2011 it had declined to 8 percent. In fact, management wages as a 
percentage of to.tal wages declined from 8.5 percent in 1997 to 6.7 percent in 2011.410 
This not-unsubstantial decline contributed to the rise in the rate of profitability discussed 
in the previous chapter. It was made possible by JIT work organisation and developments 
in ICT, especially surveillance and raw computing power. 
Despite the decline in management as a percentage of the total labour force, the 
number of managers along the supply chain has grown by over 548 percent since 2001 
(See Table 7). This likely represents the growing importance of SCM relative to 
traditional forms of management, a result of the increasing, importance of JIT-ICT 
production and distribution systems. 
a e . or ers on T bl 7 W k th s e up Illy am . I Ch . 
Percentage of total supply chain 
employment 2001 2010 
Manufacturing 33.34% 28.46% 
Wholesale trade 16.01 % 19.57% 
Retail trade 16.20% 13.12% 
Transportation and warehousing 14.78% 14.07% 
Management of enterprises 0.03% 0.18% 
Source: Canadian Supply Chain Sector Council, http://cscsc.rdaglobal.com 
41° CANSIM Series v2222249 and v2222254 
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However, the largest number of workers on the supply chain remains by far in 
manufacturing, wholesale trade, retail trade, and transportation and warehousing.411 It is 
notable that in each of these employment categories (except wholesale trade) 
employment has declined since 2001, likely the result of mechanisation and 
computerisation. 
To measure the importance of JIT-ICT in organising production, I have developed 
some simple measures. For instance, we can examine the raw materials to goods in 
process ratio (x). As its title suggests, this indicator measures the value of raw materials, 
fuel, supplies and components (M) over the value of goods or work in process (JP). 
Hence, it can be represented by the simple formula: x = M /IP. The increasing 
importance of JIT-ICT in organising production is reflected in the falling raw materials-
to-goods in process ratio. This ratio fell from 2.24 in 1992 to 1.41 in 2002. It 
subsequently rose - thanks to the bursting of the IT bubble - and then fell again to 1.52 in 
2011. See Figure 51 below. 
411Ca1culated from industry data provided by the Canadian Supply Chain Sector Council, 
http://cscsc.rdaglobal.com/.Accessed January 2, 2013. 
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Figure 51. Raw materials to goods in 
process ratio 
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This means that there is a tighter linkage between the demand for raw materials and 
goods production. Raw materials are increasingly being produced 'just in time" for use in 
production. Hence, there are fewer raw materials idling in inventories. To paraphrase 
Harvey, JIT-ICT keeps more "value in motion."412 The decline in the raw materials-to-
goods in process ratio reflects this change. 
The second phase of· the production process is represented by the goods in 
process-to-finished goods ratio (y). This ratio measures the value of goods or work in 
process (IP) over finished goods manufactured (FG). Hence, y = IP/ FG. This ratio 
rose secularly throughout the period (again with the exception of the IT bubble bursting) 
from 0.56 in 1992 to 0.81 in 2011. See Figure 52 below. 
412David Harvey, The Limits to Capital (New York: Verso, 2006): 71. 
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Figure 52. Goods in process to finished 
goods ratio 
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This means that the number of goods in processhas been rising relative to finished goods. 
Again, this is a manifestation of JIT-ICT. Relatively fewer finished goods are idling in 
warehouses. Instead, finished goods produced are sold "just in time" for final 
consumption. Hence, both of these supply-chain ratios, x and y, indicate tighter supply-
chain integration in Canada since the early 1990s. This is also reflected in the stable new 
orders-to-inventory ratio below. 
Figure 53. New orders to inventory ratio 
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The new orders-to-inventory ratio stayed relatively stable during the period in 
question and averaged 1.3. In other words, for every item in inventory (finished and 
semi-finished goods) there were 1.3 new orders. This highlights the relatively stable 
inventory investment environment in this period. Firms were ordering (i.e. investing) at a 
more-or-less stable rate throughout the period. 
The fact that the above ratio remained stable, in the context of a declining raw 
material-to-goods in process ratio and a rising goods in process-to-finished goods ratio, 
implies that there was a controlled trend to JIT. In value terms, this means that the 
quantity of value being worked upon increased as a share of the total magnitude of value 
in motion. Put differently, it means that less constant capital (in its circulating form) is 
caught up in the productive process. This implies both a lower turnover time and a higher 
rate of profit, as was discussed in Chapter 1. Less constant capital is being used 
unproductively at any given point in time. The stability these changes created is further 
reflected in the inventory-to-shipment ratios below. 
Figure 54. Inventory-to-shipment ratio 
2.4 .....------------------
2.2 
2.0 -l----U~4-#-4---l--¥\..-IJU-l---------
1.8 
1.6 ---------------11------
l.4 +-------------.... t--A'.:-ll---1"-t 
1.2 +------------------
1. 0 -+--.---.---.-----.-----,---.----r----.---r----r--.-.---.---,--.....--..,...-. 
Source: CANSIM Table 304-0014 
229 
In Figure 54 above, it is clear to see that fluctuations in the inventory-to-shipment 
ratio declined significantly in the period after the 1990-92 crisis. To be sure, fluctuations 
in this ratio were much smaller in the post-rather than the pre-JIT period. Not only were 
the fluctuations smaller, but the absolute level of inventories (relative to shipments) was 
lower. This means that firms aimed for lower inventory levels than in previous periods. 
Low levels of inventory can cause problems if there is in fact a disruption in production. 
The lack of an inventory buffer means that large firms are dependent upon the smooth 
flow of parts in order to remain competitive (i.e. to secure its market share). Therefore, if 
one firm fails to deliver for whatever reason, the large firm must find another provider 
quickly or suffer an interruption in its production process. At the same time, the 
flexibility of production - both in terms of the fixed capital employed and the pliancy of 
labour - allows for sudden adjustments to increased demand by individual supplier firms. 
Firms are more responsive to increases in demand and this further facilitates switching 
supplier firms when necessary. Moreover,because inventory levels are low, it will take 
less investment to get inventory levels back up to their desired levels in the case of 
disruption. As a result, the quantity of funds borrowed from credit intermediaries to get 
inventory levels back up will be smaller during each fluctuation. This has important 
implications for the business cycle, as we will see below. 
JIT-ICT and its effects on the inventory investment cycle 
The result of the above processes is that the debt drag described by Anwar Shaikh 
will take longer to come into effect, or it might not at all come into effect in the context 
of an ascending curve of development in which firms are already self-financingand 
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deleveraging. Moreover, as I have shown in the previous chapter, because this phase of 
capitalism in Canada was characterised by a growing rate and mass of profit, the 
inventory investment cycle was further modified by the availability of investment funds. 
To be sure, the accumulation cycle intersects with the inventory investment cycle by 
determining the interest rate, the cost of borrowing. If the rate of profit is growing, 
interest rates fall because access to loanable funds increases. Therefore, the inventory 
investment cycle itself becomes longer because it can sustain debt-based inventory 
investment for a longer period (since it takes longer for financial leakages to take effect). 
To sum up, JIT in combination with ICT has reduced discrepancies between 
demand and supply and, in this way, has reduced disruptions to the supply chain. The 
reduction in discrepancies has reduced internally generated shocks to the economy and 
smoothed out inventory investment. In combination with high MEC levels, this has 
contributed tosmoothing out the inventory investment cycle by reducing the financial 
burden associated with inventory investments. The result is a smoothing out of the 
inventory investment c·ycle. 
After having examined the long upturn of 1993-2008 and the reasons for stable 
and smooth accumulation in this period, we now turn to an analysis of the banking sector 
in Canada in relation to the Great Recession of 2008-09. 
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Chapter 5: Canadian Banking and the Global Financial Crisis of 2008-09 
The Global Financial Crisis of 2008-09 punctuated one of the longest and steadiest 
periods of economic growth in Canadian history (1993-2008). As is well documented, the 
financial crisis originated in the U.S. real estate market and subsequently spread across 
the globe when international money markets froze up.413The effects of the crisisin 
Canada were compounded by its strong trade and financial linkages to the United States 
through NAFTA. In fact, owing to the recession, exports to the U.S. fell by 28% (or $105 
billion CAD) in just one year.414 Yet despite the country's "open market" character and 
close trade ties to the poorly-performing U.S. and European economies, Canada was the 
first G7 nation to recover from the recession. Indeed, it continues to lead the G7 countries 
in terms of real economic growth. Thus, in many ways, Canada has emerged as the 
"Great Exception" to enduring stagnation and instability amongst the world's high-
income countries. 
Several explanations have emerged to account for Canada's puzzling economic 
stability in recent years. Some thinkers_ point to government regulation of the financial 
sector or timely fiscal intervention in the economy.4150thers suggest just the opposite: 
relatively low levels of stimulus and years of fiscal prudence kept the economy afloat in 
413Costas Lapavitsas, et al. Crisis in the Eurozone. (Brooklyn, NY: Verso, 2012). 
414
"Annual Statistics on Merchandise Imports and Exports, by Country and Commodity, Recorded on a 
Customs Basis," Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, 2012, 
http://www. international. gc. ca/ economist-economiste/ assets/pdfs/Data/facts-
fiches/PF ACT _Annual_ Merchandise_ Trade_ by_ Country-ENG .pdf 
415 Kevin Lynch, "Avoding the Financial Crisis: Lessons from Canada." Policy Options,JRPP (May 2010); 
Jean Boivin, "The 'Great' Recession in Canada: Perception Vs. Reality." Bank of Canada, March 28 2011, 
http://www.bankofcanada.ca/wp-content/uploads/2011/03/sp280311.pdf. 
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spite of global economic uncertainty.416Still others look to growing appetites abroad -
especially China - for exports like oil, gas and minerals.417 In this chapter, I challenge 
the claim that the concentration of Canada's banking sector lay at the heart of the 
country's positive economic performance during and subsequent to the Great Recession 
of 2008-09. From this perspective, a high degree of bank concentration reduced 
competition. Owing to greater pricing power, the big banks were able to increase profit 
margins at the expense of businesses and consumers. In turn, growing profits stabilized 
financial institutions by providing "a buffer against fragility" and "incentives against 
excessive risk taking."418 As a result of these processes, the argument runs, the 
concentration of the banks made possible the uninterrupted flow of business and 
consumer credit when it was needed most. In part, this was reflected by low and stable 
interest rates throughout the course of the global financial turmoil.419For instance, Porter 
notes that "the Canadian bank market structure has contributed to consistent profitability 
of the industry, and while this has been criticized as harmful to the interests of consumers 
it also helped with bank .resilience during the crisis. "42~ Contrary to this position,· I argue 
that the strength of the economy was not a function of the stability of the banks; rather, 
the stability of the banks was a function of the strength of the economy. In particular, 
416DavidLee, "How Canada Escaped the Global Recession." Ludwig von Mises Institute, August 29, 2011. 
http://mises.org/daily/5583/How-Canada-Escaped-the-Global-Recession. 
417Jim Stanford, "The Global Economic Crisis - Part l," Canadian Dimension, January 5, 2012. 
418 T. Beck, D. Coyle, M. Dewatripont, X. Freixas, and P. Seabright, Bailing out the banks: reconciling 
stability and competition. (London, UK: Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR), 2010), 17. 
419 
"No Evidence of Canadian Credit Crunch," The Vancouver Province, November 21, 2007. 
http://www.canada.com/theprovince/news/money/story.html?id=767e9b7f-7262-45e9-9346-ff3aa2de6f21. 
420 Tony Porter, "Canadian banks in the financial and economic crisis." Paper prepared for presentation at 
the Policy Responses to Unfettered Finance Workshop, North-South Institute, June 8-9, 2010. 
http://www.nsi-ins.ca/wp-content/uploads/2012/10/2010-Canadian-Banks-in-the-Financial-and-Economic-
Crisis.pdf 
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conditions of high profitability and strong business investment over the preceding fifteen 
years stabilised bank assets and, consequently, the financial system. To be sure, in order 
to more accurately explain the real basis for the stability of the Canadian economy in 
recent years, we must examine the dynamic historical processesat work during the long 
fifteen-year period of capital accumulation preceding the Great Recession. 
In the first s·ection of this chapter, the most important features of the Canadian 
banking system are introduced and analysed. I demonstrate that the Canadian banks 
considered in isolation from the greater economy were in fact quite unstable in the fifteen 
years leading up to the Great Recession of 2008-09, as evidenced by high levels of 
leverage. The second section demonstrates that the resilience of the banks in the wake of 
the recent global financial crisis can be accounted for by "re-embedding" them in the 
historical dynamics of capitalist accumulation in Canada. I argue that the stability of the 
banking system during and subsequent to the crisis was a function of the stability of the 
economy as whole - i.e. part of a long period of general stability in Canadian capitalism. 
To this ··end, I highlight the important theoretical and empirical linkages between bank 
asset stability and the economic environment in which they were situated. I show that 
high business profitability during this period kept bank assets stable, thereby allowing 
these institutions to escape the brunt of the financial meltdown. 
The structure of Canadian finance and the stability of the banks 
The stability of the banking sector is conventionally understood to be a function of its 
concentration. According to this view, lower levels of competition give banks greater 
pricing power, thereby improving profit margins and stability. This section makes the 
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argument that Canada's banks in fact appear quite unstable when considered in isolation 
from the greater economy.To determine the veracity of this view, we must first take stock 
of the structure of the Canadian banking system. 
Canada's banking sector has two notable features that differentiate it from other 
liberal market economies. First, it is considerably insular. Structurally, it is difficult for 
smaller foreign banks to break into the market because of the pre-existing nation-wide 
branch banking system. Moreover, legislation particular to the Canadian banking market 
prevents both domestic and foreign takeover of existing banks. The "widely-held" rule 
prohibits any single shareholder from owning more than twenty percent of the voting 
rights in a large bank. This legislation strengthens the sector's insularity. Second, 
Canadian banking is highly concentrated. For instance, although there are 77 banks 
operating in Canada, the five largest banks hold approximately ninety percent of total 
bank assets.In comparison, in the U.S. there are over 8,000 banks and the assets of the top 
five comprise less than thirty percent of total banking assets.421 
These structural features have been the basis for the argument that Canada's 
banking system is uncompetitive and exceptionally profitable. However, the error lies in 
assuming a somewhat uncomplicated relationship between the quantity of banks in 
operation and the competition to which these banks are exposed. There has actually been 
little evidence to support the idea that large firms can maintain pricing power 
421 Jason Allen, Walter Engert, and Ying Liu, "Are Canadian Banks Efficient? A Canada-U.S. 
Comparison," Bank ofCanadaWorking Paper2006-33, 2006: 3, http://www.bankofcanada.ca/wp-
content/uploads/2010/02/wp06-33 .pdf. 
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( andtherefore higher profit rates) in the long run. 422In Canada, fewer banks control more 
assets, but this does not translate into a low level of comp.etition in the sector. To the 
contrary: the capacity to compete heightens as firms get larger and better at 
competing. 423In other words, concentration and centralisation themselves are weapons of 
competition.424 In this regard, because the "Big 6" are highly competitive and dominate 
the Canadian banking market, they are not put off by new, small foreign entrants. For 
this reason, the big banks are the greatest proponents of foreign entry into the Canadian 
market. The hope is that the easing of restrictions on foreign entrants will gain them 
access to external markets. 425 It is precisely the imperative to compete and the uncertainty 
that firms will be able to maintain their current market shares that forces them to seek out 
new markets. This implies that firms, including banks, will in fact continue to seek to 
reduce costs for their consumers.426 I shall further illuminate the competitive character of 
the Canadian banking sector below in my discussion of historical interest rate movements 
as well as the shifts in the composition of bank assets and liabilities accompanying the 
most recent phase of capital accumulation in Canada (1993-2008). First, however, let us 
more closely examine the structure of the banks. 
422Jamee K. Moudud, Strategic Competition, Dynamics, and the Role of the State: A New Perspective. 
(Northampton: Massachusetts, 2010), 51. 
423 David Harvey, The Limits to Capital. (Brooklyn: Verso, 2006), 144-147. 
424Karl Marx, Capital Volume I. (New York: Penguin Books, 1990), 762-870; Henryk Grossma1rn, 
Aufsatze zur Krisentheorie. (Frankfurt: VerlagNeueKritik, 1971), 138. 
425 Murray Cooke, Banking on Mergers: Financial Power versus the Public Interest. (Toronto: Centre for 
Social Justice, 2005), 50. 
426Jamee K. Moudud, 'The hidden history of competition and its implications'. In Jamee K. Moududet al. 
(Eds.) Alternative Theories of Competition: Challenges to the Orthodoxy (New York: Routledge, 2013). 
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Leveraging 
Leveraging is a revealing indicator of competitive exposure. In an effort to 
compete, banks will "finance more and more of their business with borrowed funds" in 
order "to expand the scale of their operations."427 This is especially so in the context of 
difficulties procuring deposits. Significantly, Canadian banks rank amongst the most 
highly leveraged in the world. From this perspective, the banks appear both 
competitiveand structurally unstable. 
Indeed, bank leveraging is a common indicator of bank instability. We can 
measure leverage by means of the tangible common equity to total tangible assets ratio 
(TCE ratio). 428 Banks finance loans by borrowing. In other words, banks take deposits 
and lend them out to workers and businesses. If a bank loses an asset (e.g. if a loan fails), 
it must raise funds to pay back the depositors from whom the funds were borrowed to 
make the loan. Selling common equity is one way to raise funds (others include selling 
bonds, preferred equity and so on). TCE is the quantity of equity available to pay back 
depositors in the event that the bank loses an asset. Hence, the TCE ratio demonstrates to 
what degree banks are leveraged. It shows how many cents are available in TCE for 
every dollar in loans made. Generally speaking, banks hold around four cents in TCE for 
every dollar in assets. This means the banks can only tolerate a four percent loss in their 
assets before becoming insolvent. Hence, the TCE ratio is an important measure of bank 
427 David McNally, Global Slump: The Economics and Politics of Crisis and Resistance, 106. 
428This is a narrower measure than the Tier 1 capital adequacy ratio, which includes in the numerator 
common shares, preferred shares and deferred tax credits. 
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stability. The table below shows the 2011 TCE ratios for Canada's top banks. Canada's 
biggest banks have TCE ratios of around four percent. 
The Toronto-Dominion Bank 4.1% 
Bank of Montreal 4.6% 
National Bank of Canada 3.8% 
Source: http://ca.advfn.com, October, 2011 
To illustrate the importance of the TCE ratio, let us examine Canada's top bank. 
RBC equity equals $40 billion, and its TCE ratio is 4.2 percent. Hence, if its asset prices 
were to fall by 2.1 percent, the bank would have to raise $20 billion to cover losses. If 
the value of the assets of RBC were to decrease by 4.2 percent, the bank would become 
insolvent. From this perspective, bank stability is a function of the TCE ratio and the 
price stability of its assets. TCE ratios averaging four percent have prevailed for at least 
fifteen years in Canada. This has led some commentators to suggest that the "sterling 
reputation" of Canada's banks is "an illusion" and that these will be "the next dominos to 
fall."429 Nevertheless, despite high levels of leverage the banks have been stable for 
almost two decades. 
This suggests that leverage alone cannot explain the stability or instability of the 
Canadian banking system over the last decades. The TCE highlights the importance of 
429 Daniel Tencer, "Canadian Banks' Sterling Reputation An Illusion, Financial Blog Argues," Hu.ffington 
Post August 19 2011. http://www.huffingtonpost.ca/201 l/08/19/canadian-banks-illusion_n_931327.html.; 
Body Erman, "Canada's banks: Next dominos to fall?," The Globe and Mail. September 10 2012. 
http://m.th egl obeandmai I. com/report-on-business/ streetwise/ canadas-banks-next-dominos-to-
fall/ arti cle213487 l /? service=mo bile. 
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bankasset stability. To be sure, highly leveraged banks will remain stable as long as their 
assets remain stable. Hence, we must examine the quality of bank assets. Low quality 
assets are those that might quickly turn to "junk" (e.g. collateralized debt obligations). 
High quality assets usually constitute securities, such as ownership shares in an oil 
refinery. To put it differently, high-quality assets tap into the stream of value directly, 
whereas low-quality assets do not. Therefore, there is an important linkage between bank 
assets and capital accumulation that must be examined. 
Thus far we have examined the structure of the Canadian banking sector. We have 
seen that the banks are both competitive and highly leveraged, despite relative insularity 
and concentration. By examining the TCE ratio, we established that bank asset stability 
was an important foundation for the enduring buoyancy of the banking sector during the 
global financial crisis. In what follows, I argue that the historical dynamics of capital 
accumulation underlie the stability or instability of bank assets, their composition and the 
composition of bank liabilities.430 Economic growth itself is fundamental to bank asset 
stability. Hence, in order to··understand the stability of bank assets and liabilities during 
the Great Recession, we must examine the long-run dynamics of capital accumulation in 
the period preceding the crash and re-embed the banks in these historical processes. 
Re-embedding the banks in the historical dynamics of accumulation 
The Canadian banks were stable in the face of the recession of 2008-09 despite 
competitive leveraging and structural instability. This highlights the limits of examining 
the banks in abstraction from the historical dynamics of accumulation. The outward 
430Historical contingencies and short-run cyclical phenomenon are important secondary determinants of 
bank asset prices. 
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structural stability or instability of the banking sector is not of central importance when 
analysing the soundness of the banks. To be sure, bank "stability" and "instability" tell us 
very little when abstracted from capital accumulation. This kind of abstraction ignores 
the production of profit as the principal factor governing general economic stability. In 
this section, I develop the argument that bank asset stability was a function of the stability 
of accumulation in the period in question. To make my case, I examine business loans 
and mortgages, personal loans and mortgages, securities, as well as bank liabilities and 
financial profits. I argue that each of these categories was stable in the fifteen years 
preceding the crisis, and that this stability reflects the strength of the underlying 
economy. 
Figure SS. Major bank assets before the Great 
9_52% _______ R_e_cession 
Source: CANSIM Table 176-0011 
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Figure 55 shows the composition of major bank assets in Canada before the Great 
Recession of 2008-09. As can be gleaned from the chart, the majority of assets were 
personal or business loans and mortgages. The upshot is that the primary source of 
revenue for all banks has been interest income on these loans.431 For instance, in.2010 the 
431Mario Seccareccia. "Financialization and the Transformation of Commercial Banking in 
Canada."University of Ottawa, 2010. 
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Bank of Nova Scotia's total interest income was $16.89 billion, whereas its total income 
from other sources was only $6.88 billion. Approximately 71 % of its revenue was based 
on interest from loans and securities.432 To be sure, interest comes primarily from loans 
to businesses and workers and from returns on investments. Moreover, it is typical for 
interest-bearing loans to make up the greatest proportion of bank assets. In the case of 
RBC, in 2010 loans made up 40 percent of total tangible assets. Since the 1980s, the 
trend has been for loans to decrease as a proportion of assets for all banks in Canada. In 
fact, in 1988 loans made up 75 percent of total bank assets. By 2009 they had fallen to 
56 percent.433 Nevertheless, loans still make up a significant proportion of total bank 
assets. Thus, for the purposes of this chapter, we will focus on the role of loans, 
mortgages and securities in stabilising the banks during the recent global financial 
meltdown. 
The Government of Canada recognized the potential for disaster in 2008-09 when 
it initiated the Insured Mortgage Purchase Program to make billions of dollars available 
to the banks.434The Canadian Mortgage and Housing Corporation (CMHC) wa~to buy up 
potentially distressed mortgages. To this end, $125 billion CAD were made available. Of 
this sum, the banks made use of $69.35 billion. Importantly, they did not make full use 
of the $125 billion available from CMHC because these assets were· for the most part 
432Mergent Online. Bank ofNova Scotia Halifax (NYS: BNS) Income Statement. Accessed June 13, 2011. 
433 OECD, "Table 1.1.b Income Statement and Balance Sheet, all banks, percentages: Canada," OECD 
Banking Statistics: Financial Statements of Banks 2012, (Paris: OECD 2012), http://www.oecd-
ilibrary.org/finance-and-in vestment/ oecd-banking-statistics-financial-statements-of-banks-2012/incom e-
statement-and-balance-sheet-all-banks-percentages-canada _9789264180291-tab le 15-en. 
434 Jean-Francois Nadeau, "The Insured Mortgage Purchase Program," Library of Parliament of Canada, 
March 13 2009, http://www.parl.gc.ca/Content/LOP/ResearchPublications/prb0856-e.pdf. 
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quite sound.435 In fact, the ratio of mortgages in arrears three or more months to total 
mortgages has remained below 0.5 percent since the outbreak the crisis, and has remained 
lower than its average levels from 1991-2001.436 In contrast, this number reached 16 
percent in the U.S. during the worst of the crisis.437 Moreover, consumer insolvency rates 
have remained relatively low in Canada, and business insolvency rates have actually 
fallen. 438 In what follows, we will examine mortgages, loans and securities in great detail 
to understand the source of their stability. 
Business loans and non-residential mortgages 
Currently, 23.9 percent of all bank loans go to business. This number has been 
decreasing steadily since 1998 (when it stood at 37.4 percent). The stability of this asset 
will depend upon business profitability. Theoretically, strong profitability in the business 
sector contributes to stable loan repayments and therefore secure bank assets.Likewise, 
weak profitability leads to insecure bank assets in the form of loans. In the fifteen years 
preceding the financial crisis of 2008-09, loans to business became increasingly stable, 
yet increasingly scarce. Let us examine this more closely. 
435 In addition to those funds, the Bank of Canada lent the banks $41 billion and Canadian banks in the U.S. 
received $111 billion from the U.S. Government. 
436Canadian Bankers Association, "Number of Residential Mortgages in Arrears," July 2012, 
http://www.cba.ca/contents/files/statistics/stat_mortgage_db050_en.pdf. 
437Bank of Canada, Percentage of Subprime Mortgages in Arrears for More Than 90 Days or in 
Foreclosure, March 2010, http://www.bankofcanada.ca/wp-content/uploads/2010/03/slidel0_230608.pdf. 
438 In 2007, 2008, 2009 and 2010 Canadian consumer insolvency rates were 3.1, 3.4, 4.5 and 5.1 
respectively. Per 1,000 aged 18 and over. Business insolvency rates for the same years were 3.2, 3.1, 2.9 
and 2.3 per 1,000 businesses. "Annual Consumer Insolvency Rates by Province and Economic Region -
2000-2009," Office of the Superintendent of Bankruptcy Canada, accessed August 2012, 
http://www.ic.gc.ca/eic/site/bsf-osb.nsf/eng/brO 1820 .html#three. 
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All in all, the Canadian financial system provides "over half of the short-term 
business credit in Canada."439 Nevertheless, as profitability grew throughout the period, 
business interest, dividends and miscellaneous payments trended more-or-less 
flatly. 4400n the other hand, undistributed corporate profits grew rapidly in the same 
period.441In other words, retained earnings grew while interest payments stabilized. 
Firms were self-financing and deleveraging throughout the period. 
Interest rates sank as firms became less dependent on the banks for financing their 
operations throughout the period. To be sure, as the mass of profit grew, the interest rate 
fell. This indicates that interest rates are not merely determined by competition between 
banks or by Bank of Canada policy, but by the relations of supply of and demand for 
loanable funds. 442 In other words, the production and realisation of profit and its relation 
to accumulation condition the interest rate. If firms can self-finance, the demand for 
money will decrease and so too will interest rates. In the period in question, capitalism in 
Canada was on an ascending curve of development and the system was awash with 
profits. Therefore, the supply of profits for reinvestment was great. This is reflected in a 
rising rate of investment throughout the period (see Figure 56). 
439 Allen, "Are Canadian Banks Efficient?," 1. 
44° CAN SIM Series v64 7072 adjusted for inflation (2005 = 100). 
441 CANSIM Series v647075 adjusted for inflation (2005 = 100). 
442Harvey,Limits to Capital, 259-260. 
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Due to high profitability, firms were increasingly able to self-finance. As a result, 
the function of the banks as intermediaries became less important for business. Moreover, 
when large firms require loans, they "typically borrow directly from capital markets, or 
from syndicates that include and are often led by foreign banks."443 Hence, as concerns 
large business, banking in Canada is subject to the same process of disintermediation that 
is occurring around the globe; i.e. "direct relations between firms and investors, without 
banks mediating between them."444As a result of these historical processes, firms have 
become progressively less dependent on the banks in Canada and other money lenders. 
These conclusions undermine the cogency of the idea that "finance" has inordinate power 
over the so-called "real economy. "445 The upshot is that interest rates fell throughout the 
443Lev Ratnovski, and Rocco Huang, "Why are Canadian banks more resilient?"JMF Working Paper, July 
2009, http://www.imf.org/ extemal/pubs/ft/wp/2009/wp09 l 52. pdf. 
444 Tony Smith, Globalization: A Systematic Marxian Account, (Boston: Brill, 2006), 115. 
445Standford, James. Paper Boom: Why real prosperity requires a new approach to Canada's 
Economy.(Ottawa: Canadian Centre for Policy Alternatives, 1999). 
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1990s and 2000s. The positive effect of these developments on business is captured in the 
rate of profit of enterprise, which measures the rate of profit minus the interest rate. 446 
Figure 57. Rate of profit of enterprise, 1974-2011 
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The stability of loans to business as an asset depends upon business profitability 
and interest rates. Business profitability has been strong and interest rates low. In this 
context, business has been able to make a large dent in its outstanding debt. In 2006 the 
debt to equity ratio had fallen to 0.99, its lowest level in at least a decade.447 As is 
apparent from Figure 57, lending to business has been good business in the period in 
question. Loans to business have been a highly stable asset. 
446It is not inconsistent here to use the rate of profit of enterprise as a general indicator for the stability of 
bank loans to individual businesses as opposed to the MEC. As I have shown in Chapter 2, the MEC 
determines whether expanded reproduction will occur, i.e. the addition of new capital equipment and 
buildings. Indeed, the MEC may be zero, while the rate of profit of enterprise may be positive; hence, in 
this circumstance many firms are still able to service their debts. 
447CANSIM Table 180-0003. 
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Residential mortgages and consumer loans 
Banks were able to cope with declining interest rates to business by "aggressively 
seeking new clients. "448By increasing the volume of credit to workers they were able to 
increase the magnitude of interest, despite historically low rates. As a result, a growing 
share of loans went to workers as business reduced its share. Residential mortgages now 
make up 43.99 percent of all bank loans in Canada.449 To repeat, strong profitability in 
the recent period lead to a reduction of bank loans to the business sector as the latter 
increasingly self-financed and deleveraged. As the quantity of business loans decreased, 
and the interest rate with it, banks increased the volume of loans to workers (and other 
consumers) to compensate. Hence, economic. growth has led to an increase in residential 
mortgages as a portion of total loans. This has fuelled a housing boom in Canada in 
which it is generally acknowledged that real estate is overvalued by as much as fourteen 
percent, especially in major cities like Vancouver and Toronto.450 If accumulation slows, 
workers may be unable to repay their debts. In turn, this may lead to a reduction in the 
value of bank assets an~ to a potentially unstable situation for the banks. Therefore, the 
stability of this asset is linked to wage movements and interest rates. 
In the context of stable accumulation, the relative shift of loans from businesses to 
workers has been good for banks. Aggregate wages and salaries were rising since the 
mid-1990s, thereby acting to stabilize this asset. Upper-income consumers take on 
consumer loans and mortgages as well, but the macroeconomic significance of workers 
448 Fletcher Barager, "The Credit Crisis in Canada: The First Six Months," Relay, 21: 9. 
449CANSIM Series v36918 and CANSIM Series v53006714. 
450Bank of Canada, "Financial System Review," June 2012, http://www.bankofcanada.ca/wp-
content/uploads/20 l 2/06/fsr-0612. pdf. 
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matters most in this area. It is the latter who are more likely to default. Of course, if 
accumulation were to slow down, wages would suffer and this situation would become 
unsustainable. Nevertheless, for the time being, it appears that this asset is quite stable.451 
...... 
c: 
Figure 58. Debt service ratio below historical 
average 
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The debt-service ratio measures interest expense to personal disposable income~452 
The lower the ratio, the more stable are loans to workers. The debt-service ratio fell from 
1990 to 2004, after which it remained below its historical average of 7.83 percent. The 
monthly payments of households were quite manageable in this period. In the U.S., on 
the other hand, the debt-service ratio peaked at 13. 96 percent in the third quarter of 2007, 
451 Of course, accumulation did slow down after the Great Recession of2008-09 and wages did suffer. In 
this context, historically low interest rates were one factor keeping housing assets relatively stable. 
452CANSIM Table 384-0013. 
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almost double the Canadian ratio of 7 .61 percent at that time. 453 This ratio was 
strengthened by falling residential mortgage rates. These declined secularly from the 
1990s and throughout the 2000s, from approximately 9 percent to 5 percent for five-year 
mortgages.454 Hence, falling interest rates alongside rising wages have led to relative 
stability in this area. Let us now turn to our final bank asset under consideration; i.e. 
securities. 
Securities 
Securities made up 16.04 percent of major bank assets before the financial crisis. 
In standard economic theory, the price of a security stands in close relation to its 
profitability. Although there is always the potential for a divergence of the price of a 
security from its profitability, major and persistent divergences only tend to occur in 
periods of low profitability. In those circumstances, investment funds turn to the stock 
market or other speculative undertakings for higher returns. As a result, they are not put 
to use for further capital accumulation. The upshot is that strong corporate profitability 
will result in steady security prices·.· 
In the fifteen years preceding the Great Recession, profits and stock prices tracked 
each other closely, with no major divergences.455This reflected high levels of profitability 
and stable accumulation. When the financial crisis erupted in the U.S., stocks prices in 
Canada declined, but not sufficiently to cause significant long-term damage to bank 
balance sheets - especially since securities made up a relatively small proportion of bank 
453 US Federal Reserve Board, "Household Debt Service and Financial Obligations Ratios," September 
2012. http://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/housedebt/default.htm. 
454CANSIM Table 176-0043. 
455 CAN SIM Table 176-004 7 and CANS IM Table 380-0020. 
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assets. Since that time, stock prices have recovered, in part due to the relative strength of 
the domestic economy (reflected in resilient profit and investment rates within the 
country).456 As a result of these processes, securities have been a stable asset throughout 
the period. 
To sum up, thus far we have seen that Canadian banks are highly leveraged - and 
so appear structurally unstable. In light of this, we have discussed the importance of the 
health of bank assets to lasting financial stability. We have shown the linkage between 
the strength of bank assets and capital accumulation. In particular, we have seen that 
loans as well as mortgages to business and consumers have been stable over the last two 
decades, principally owing to growing business profits, falling interest rates and rising 
wages. Let us now examine the relationship between the strength of bank liabilities and 
accumulation. 
Are bank liabilities stable? 
Until now, we have focused on the relationship between bank assets and financial 
institution stability. On the other side of the ledger lie bank liabilities, including 
advances from the Bank of Canada, equity and deposits. Like other advanced capitalist 
economies, Canada has a fractional reserve banking system. The ratio of deposits in 
reserve to total deposits is called the reserve ratio. Although the 1991 Bank Act does not 
place legal restrictions on this ratio, banks continue to hold reserves for their day-to-day 
functioning (e.g. ATM withdrawals).457 It is possible for a fractional reserve system to 
456It is beyond the scope of this dissertation to explore the relationship between the dynamics of 
accumulation in the world economy and equity prices in Canada in the current period. 
457 Pierre L. Siklos, Money, Banking & Financial Institutions: Canada in the Global 
Environment.(Toronto: McGraw Hill, 2006), 326. 
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cause general financial instability. For instance, if depositors demand cash in excess of 
what the bank has in its reserves, insolvency could result. Hence, the reliability of 
business and consumer deposits is an important facet of bank stability. 
To get a sense of the dynamic relationship between capital accumulation and the 
composition of bank deposits,consider the following scenario. If the mass of corporate 
profit stagnates, business deposits in the banks shrink and interest rates rise as firms 
struggle to operate with lower returns. Conversely, ifthe mass of profit grows - which it 
did in the fifteen years preceding the global financial crisis - firms begin to deleverage, 
interest rates fall and, as a result, banks are forced to increase the volume of their loans to 
increase their share of available interest. At the same time as banks are forced to compete 
over access to interest on loans by seeking out new borrowers, businesses - awash with 
profits - increase their deposits in the banks. Hence, bank competition over deposits 
decreases. 
In the period in question, banks increasingly financed their activities with 
business deposits. In other words, banks financed operations · primarily by · the 
conventional practice of borrowing from depositors, especially businesses. In a recent 
study, Ratnovski and Huang have shown that the stability of the banks in Canada was a 
function of ample depository funding.458 Because "deposits are far less subject to runs 
when banks experience difficulty," this contributed to bank stability.459 Ample business 
depository funding was made possible because the system was awash with profits. As 
458Ratnovski and Huang, "Why are Canadian Banks more Resilient?." 
459 D. J. S. Brean, L. Kryzanowski, and G.S. Roberts, "Canada and the United States: Different roots, 
Different routes to Financial Sector Regulation," Business History 53, no. 2, (April 2011): 263. 
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Figure 59demonstrates, in the case of the Bank of Nova Scotia, business deposits as a 
percentage of total deposits have been rising secularly since 1994. They now make up 
close to 60 percent of total deposits. As a result of these processes, the banks have had a 
stable source of funding to finance their operations. The years preceding the Great 
Recession was a period of stable and profitable banking. Let us now examine financial 
profits more closely. 
Figure 59. Bank of Nova Scotia, business deposits 
as a percentage of total deposits, 1994-2010 
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Banking profits 
Profits may provide banks a buffer against potential losses during a recession. In 
the foregoing analysis, I have shown how businesses have been less reliant on the banks 
for finanCing their activities. The system has been awash with profits. As a result, 
interest rates have been historically low. This is reflected in a high rate of profit of 
enterprise. As a result, the case cannot be made that banks profited inordinately by 
gauging businesses and workers in this period, as is often argued by those who suggest 
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the banks have inordinate pricing power in Canada. 460 Nevertheless, financial firms 
involved in depository credit intermediation of the type discussed throughout this chapter 
have done remarkably well in the fifteen years leading up to the recession. Indeed, the 
rate of return on equity for both foreign-owned and domestic banks grew throughout the 
period 1993-2006. Interestingly, the rate of return equity of foreign-owned banks 
exceeded that of domestic banks from 2002-04, again undermining the idea that Canadian 
oligopolies have created non-competitive conditions.461 Still, the year before the crisis 
broke out, net profits for these firms grew by 19.34 percent from the previous year.462 In 
that year alone, they made over $16 billion in net profit. This profit was primarily 
acquired by increasing the volume of loans to workers - but it also tapped into the stream 
of corporate profit directly by lending to businesses. This means banks had substantial 
liquidity to cope with potential asset losses when the crisis erupted. This certainly added 
a layer of stability to Canada's financial system. 
Conclusion 
The foregoing analysis . .has called into question the widely held notion. that 
theconcentration and centralisation of the banking system in Canada were the source of 
its stability leading up to, during and subsequent to the global financial crisis. From the 
standpoint of classical political economy, we examined the historical dynamics 
underlying bank stability by reintegrating the financial system into the historical 
processes of capital accumulation. The mass of profit grew domestically. As a result, 
460 The contribution of bank fees to income has been negligible in the period in question. 
461 See Figure 5 in Seccareccia. "Financialization and the Transformation of Commercial Banking in 
Canada." 
462CANSIM Table 187-0001. 
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banks were able toprofit by making stable interest-bearing loans and finance by means of 
business deposits. The stability in the period in question was a result not of the 
profitability of the banks at the expense of business, but of the absolute growth of 
profitability for the Canadian economy as a whole. This benefited both business and the 
banks. Strong profitability and capital accumulation stabilised banks. Hence, the 
resilience of the banking system in Canada was a reflection of the fundamental stability 
of the economy as a whole at the time the global financial crisis erupted. 
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To feel the completion apart from any sense of growth, is in fact to fail in understanding. 
For it is a failure to sense dimly the unexplored relationships with things beyond. To feel 
the penetration without any sense of completion, is also to fail in understanding. The 
penetration itself is then deficient in meaning. It lacks achievement. 463 
- Alfred North Whitehead 
What's fulfilment got to offer? 
- Leonard Cohen 
Conclusion 
Before bringing this dissertation to a close, a short summary as well as some of the policy 
implications of this work are in order. In this work, I argue that the long periods of 
stability and instability in capitalism are functions of movements in the marginal 
efficiency of capital. In particular, a falling rate of profit is an insufficient cause for 
instability and crisis. Instead, I have shown how a downward sloping marginal efficiency 
of capital (MEC) - itself the result of the slowing growth rate of the mass of profit 
endemic to the process of capital accumulation - results in increasing capitalist 
instability. The essential condition for stable capitalist reproduction - namely, capital 
accumulation - is progressively undermined as the fundamental condition for the 
propensity to invest progressively disappears. As the MEC approaches zero, the perpetual 
shocks to profitability to which the capitalist system is subjected become increasingly 
disruptive. Recessions become deeper and longer. Finally, once the MEC achieves zero, 
capital accumulation can no longer continue. A deep crisis of overaccumulation or failed 
valorization sets in and a depression begins. 
463 Alfred North Whitehead, Modes of Thought (New York: The Free Press, 1966): 48. 
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In Chapter 2, I demonstrated how the above processes manifested themselves 
concretely in Canada between 1974 and 1990. I showed how capitalism in Canada was 
characterised by increasing instability in the period and how the MEC trending to zero 
underlay this historical movement. This downward sloping MEC was fundamentally the 
result of an increasing organic composition of capital. Finally, I demonstrated how once 
the mass of profit began to shrink in 1988, fundamental instability was the result. Further 
capital accumulation until 1990 was only possible on the basis of the proliferation of 
credit, which in turn ushered in inflation. In response, the central bank raised interest 
rates, thereby deflating the credit bubble that was sustaining capital accumulation. Next 
to the Great Depression of the thirties, the ensuing depression was Canada's deepest and 
longest ever. In these ways, I demonstrate howthe intense upset and social torment of the 
early 1990s was intimately bound up with the very process of capital accumulation itself. 
Furthermore, I have shown how the conditions for the recovery and the 
establishment of a new phase of capital accumulation from 1993 to 2008 lay in the crisis 
of the early 1990s itself. I examine how this profound interruption in the process of 
capital accumulation put intense downward pressure on the price of machinery and 
equipment. As a result of a tsunami of bankruptcies at that time, the price of doing 
business got cheaper and the conditions for the implementation of new forms of work 
organization became more favourable. As the MEC began to improve, owing to cheaper 
means of production and a substantial reduction in the wage bill, sustained capital 
accumulation got underway around 1993. The implementation of new forms of work 
organization like JIT and new technologies like ICT was made possible owing to the 
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increased vulnerability and therefore pliancy of labour in this recessionary environment. 
As a result, businesses were able to implement new and effective ways to pump out more 
labour-time from workers. The result was high rate of surplus-value. In addition to the 
increase in surplus-value extraction that new forms of work organization like JIT made 
possible, these same processes resulted in a significant reduction in the inventory-to-
shipment ratio. Hence, an important element of constant capital - namely buildings and 
structures responsible for housing stores of unsold inventories - was reduced 
significantly. Furthermore, the substantial cheapening of business computers, 
communication technologies as well as means of transportation - all essential 
components for JIT-ICT investment - reduced the constant capital component of the 
organic composition of capital. As a result, the organic composition of capital fell 
throughout the period. Finally, owing to JIT-ICT innovations, the turnover time of 
capital was significantly reduced throughout in these years. The result ·of all of these 
processes was a radical turnaround of the tendencies of decline. The rate and mass of 
profit began ·to grow as did the average MEC. A long phase ·of stable capital 
accumulation got underway around 1993. 
The same transformations that resulted in a growing rate and mass of profit as 
well as a relatively high and upward sloping MEC significantly influenced the character 
of the business cycle in this period. Not only was the downward phase of the business 
cycles, or growth cycles, short and shallow owing to a high and increasing average MEC, 
but the introduction of JIT-ICT helped to smooth out the inventory investment 
environment. As a result, the endogenous shocks to which the capitalist system was 
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subjected were reduced both in number and magnitude. The result was a reduction in the 
stimulus of excess demand, which is the spur for the inventory investment cycle, as we 
have already seen. At the same time, the availability of cheap money owing to the rise in 
the rate of profit and the decline in the demand for loanable funds meant that the other 
element of the inventory investment cycle responsible for limiting the upward phase of 
the cycle - namely, the debt burden - became increasingly less of a restraint. To be sure, 
shrinking interest rates throughout the period facilitated smoother growth. Firms were 
self-financing and deleveraging and the cost of borrowing was decreasing. The result of 
these . processes was a smoothing out - but not an elimination - of the inventory 
investment cycle. 
Moreover, I have demonstrated that the fifteen-year period of stability preceding 
the Great Recession of 2008-09 was also the principal reason for Canada's quick 
recovery from the recent economic downturn. Indeed, Canada was the first G 7 country to 
recover from the Great Recession and continues to lead in terms of real economic growth. 
In the penultimate chapter, I showed how the stability- of the Canadian economy was not 
a function of the stability of the banks in the recent period. Instead, the stability of the 
banks was shown to a function of the stability of the economy. I attempted to re-embed 
the banks in the long-run dynamics of capital accumulation in Canada and to demonstrate 
how bank assets, as well as deposits and profitability were stable before the recession 
broke out, owing to a high and growing MEC. Indeed, the banks did quite well despite 
the fact that they were highly leveraged and therefore structurally unstable. 
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Policy implications 
This brings us to the present and the policy implications for today of the foregoing 
analysis. First, it is well known that Canada has strong economic linkages with the United 
States. Indeed, the effects of the Great Recessionin this country were compounded by its 
strong trade and financial linkages to the U.S. through NAFTA. For instance, 
approximately 77.6% of Canada's exports went to the U.S. in 2008. For this reason, when 
the Great Recession erupted in the U.S., strong shockwaves were sent through the 
Canadian economy. Owing to the recession, exports to the U.S. fell by 28% (or $105 
billion) in just one year.464However, while the recession lasted 18 months in the U.S., it 
lasted only seven in Canada.465 Moreover, in terms of real GDP growth Canada was the 
first of the G7 countries to recover. It recouped numerically the jobs lost during the 
recession and gained several hundred thousand more, while employment in the U.S. 
remained below levels prevailing before the recession.466 As we saw in Chapter 5, despite 
its strong linkages to the U.S., Canada has fared better than the latter because it has a 
nationally integrated economy with rhythms of accumulation. of its own.467In the period 
preceding the global financial crisis, Canada was riding a long wave of economic 
stability. Indeed, we have seen that Canada and the U.S. have significantly different 
patterns of profitability. Thus, on the one hand, the recession in Canada was deep because 
of its unique relationship to the U.S. On the other, it was short because the rate and mass 
464DF AIT (2012a). "Merchandise Trade, Trade Investment and Economic Statistics." Ottawa. 
465 Gordon Isfeld, "Slow U.S. recovery hampering Canadian growth: BoC." Financial Post, Feb. 21, 2013. 
http ://business. financialpost. com/20 13 /02/21 I slow-u-s-recovery-hampering-canadian-growth-boc/ 
466Philippe Bergevin and Finn Poschmann, "Are we ready for that double dip?"Financial Post, (August 20, 
2011). 
467 Paul Kellogg, "Kari Levitt and the long detour of Canadian political economy," Studies in Political 
Economy 76 (Autumn 2005): 31-60. 
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of profit as well as the MEC were ascending when the crisis erupted. All of this to say 
that the processes of capital accumulation endogenous to Canada have been relatively 
stable over the course of the last twenty years. Therefore, even after the tremendous 
shock issued by the U.S. economy and despiteits tight trade relations with the latter, 
Canada continues to lead the pack of G 7 nations. 
This does not mean that Canada is out of the woods yet, figuratively 
speaking.Indeed, it appears that the challenges faced by Canada's capitalist class stem 
from instability in the international arena. In particular, Canada needs access to 
international markets for its exports. In this respect, it has lost significant ground since 
the outbreak of the crisis, especially because of its heavy reliance on U.S. markets. The 
Canadian state has been using the country's distinctive geography - spanning three 
oceans - to compensate for this fact. This geography has facilitated the development of 
unique economic linkages with other regions around the globe. In addition to the already-
existing trend of increasing exports to the Asia-Pacific region (bilateral trade with that 
region now exceeds bilateral trade with Europe), the Great Recession has undoubtedly 
encouraged and accelerated the formation of new patterns of trade between Canada and 
the world economy. Indeed, half of Canada's current free trade agreements were 
established in the few years following the outbreak of the Great Recession of 2008-
09. 468The continuing effort on the part of Ottawa towards this end is apparent, as Prime 
Minister Stephen Harper tours emerging markets in the hopes of establishing stronger 
468Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, "Negotiations and Agreements," 
http://wv.,1w.internationa1.gc.ca/trade-agreements-accords-commerciaux/agr-
acc/index.aspx?view=d.Accessed January 6, 2012. 
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trade relationships.469 The relative shift of exports to China, Brazil, India and elsewhere 
hints at how Canada is reconfiguring its international linkages. The Harper government 
aims to expand these linkages through arrangements like the Trans-Pacific Partnership 
and the Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement.470In tum, emerging patterns of 
international trade have already begun to leave indelible marks on Canada's diverse 
geographical regions and landscapes.471 Thus, Canada's relatively stable endogenous 
market processes do not preclude it from attempting to establish new economic linkages 
with external markets. Moreover, the immanently recurring tendency for the rate of profit 
to fall and the mass of profit to stagnate will manifest itself in the future. The precise 
timing of this development, however, is subject to a variety of factors beyond the scope 
of this dissertation. We can, however, from the foregoing analysis, draw certain 
theoretical-empirical as well as policy conclusions. 
Perhaps the most important lesson of the foregoing analysis is that the period of 
economic stability from 1993-2008 was only made possible by the crisis of 1990-92, the 
technological and org~sational restructuring that followed it and the social anguish that 
was its result. As I have shown above, the terms of recovery after a crisis are 
simultaneously challenges to labour, in terms of wage reductions, new forms of work 
organization and the implementation of new technologies.Solong as the profit motive is 
the guiding force of the economy, the crises and economic instability it generates can 
469 Mark MacKinnon. "Beyond the Pandas, Stephen Harper's China Visit Heavy on Trade, Light on Human 
Rights." The Globe and Mail, February 11, 2012. 
470Departrnent of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, "Merchandise Trade, Trade Investment and 
Economic Statistics" and "Minister Baird Concludes Trip to India." 
http://www.international.gc.ca/.Accessed January 6, 2012. 
471 Andrew Nikiforuk, Tar sands: dirty oil and the future of a continent (Vancouver: Greystone 
Books, 2008). 
260 
only be attenuated by ushering in social instability. Crises of overaccumulation are 
immanent to capitalism and can be overcome only at the expense of working people. 
Thus, the politics implied in this position points beyond capitalism. 
The second lesson is that we should not overstate the degree to which the 
Canadian economy is integrated with that of the U.S. The experience of the last 40 years 
has shown that these countries have had different patterns of profitability and capital 
accumulation. If anything, the experiences of the Great Canadian Slump of 1990-92 and 
the Great Recession of 2008-09 have brought to light the fact that Canadian capitalism is 
significantly independent from U.S. capitalism. This explains why Canada was the first 
of the G7 countries to recover from the recession, while the U.S.- its closest trading 
partner - was still in dire straits. That the long-run dynamics of capitalist development in 
Canada and the U.S. are significantly different calls into question both the idea that 
Canada is a "rich dependency" and the politics of nationalist reformism implied in this 
position.472Instead, it points to a revolutionary politics to emancipate humankind from the 
imperatives of capital accumulation. It also points to future avenues of research. In 
particular, it points to the need for an analysis of the combined and uneven patterns of 
capital accumulation in North America. For instance, it would be worthwhile to examine 
how Canada's endogenous and exogenous political-economic processes combined to 
shape the character of the Great Recession and subsequent economic developments in 
this country in recent years. 
472 For a critique of the idea of Canada as a "rich dependency," see Kellogg, "Kari Levitt and the long 
detour of Canadian political economy" and Jerome Klassen, "Canada and the new imperialism: The 
economics of a secondary power" in Studies in Political Economy 83 (Spring 2009): 163-190. For a 
critique of the politics implied in this position, see Murray Smith, "Political Economy and the Canadian 
Working Class: Marxism or Nationalist Reformism?" in Labour/Le Travail 46 (2000): 343-368. 
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Indeed, economic developments in this country do not occur in a vacuum. For 
example, despite the country's superior fiscal position internationally, Canada's statutory 
retrenchment is set to exceed the OECD average for the coming period.473 It is clear that 
the current government is taking advantage of the recessionary mood internationallyand 
relative economic stabilitynationally to re-balance the budget.' This is similar to what 
Paul Martin did in the mid-1990s. Indeed, in a recent interview with the Wall Street 
Journal, Prime Minister Harper was frank about his plans for austerity in the context of 
growth.474This has already begun to translate into cuts to public spending.Hence, 
developments in the political realm cannot merely be read offof developments in the 
national economic realm. To put it differently, political actions should not always be 
interpreted as responses to economic imperatives.Class struggle is on the agenda despite 
Canada's relatively strong economic performance. In Chapter 2, I showed how 
overaccumulation means capital accumulation cannot continue except by reducing wages 
or reducing the constant capital component of the organic composition of capital. This, 
we could say, is the ultimate limit to the struggle over output in capitalism: the ultimate 
economic imperative. In this sense, the crisis of capitalism limits wage growth. The 
upshot is that, in the current context, where capitalism in Canada has not reached the 
point of overaccumulation, should the political necessity arise, employers and the 
Canadian state have significant wiggle room to manoeuvre between the current political 
front of austerity and underlying economic imperatives rooted in the dynamics of capital 
473 Andrew Jackson, "Public sector austerity: Why is Canada leading the way?" The Progress Economics 
Forum, (August 2, 2011), http://www.progressive-economics.ca/201 l/08/03/public-sector-austerity-why-is-
canada-leading-the-way/ 
474 Stephen Harper, "Harper: Evidence Still Points to Growth in Canada." Wall Street Journal, (August 26, 
2011), http://online.wsj.com/article/SBl 0001424053111904875404576531031446794702.html 
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accumulation. For this reason, the massive student mobilizations in Quebec were 
successful in their defensive struggle against austerity. It is clear that the room for 
manoeuvre that the state and the capitalist class enjoy can act as a safety valve against the 
implicit revolutionary implications of mass mobilizations against austerity.475 
I would like to make one final point. This dissertation is a historical work in two 
senses. First, it recounts the dynamic historical processes that brought us to this point. 
Second, it strives to contribute to the making of history. For, as Thom Workman notes, 
"the pageant of humanity in the age of capitalism has been an illimitable web of misery. 
If we let the apologists define the present ... then we will have done a terrible disservice 
to working people everywhere."476 In this sense, I hope this dissertation serves as a tool 
in the forging of history insofar as it contributes to an explanation ofthe current 
conditions of struggle so working-class activists can invest that struggle with appropriate 
political forms as a necessary prelude to the struggle for political power. 
475 This is not to say that even in circumstances where the objective limits to reforms have been reached 
capital will not be able to make objectively unaffordable concessions with hopes ofrecouping them later, 
assuming the working class can be disorganized. What I am here describing is the overall terrain of struggle 
and the underlying dynamics that shape it. Conjunctural events can, of course, drammatically influence 
immediate results. 
476Thom Workman, If You're Jn My Way, I'm Walking: The Assault On Working People Since 1970 (Black 
Point: Fernwood Publishing, 2009): 1. 
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Appendix 
Constant capital: Business sector end-year gross capital stock.See "organic composition 
of capital" belowfor further discussion.Statistics Canada, CANSIM Series v1408305. 
Surplus-value: Corporation profits before taxes, government business enterprise profits 
before taxes, interest, dividends and miscellaneous payments. Also included are wages 
and salaries for non-production activities in trade, finance, insurance and real estate, 
commercial services, religious organizations, private households and public 
administration. Statistics Canada, CANSIM Tables 3800020, 3820001 and 3820006. 
·Variable capital: Before-tax wages and ·salaries of production workers in mining 
quarrying and oil wells, manufacturing, construction, education and related services, 
health and social services, transportation, storage, communication and other utilities, 
agriculture, fishing and trapping, logging and forestry and supplementary labour income. 
Note that I use a before-tax measure of variable capital, whereas Shaikh and Tonak use 
an after-tax measure. See Anwar Shaikh &Tonak, E. A. (1994) Measuring the Wealth of 
Nations: The Political Economy of National Accounts. New York: Cambridge 
University Press, pp. 187-8. This difference is unlikely to produce radically different 
results. Statistics Canada, CANSIM Tables 3820001 and 3820006. 
Organic composition of capital: End-year gross capital stock over wages and salaries of 
production workers and surplus-value. For an alternative measure of the organic 
composition of capital in the Canadian context, see Murray Smith & K. W. Taylor, 
"Profitability crisis and the erosion of popular prosperity: The Canadian economy, 194 7-
1991," Studies in Political Economy 49, (1996). The measure for the organic 
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composition of capital employed here departs from that of Smith and Taylor in two 
important ways. First, as is the convention, Smith and Taylor include end-year net 
capital stock in their measure of constant capital. Shaikh argues convincingly against this 
convention. He maintains that a measure of gross capital stock better enables us to assess 
the changing profitability of an asset over its lifetime. I adopt this measure. For a 
detailed treatment of this question, see Anwar Shaikh, "Explaining the Global Economic 
Crisis," Historical Materialism 5, (1999), 106-7. Second, in addition to end-year net 
capital stock, Smith and Taylor include in constant capital the wages and salaries of non-
production workers necessary for the reproduction of capitalism. They argue that these 
activities constitute socially necessary unproductive labour (SNUL ). Contrary to Smith 
and Taylor, Shaikh, Tonak and Moseley adopt the conventional approach when dealing 
with this problem; i.e. that SNUL is a non-profit deduction from surplus-value. It is 
beyond the scope of this dissertation to engage with these debates. For the purposes of 
this study, I treat wages and salaries of non-production workers as a non-profit 
component-of surplus-value .. 
Turnover time: Business sector end-year gross capital stock over business sector 
investment. This simple proxy measures the number of years it would take to turn over 
capital stock once. Statistics Canada, CANSIM Table 031-0002. 
Rate of accumulation: Rate of growth of the business sector end-year gross capital 
stock. Statistics Canada, CANSIM Table 031-0002. Let k equal capital stock and t equal 
time. We can write the rate of accumulation as a= (kt - kt_ 1 )/kt-l· 
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Rate of profit:Surplus-value at time t divided by end-year gross capital stock at time t-1. 
Lets equal surplus-value. Let k equal business sector end-year gross capital stock. Hence, 
the rate of profit can be written as r = stf kt-i · Elsewhere, the rate of profit is measured 
differently. For example, in Chapter 5, corporation profits before taxes are used in the 
measure for the rate of profit of enterprise. The particular measure employed depends 
upon the process to be illuminated. For further considerations on this question, see the 
introductory paragraphs to Chapter 2. 
Marginal efficiency of capital: Additional corporation profits before tax at time t over 
additions business sector end-year gross capital stock plus wages, salaries and 
supplementary labour incomet-1. Statistics Canada, CANS IM Tables 031-0002 and 3 80-
0016.477 Let P equal corporation profits before taxes, C equal end-year gross capital 
stock and W equal wages, salaries and supplementary labour income. The marginal 
efficiency of capital can be written as follows: 
477Statistics Canada.Canadian Socio-Economic Information Management System 
(CANSIM).http://www5.statcan.gc.ca/cansim/ 
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